HSR

THE REFUGEE SITUATION IN PHU-YEN PROVINCE, VIET-NAM

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July 1967

human sciences research inc

HSR

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FIELD RESEARCH MEMORANDA

FRM #1. Jerry M. Tinker, "Notes on the Refugee Situation in Dinh Tuong Province, Republic of Viet-Nam," May 1966. (HSR-FRM-66/1-Au) AD 808 061

FRM #2. John D. LeNoir, "Notes on the Refugee Situation in Darlac Province, Republic of Viet-Nam," June 1966. (HSR-TN-66/2-Aa) AD 808 062

FRM #3. John D. LeNoir, "Notes on the Interprovincial Resettlement of Refugees: Phu-Yen Province to Cam Ranh Bay Area, Republic of Viet-Nam," August 1966. (HSR-TN-66/6-Aa) AD 489 622

FRM #4. A. Terry Rambo, Jerry M. Tinker, John D. LeNoir, "Preliminary Report on the Refugee Problem in Phu-Yen Province, Viet-Nam," November 1966. (HSR-TN-66/7-Aa) AD 804 794

FRM #5. Robert L. Sansom, "Economic Aspects of the Refugee Problem in Viet-Nam," October 1966. (HSR-TN-66/8-Aa) AD 804 795

FRM #6. Jerry M. Tinker, "The Refugee Situation in Dinh Tuong Province" (forthcoming)

The above memoranda may be requested from

Defense Documentation Center
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Refugee Family Being Interviewed

The head of a refugee household responds to a question from one of the thirteen students who served as interviewers for the HSR study.

THE REFUGEE SITUATION IN PHU-YEN PROVINCE, VIET-NAM

July 1967
HSR-RR-67/9-Aa

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John D. LeNoir

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PREFACE

In the fall of 1965 it became apparent that the rapidly increasing number of refugees in the Republic of Viet-Nam would present a continuing problem in the conduct of the counterinsurgency effort. Consequently, the Advanced Research Projects Agency contracted with Human Sciences Research, Inc., to conduct a scientific field study to provide empirical data on the refugee situation.

This report presents an analysis and discussion of the refugee situation in Phu-Yen Province, based on data collected in the summer of 1966 as part of the Human Sciences Research Refugee Study Project in Phu-Yen Province, Viet-Nam. An abridged version of the report (HSR-RR-67/6-Aa), summarizing the principal findings, is also available.

The previously issued Field Research Memoranda series on selected aspects of the refugee problem in Viet-Nam will continue to be issued at irregular intervals. A listing of memoranda prepared to date appears on the inside back cover of this report.

Comments on this or other Refugee Study Project publications are invited and should be addressed to:

Director
Refugee Study Project
Human Sciences Research, Inc.
7710 Old Springhouse Road
McLean, Virginia 22101

U.S. Governmental agencies in Viet-Nam may communicate directly with:

Director
OSD/ARPA R&D Field Unit
APO San Francisco, California 96222

Vietnamese military and civilian agencies may channel communications through:

Commanding Officer
Combat Development Test Center, Viet-Nam
4a Ben Bach Dang
Saigon

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To acknowledge everyone, Vietnamese and American, who assisted in the completion of this study would be a lengthy task; the best we hope to achieve is to mention those individuals who made major contributions in the collection and analysis of the data presented in this report.

Foremost thanks must be expressed to Capt. La Van Truong of the Combat Development Test Center, Viet-Nam, the RVNAF counterpart agency to OSD/ARPA, Saigon. Capt. Truong participated in all phases of the project, assisting especially in arrangement of field operations. While unable to participate in the analysis of the data in Washington, he has continued to make contributions to the research effort from Saigon. Capt. Truong has been commended by Major General Charles J. Timmes, former Director of ARPA/AGILE, for outstanding service to the Refugee Study Project in Viet-Nam.

In Saigon, Col. Kemper Baker, USAF, formerly Director of the OSD/ARPA R&D Field Unit, and his successor, Col. John Patterson, USAF, have aided us in all respects. Lt. Col. Robert Nelson, USA, the Field Unit Project Monitor, contributed greatly during the initial phase of the project. To his successor, Maj. Robert Cottey, we wish to express our special thanks for his continuing efforts on behalf of the project.

Col. Bui Quang Trach, Commanding Officer of the Combat Development Test Center, Viet-Nam, provided considerable support to the field effort. Officials connected with USAID, particularly Mr. Edward Marks, formerly Refugee Coordinator, also aided in the execution of the study.

Dr. Gerald Hickey and Mr. Douglas Scott of the Rand Corporation were extremely generous with both their time and knowledge of refugee problems.

Special appreciation must be offered to those in Phu-Yen Province who provided the most essential and direct kind of support during field work there: specifically, Chief of Province Lt. Col. Nguyen Van Ba; MACV Senior Sector Advisor Lt. Col. Jay Hatch; and Mr. Campbell McClusky, formerly USAID Assistant Province Representative for Refugees.

At HSR, Dr. M. Dean Havron and Dr. Robert Teare assisted in analyzing the field data. Mr. Donald Link provided assistance with the data processing problems while Mrs. Carol LeNoir put much of the data into usable format. Mrs. Virginia Hunter edited the final manuscript and Mrs. Audrey Reniere has ably served as project secretary.

A.T.R.
J.M.T.
J.D.L.

Saigon
27 July 1967

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SUMMARY OF THE REPORT

I. Introduction

● The refugee movement has grown so rapidly that the Government of Viet-Nam has faced great difficulties in both aiding the refugees and assessing their potential as an asset or a liability in the current pacification effort. Much of the continuing difficulty is caused by a lack of information on the precise dimension and nature of the refugee movement.

● This study is an attempt to provide such information on the refugee situation in Phu-Yen Province. Its purpose was to discover who become refugees, why they want to relocate, and when and how they move; to examine some of the problems involved in relief and resettlement for the refugees, their host community, and their Government; and to propose and set forth some implications of the refugee situation for the pacification effort.

● The information presented in this report was developed through questionnaires administered to 1,193 refugee households; through interviews with U.S. and Vietnamese officials at district, province, and national levels; and through the personal observations of the authors.

II. Characteristics of the Refugee Population

● Of the Phu-Yen refugees studied, 96% are ethnic Vietnamese; the remainder are Rhade and Hroi tribespeople. Buddhists form 45%, ancestor worshippers 39%, Catholics 8%, Cao Dai 5%, and animists 3%. This roughly approximates the general population of the area, except that the Cao Dai are slightly overrepresented and the Catholics slightly underrepresented.

● Almost half of the refugees are children 14 and under; one-third are of productive age -- 15-49; one-sixth are older than 49. There are more children and old people than in the general rural Vietnamese population, and both males and females in the 15-35 age group are greatly underrepresented. In the 15-29 age group, there are only 69 males per 100 females, compared to 90 males to 100 females in the overall refugee population and 96 males to 100 females in the general population.

● The mean refugee household size is 5.2 persons, smaller than that of the nonrefugee population; one-fourth of the families reported separating from one or more members of their family at the time of moving. There are more small children per woman than in the nonrefugee population.

● Nearly 40% of the refugees are literate, and males have a higher literacy rate than females: in the 15-29 age group, 84% of the males and 53% of the females are literate.

● There are more nonproducers than in the nonrefugee population: each refugee of productive age (15-49) must support 2.7 other people, compared to a 1.3 ratio among nonrefugees. Only 4% of the total refugee sample were physically disabled, but this included one-fourth of those 60 and older.

● 80% of the refugees were formerly employed in food-producing industries; only 6% were employed in the service sector of the economy. Three-quarters of the households had access to farm land in their native villages and 65% owned the land they worked. Distribution of land was on a relatively broad and egalitarian basis -- the mean holding was 2.4 hectares and the mode 1.5.

III. Causes of Movement

● Refugees cite a complex of factors as contributing to their decisions to move, with most respondents citing two or more reasons. Various military activities were cited by 86% of the refugees, and 68% cite terroristic and coercive acts as reasons for moving. Bombing and artillery specifically were cited by only 32% of the refugees, and only 6% indicated that they were physically forced to move during military operations.

● The Viet-Cong are the causal agent most frequently associated with refugee movement -- cited by 84% of the refugees -- while Allied Forces are cited by 67% of the respondents (refugees could cite more than one agent).

● Almost 17% of the refugees were GVN civilian or military cadre or their families who fled because of threats of Viet-Cong reprisals.

● One-third of the refugees reported being encouraged to leave their villages, principally by Allied military forces and friends and relatives.

● 15% of refugees reported Viet-Cong efforts to discourage them from moving.

● When asked why their neighbors became refugees, nonrefugees gave reasons coinciding with those actually cited by the refugees themselves.

IV. Characteristics and Dynamics of Movement

● Refugee movement in Phu-Yen has been almost wholly intraprovincial and primarily intradistrict; the small amount of interdistrict movement was largely toward the provincial capital of Tuy-Hoa. As this suggests, the median distance traveled by Phu-Yen refugees from their homes to their relocation area is short: the mean distance was only 13 km (7.8 miles), and three-fourths of the refugees traveled 18 km or less.

● Duration of travel was also short: over half (56%) reached their new settlement site within 9 hours, and most of the rest arrived within one day. An overwhelming majority (95%) traveled wholly during the daytime, differing from refugees in Dinh Tuong Province, 15% of whom moved after dark.

● The principal means of travel was walking, cited by 63%; 13% used lambretta scooters or other motorized transport and 7% used small boats.

● The majority of refugees -- 51.2% -- moved only with their immediate family members, and 44% indicate that their family traveled with other hamlet neighbors; only 2% moved alone. This indicates at least some carryover of pre-migration social structure into the resettlement areas.

● The type and number of refugees appear to vary according to the stage of the insurgency, which in Phu-Yen passed through five fairly distinct phases. If the pattern of insurgent-counterinsurgent activity which occurred in Phu-Yen proves applicable elsewhere, the number and kind of refugees can be generally foreseen. The factors operating in each phase singly would appear to operate even where the sequence of events varies.

V. Relief and Resettlement Characteristics

● Over one-third of the refugees said they have received no government aid. The remainder report receiving varying amounts of assistance, principally foodstuffs and money. Most of these receiving aid have been in settlement areas for over six months.

● Most refugees have resettled in existing hamlets around the six major provincial towns; only 14% have been relocated in government sponsored resettlement camps.

● Hamlets around the province capital have experienced a mean increase in population of nearly 50% with three reporting increases over 100% due to refugee immigration. The refugee influx has resulted in inflation, increased unemployment, and the overburdening of community facilities.

● Only 14% of the refugee children are enrolled in schools.

● Relocation has caused marked changes in the occupation of refugee heads of household. Most shifted from agricultural occupations to general labor.

● Approximately 33% of the refugee heads of household are unemployed.

● The average daily income of refugees is less than 99 piastres per day.

● Some refugees who were in the lower income brackets before migration are now earning more money, while those who were previously in the higher income brackets have suffered considerable losses in income. These changes in income suggest that there may be incentive for some refugees to stay in settlement areas rather than return to their native hamlets.

● When refugees were asked where they would like to reside in contrast to where they expected to reside in the future, a large majority (92%) said they expected to remain in refugee settlements, but would like (63%) to return to their native hamlet.

VI. Implications of the Refugee Movement for the Pacification Effort in Phu-Yen

● Refugee movement represents a major liability to the insurgents in Phu-Yen. It has directly attacked their basis of power in the rural areas without offering the Viet-Cong new exploitable opportunities of sufficient value to balance this loss of control of the population. In turn, refugee migration has presented the government with a major "negative" gain: by reducing the strength of the guerrillas -- by simply denying them a resource -- refugee movement has, in effect, bettered the GVN position in Phu-Yen.

● Refugee movement could, however, present the GVN with a "positive" asset. Yet, it is precisely here that the balance sheet suffers: the counterinsurgents have generally failed to take advantage of the latent opportunities inherent in the refugee problem. In Saigon, the slogan is that "refugees are an obligation and an opportunity," but in Phu-Yen the refugees are generally seen only in terms of the considerable burden they represent to the provincial government, while their potential as a pacification resource is ignored. Thus the province has suffered a double loss: it has had to divert resources to meet the problems presented by the refugees, and it has failed to exploit a potential human resource offered it.

● In sum, refugee movement has been more harmful to the Viet-Cong than to the GVN position in Phu-Yen. But refugees have not represented an unalloyed gain to the Allies; rather, they have placed heavy new burdens on a provincial administration unprepared to exploit the opportunities offered by the refugee movement. Thus refugees are a liability for the Viet-Cong, but they are not yet a positive asset for the government.

SƠ LƯỢC PHÚC TRÌNH

I. Nhập đề

● Phong trào tỵ nạn lên cao nhanh đến nỗi Chính Phủ VNCH đã phải đối phó với nhiều khó khăn về cả hai phương diện cứu trợ và nhận định về giá trị của phong trào như là một lợi khí hay một bất lợi trong nỗ lực bình định hiện nay. Phần lớn của sự khó khăn liên tục nầy là do sự thiếu sót tin tức chính xác về kích thước và bản chất của phong trào tỵ nạn.

● Cuộc nghiên cứu nầy nhằm cung ứng loại tin tức nói trên về tình hình dân tỵ nạn tại tỉnh Phú Yên. Mục đích là khám phá xem những người trở thành dân tỵ nạn là ai, tại sao họ rời bỏ làng mạc và lúc nào và bằng cách nào họ đã ra đi; cứu xét một vài vấn đề liên quan đến sự cứu trợ và định cư, về sự tiếp nhận của cộng đồng và chính quyền địa phương dân tỵ nạn di chuyển đến; và đề nghị cũng đưa ra một vài quan hệ ảnh hưởng của tình hình tỵ nạn đối với nỗ lực bình định.

● Tin tức trình bày trong bản phúc trình nầy là kết quả khai thác từ các bản phỏng vấn đã thực hiện với 1.193 gia đình dân tỵ nạn; những cuộc phỏng vấn các viên chức Hoa-Kỳ và VietNam từ cấp quận, tỉnh lên đến trung ương và sau hết là sự quan sát của chính các tác giả.

II. Những Đặc Tính của Dân Tỵ Nạn

● Trong số dân tỵ nạn được nghiên cứu tại Phú Yên gồm các thành phần: người Kinh (Việt) 96%, phần còn lại là người Thượng Rhade và Hroi. Theo đạo Phật 45%, thờ tổ tiên 39%, theo đạo Thiên Chúa 8%, đạo Cao Đài 5% và đa thần 3%. Những số bách phân nầy cho thấy thành phần tỷ lệ gần sát của dân tỵ nạn ngoại trừ số tỷ lệ những người theo đạo Cao Đài được thấy hơi cao và những người theo đạo Thiên Chúa hơi thấp.

● Gần một nửa dân số tỵ nạn là trẻ con từ 14 tuổi trở xuống; một phần ba nằm trong lứa tuổi sản xuất được: 15 đến 49 tuổi; một phần sáu là những người trên 49 tuổi. So với thành phần tổng quát của dân quê VietNam, ở đây ta thấy số trẻ con và người già cả khá cao và tỷ số đàn ông và đàn bà trong khoảng tuổi từ 15-35 lại quá thấp. Ở nhóm người tuổi từ 15-29, tỷ lệ đàn ông và đàn bà là: 69 đàn ông trong mỗi 100 đàn bà, so với tỷ lệ 90 đàn ông/100 đàn bà trong toàn khối dân chúng tỵ nạn và 96 đàn ông/100 đàn bà trong khối toàn thể dân số.

● Trung bình một gia đình tỵ nạn là 5.2 người, số người ít hơn trong một gia đình không tỵ nạn; một phần tư các gia đình tỵ nạn cho biết trong lúc di chuyển đã có ít nhất là một người hay nhiều hơn nữa tách rời khỏi gia đình. Trong nhóm người tỵ nạn, mỗi người đàn bà cũng có nhiều con nhỏ hơn so với người đàn bà trong số dân không tỵ nạn.

● Gần 40% dân tỵ nạn biết chữ, và số đàn ông biết chữ cao hơn đàn bà: trong cỡ tuổi 15-19 có 84% đàn ông và 53% đàn bà biết chữ.

● Trong số dân không tỵ nạn lại có nhiều người không sản xuất hơn: mỗi người dân tỵ nạn ở trong tuổi sản xuất (15-49) phải cấp dưỡng 2.7 người khác so với tỷ lệ 1.3 trong số những người không tỵ nạn. Chỉ có khoảng 4% dân tỵ nạn trong số đã được phỏng vấn là yếu kém thể chất nhưng một phần tư số người này lại là những người già từ 60 tuổi trở lên.

● 80% dân tỵ nạn trước đây là những người làm công việc sản xuất thực phẩm, chỉ có 6% làm việc trong các ngành kinh tế dịch vụ. Ba phần tư các gia đình tỵ nạn làm nghề nông tại làng cũ và 65% những người này là sở hữu chủ đất của họ cày. Sự phân phối đất đai tương đối rộng rãi và công bình: sở hữu sản trung bình là 2.4 mẫu và con số thường thấy là 1.5 mẫu.

III. Những Nguyên Do Di Chuyển

● Những nguyên do khiến dân tỵ nạn quyết định ra đi khá phức-tạp, hầu hết các đáp viên đã kể ra từ 2 hay nhiều lý do đã thúc đẩy họ ra đi. Những hoạt động quân sự đã được 86% dân tỵ nạn nêu ra và 68% kể rằng những hành động khủng bố và áp bức đã là lý do của sự ra đi. Đặc biệt những cuộc pháo kích và dội bom chỉ có 32% dân tỵ nạn đã kể là lý do ra đi của họ, và chỉ có khoảng 6% tiết lộ rằng họ đã bị bắt buộc ra đi trong lúc có những cuộc hành quân.

● Việt-Cộng được thấy là nguyên nhân thường xuyên liên quan đến sự di chuyển của dân tỵ nạn -- 84% dân tỵ nạn đã nêu lý do này -- trong khi các lực lượng Đồng Minh chỉ có 67% dân tỵ nạn nhắc tới (dân tỵ nạn có thể nêu ra nhiều lý do một lần).

● Hầu như 17% dân tỵ nạn là viên chức Chính Phủ hay cán bộ quân sự hoặc gia đình đã phải ra đi để tránh những đe dọa trả thù của Việt-Cộng.

● Một phần ba số dân tỵ nạn cho biết đã được các lực lượng quân sự Đồng Minh, bạn bè và họ hàng khuyến khích rồi bỏ xóm làng ra đi.

● 15% đã kể ra những trường hợp Việt-Cộng nỗ lực ngăn cản họ ra đi.

● Khi được hỏi về lý do khiến những người láng giềng của họ trở thành dân tỵ nạn, những người không tỵ nạn cũng đã đưa ra những ý kiến trùng hợp với những điều chính dân tỵ nạn đã nại ra.

IV. Những Đặc Tính và Cơ Động của Cuộc Di Chuyển

● Sự di chuyển của dân tỵ nạn trong tỉnh Phú Yên hầu hết là có tính cách liên tỉnh và trước nhất là liên quận; một phần nhỏ các cuộc di chuyển có tính cách liên quận là những cuộc di chuyển hướng về tỉnh lỵ Tuy Hoà. Do đó khoảng cách mà dân tỵ nạn tại đây phải di chuyển từ nhà đến nơi định cư tương đối ngắn: trung bình vào khoảng 13 cây số (7.8 dặm) và ba phần tư dân số tỵ nạn đã di chuyển khoảng 18 cây số hay ít hơn.

● Thời gian di chuyển cũng ngắn: quá nửa (56%) dân tỵ nạn đã tới cho định cư trong khoảng 9 tiếng đồng hồ và đa số còn lại đã đến nơi định cư trong khoảng một ngày. Một đa số lớn lao (95%) đa di chuyển hoàn toàn ban ngày khác với dân tỵ nạn tại tỉnh Định Tường, chỉ có 15% đã di chuyển ban đêm.

● Phần lớn đã đi bộ, 63%; 13% đã xử dụng xe Lambretta ba bánh hay một phương tiện di chuyển có động cơ khác và 7% đã dùng thuyền nhỏ.

● Đa số dân tỵ nạn -- 51.2% -- di chuyển cùng với gia đình và 44% cho biết cùng ra đi với những người cùng ấp; chỉ có 2% ra đi một mình. Điều này cho thấy ít nhất đã có sự chuyển vận một phần nào cái cơ cấu tổ chức làng xóm tại nơi ở cũ đến nơi định cư.

● Loại và dân số tỵ nạn dường như biến đổi tuỳ theo các giai đoạn của phong trào phiến loạn mà tại Phú Yên ta có thể nhận thấy qua 5 giai đoạn khá phân biệt. Nếu các khuôn mẫu hoạt động phiến loạn và chống phiến loạn đã diễn ra tại Phú Yên có thể ứng dụng tại các nơi khác thì số lượng và loại dân tỵ nạn, nói một cách tổng quát, có thể dự đoán trước được. Những yếu tố vận động trong mỗi giai đoạn riêng rẽ dường như vẫn giữ vai trò của nó dù cho diễn tiến của các biến cố có thay đổi thứ tự.

V. Những Đặc Tính Của Công Cuộc Cứu Trợ và Định Cư

● Trên một phần ba dân số tỵ nạn kể rằng họ không nhận cứu trợ nào của chính quyền. Số còn lại cho biết có nhận một số trợ giúp khác nhau, phần chính là thực phẩm và tiền bạc. Đa số những người nhận được trợ giúp đã ở trong khu vực định cư trên sáu tháng.

● Phần lớn dân tỵ nạn đã định cư tại các ấp hiện hữu nằm quanh sáu thị trấn quan trọng của tỉnh; chỉ có 14% đã được định cư trong các trại định cư do chính quyền bảo trợ.

● Dân số tại các ấp chung quanh tỉnh lỵ đã gia tăng trung bình vào khoảng 50%, trong số có 3 ấp báo cáo dân số gia tăng trên 100% do sự xâm nhập của dân tỵ nạn. Trào lưu dân tỵ nạn này đã đưa đến hậu quả lạm phát, nạn thất nghiệp gia tăng, và là cả một gánh nặng cho các cơ sở cộng đồng địa phương.

● Chỉ có 14% trẻ con tỵ nạn được đi học.

● Sự thay đổi nơi cư trú nầy cũng gây ra sự thay đổi trầm trọng trong nghề nghiệp của các gia trưởng tỵ nạn. Đa số đang từ nghề nông biến thành lao công.

● Gần 33% các gia trưởng tỵ nạn không có việc làm.

● Lợi tức trung bình hàng ngày của dân tỵ nạn chưa được 99 đồng.

● Một vài người trước đây có lợi tức thấp kém nay kiếm được nhiều tiền hơn trong khi những người trước đây có lợi tức cao nay lại phải chịu những thua thiệt lớn lao về lợi tức. Sự thay đổi về mức lợi tức nầy có thể là nguồn gốc khuyến khích một số dân tỵ nạn ở lại trong các trại định cư hơn là trở về làng cũ.

● Khi được hỏi về nơi nào là chỗ họ mong muốn được cư trú đối lại với nơi nào là chỗ họ định sẽ ở trong tương lai, đa số (92%) nói rằng họ định ở lại trong các trại định cư, nhưng mong muốn (63%) được trở về làng xưa.

VI. Những Liên Quan Của Phong Trào Dân Tỵ Nạn Với Nỗ Lực Bình Định Tại Phú Yên

● Phong trào tỵ nạn tại Phú Yên tiêu biểu một bất lợi quan trọng cho quân phiến loạn. Nó trực tiếp nguy hại đến nền tảng quyền hành của Việt-Cọng tại vùng nông thôn mà không cung hiến một cơ hội nào khả dĩ khai thác được để bù đắp lại sự mất mát quyền kiểm soát khối dân chúng này. Ngược lại, sự di chuyển của dân tỵ nạn đã đem lại cho Chính Phủ VNCH một thành quả "tiêu cực" quan trọng: làm suy giảm lực lượng du kích bằng cách gián dị là cắt giảm nguồn tài nguyên cung cấp -- phong trào dân tỵ nạn do đó đã củng cố vị trí của Chính Quyền VNCH tại Phú Yên.

● Tuy nhiên, phong trào tỵ nạn có thể là một lợi khí "tích cực" của Chính Quyền VNCH. Nhưng ở đây khí thế này chưa được thể hiện: các nỗ lực chống phiến loạn nói chung chưa khai thác được những thuận lợi tiềm ẩn nội tại của vấn đề dân tỵ nạn. Tại Saigon, khẩu hiệu công tác là "Giúp đỡ dân tỵ nạn là một trách vụ và cũng là một cơ hội," nhưng tại Phú Yên dân tỵ nạn được coi như là một gánh nặng đáng ngại cho chính quyền tỉnh trong khi tiềm năng có thể khai thác như một tài nguyên phục vụ công cuộc bình định lại bị bỏ rơi. Vì vậy, tỉnh này đã phải gánh chịu một thiệt thòi gấp đôi: một mặt phải chuyển dụng một số tài nguyên để đối phó với những vấn đề dân tỵ nạn đặt ra và mặt khác đã không khai thác được tiềm năng nhân lực mà khối người này đưa lại.

● Tóm lại, phong trào tỵ nạn tại Phú Yên đã gây ra nguy hại cho Việt-Cộng hơn là cho Chính Quyền VNCH. Nhưng dân tỵ nạn cũng không phải một thành công đơn thuần của lực lượng Đồng Minh; hơn nữa, dân tỵ nạn thực ra đã đặt một gánh nặng mới lên vai trò của chính quyền tỉnh, một chính quyền không được sửa soạn để khai thác những cơ hội thuận lợi mà phong trào tỵ nạn mang lại. Do đó dân tỵ nạn chính là một bất lợi của Việt-Cộng nhưng cũng chưa thật là lợi khí tích cực của Chính Quyền VNCH.

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

Background of the Problem

This study was undertaken in the context of an increased concern with and need for detailed information on the refugee situation in Viet-Nam. Refugee movement related to the current conflict began relatively early, initially involving only small groups of people in isolated areas. A generalized movement into urban areas is reported as early as 1958,[1] perhaps reflecting a normal rural-urban demographic shift as much as a "refugee" movement. One early sign of conflict-related refugeeism is reported for the delta province of Long-An, where in 1960 village officials and a few large landlords had taken refuge from the Viet-Cong in the provincial capital.[2] In the Central Highlands in July 1962, some 10,000 Montagnards reportedly fled from Viet-Cong control to Government of Viet-Nam (GVN) resettlement centers in the Dalat region,[3] and one source states that "150,000 mountain tribesmen out of a total of about 700,000 sought refuge in government-controlled areas during 1962."[4]

It was not until 1964-65, however, that refugee movement reached major proportions. The 1964 spring floods had displaced thousands of families in the central coastal regions; before this initial group of refugees could be resettled, it was vastly augmented by the major rural civilian population displacement, which began to occur simultaneously with the 1965 Viet-Cong military effort in Central Viet-Nam and the large-scale introduction of Allied forces to checkmate the so-called "summer offensive."

The first official estimates of the refugee population were compiled and released in May 1965 by the Ministry of Social Welfare in Saigon, indicating that over 300,000 people had become what were labeled "refugees from communism." (The term "refugee" is a misnomer, as by international agreement refugee refers to persons crossing national boundaries. A more accurate term would be "dislocated or displaced persons," but "refugee" has been used so extensively by the U. S. Government and the press that it is adopted here.) The following month the Ministry reported an additional 250,000 refugees, bringing the total in July 1965

to slightly less than 600,000 (see Map 1).[5] By November 1965 the total refugee population reported by the GVN was nearly 750,000, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reported that the Vietnamese Government underestimated the actual refugee populations in the provinces.[6] Toward the end of the year it was anticipated that the total would exceed one million by January 1966.

The development of a refugee problem of this magnitude apparently had not been anticipated, and GVN officials, particularly at the province level, were undecided as to whether the refugees presented the government with a liability or an opportunity.

Thus an ambiguity of policy developed toward aiding the refugees, stemming in part from the considerable fear that if the refugees were offered too much assistance, they might never return to their villages and would remain a permanent drain on government resources. Moreover, some Vietnamese officials and Military Assistance Command-Viet-Nam (MACV) officers were concerned that the refugee movement was inspired by the Viet-Cong as part of a strategic "plot" to force the rural population to flood government secured areas, thus overburdening GVN administrative and logistic systems and infiltrating subversive agents.

In some areas the refugees also disturbed the local political balance, such as in Binh-Dinh Province, where latent politico-religious frictions were exacerbated by segregation of refugees into Catholic and Buddhist camps under the control of their respective religious leaders. As these refugees could provide ready-made mobs for denominational political activity, the reaction of provincial authorities was actively to resist aiding them, hoping that they would be forced to return home, thus reducing political tensions.

These and other fears were frequently held by province-level officials who, in the final analysis, had direct responsibility for administering refugee relief programs. During most of 1965, then, refugees received assistance largely according to how each province chief viewed them.

MAP 1.

Refugee Population Density

(as of August 1966)



Source: Special Commission for Refugees, Saigon

In the wake of press reports and growing U. S. Mission concern--evidenced during the hearings conducted in the summer of 1965 by the U. S. Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees[7]--decisions were made both in Washington and Saigon to pay increased attention to refugees. USAID established a special Office of Refugee Coordination (ORC) to supervise and coordinate an increased American effort in refugee assistance.[8] A Washington-based Viet-Nam Refugee Relief Coordinator was appointed and Dr. Howard Rusk, Director of New York University's Institute of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, was sent to Viet-Nam to assess the role U. S. private charitable groups might play in refugee assistance. The Government of Viet-Nam issued a number of directives to provincial authorities that authorized increased expenditures for refugee relief, and the Ministries of Social Welfare and Rural Construction were allocated additional funds for temporary relief payments and resettlement allowances to refugees.

Despite this increased relief effort, there was still considerable uncertainty as to the precise dimension and nature of the refugee problem. Other than the tentative statistics compiled by the Ministry of Social Welfare, no assessment was available to government planners as to the numbers, social characteristics, locations, needs, and motivations of the refugees. USAID's new Office of Refugee Coordination deployed American representatives for refugees in key provinces and began to gather the first general report on refugees. In its first quarterly Refugee Status Report in December 1965, ORC observed that further attention was required in order to develop

> ...more complete information about the refugees including why they became refugees, more reliable statistical data for planning purposes, and information concerning refugee attitudes including their desires and expectations for the future, and a clearer definition of the term "refugee"--who qualifies as a refugee.[9]

Similarly, at this time, elements in the Department of Defense and MACV expressed interest in determining what benefits the refugee movement might offer to the Allied war effort, both in terms of direct resource gains to the GVN--e.g., increased manpower pool for the Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam (ARVN) recruitment--and indirect or longer range impact on the rural pacification effort. Against this background the present study was begun.

Refugees represent a national problem with certain common characteristics. Although this report will be viewed in the context of the Vietnamese refugee problem as a whole, numerous regional or provincial variations weigh against drawing generalizations from these data, which were derived from a single province: Phu-Yen.

Objectives of Research

The objectives of this research were to discover which people become refugees, why they want to relocate, and when and how they move; to examine some of the problems involved in refugee relief and resettlement for the refugees, their host community, and the Government of South Viet-Nam; and to propose and set forth some implications of the refugee situation for the pacification effort.

Methodology

The information presented in this report was developed through the use of questionnaires administered by Vietnamese trained in their use to a sample of 1,193 refugee households in Phu-Yen Province, where 17% of the population are refugees; through interviews with U. S. and Vietnamese officials at district, province, and national levels; and through the personal observations of the authors. (Further discussion of methodology is treated in Appendix C.)

Organization of the Report

Information derived from the field investigation is organized according to its relevance to research objectives, as follows:

Who are the refugees?--Chapter II, Characteristics of the Refugee Population, reports the demographic characteristics of the refugee population--age, sex, religion, literacy, and so on.

Why do they become refugees?--Chapter III, Causes of Movement, examines the factors and agents contributing to the decision to move, assesses the extent of

forced movement, and compares the motivation of Phu-Yen refugees to refugees from another province and to a nonrefugee population.

When and how do they move?--Chapter IV, Characteristics and Dynamics of Movement, describes the time, distance and rate of refugee movement and hypothesizes the relationship of refugee movement to phase of insurgency.

What was the impact of movement on the refugees, their host community, and their government?--Chapter V, Relief and Resettlement, outlines the development of government policies and the impact of the refugee movement on the refugees, their host community, and the government.

What are the implications of the refugee movement for the pacification effort?--Chapter VI, Implications for Pacification, discusses, in the light of data developed in this study, 18 propositions derived from current official opinions on the pros and cons of the refugee movement.

Appendix A, Reference Tables, provides additional statistical backgroun and information. Appendix B presents a description of Phu-Yen Province at the time the research took place. Appendix C, Survey Method, provides a discussion of the methodology and samples of the questionnaires used. The GVN's "Return to the Village" campaign plan is presented as Appendix D.

Footnotes

[1]Bernard Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 361.

[2]Gerald Hickey, Village in Viet-Nam (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 11.

[3]"10,000 Tribesmen Flee Viet-Cong" (Saigon: The Times of Viet-Nam, July 23, 1962).

[4] Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., p. 366. See also Jerry Rose, "I'm Hit! I'm Hit! I'm Hit!" (Saturday Evening Post, March 23, 1963), 11. 35-46.

[5] These figures, upon which Figure 1 and Map 1 are also based, were compiled by the GVN Ministry of Social Welfare; they are limited by unsystematic collection and by the irregularities in defining "refugee."

[6] Cited in U. S Senate, Hearings of the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees. Refugee Problems in South Viet-Nam (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 12.

[7] U. S. Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, Refugee Problem in South Viet-Nam and Laos (Washington, D C.: Government Printing Office, Sept. 1965.)

[8] In late 1966 ORC was transferred from USAID/Saigon to the newly-formed OCO (Office of Civil Operations); in 1967 it was again reorganized under CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support).

[9] U. S. Agency for International Development, Office of Refugee Coordination, Viet-Nam Refugee Status Report (Saigon: USAID, December 31, 1965, Mimeographed), p. 15. Limited Official Use.

CHAPTER II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REFUGEE POPULATION

Introduction

Not surprisingly, reliable data on the demographic, social, and economic characteristics of the Vietnamese refugee population are in short supply. In Phu-Yen, for example, interviews revealed that even statistics as to the overall size of the refugee population vary considerably between officials and agencies: USAID reported 60,505 persons, the GVN Ministry of Social Welfare representative counted 71,200, and the MACV Sector Advisor estimated 78,000. Further, there were no figures available whatsoever regarding such important characteristics of the population as age and sex distribution, occupational skill, and so on.

Questions as to whether the refugee movement is a deliberate program of the Viet-Cong to "evacuate" women and children from their areas of control or whether, to the contrary, the flight of refugees from Viet-Cong areas represents serious losses of laborers and potential conscripts can only be answered when the population has been described. The need for such data is all the more important if the government is to use the refugees as a pacification resource or to design effective programs of assistance, military or civilian labor recruitment, or vocational training. Experience in Phu-Yen provides an excellent example of the kinds of administrative difficulties that can result from lack of such demographic data: while one U. S. government agency was planning to transport hundreds of refugees to another province to relieve unemployment in the Tuy-Hoa area of Phu-Yen, another agency was planning at the same time large-scale importations of third-country nationals to alleviate a supposed labor "shortage" in the province.

This chapter presents basic social, demographic, and economic data on the Phu-Yen refugees. Persons using this information for planning purposes must keep in mind that there is great regional variation in Viet-Nam, and other refugee groups in other areas of the country may well display considerably different demographic configurations from those reported here. Further, refugee populations appear to be quite mobile, and there may have been considerable change in the characteristics of the Phu-Yen refugee population since the time this research was carried out.

Social and Demographic Characteristics

Ethnic Groups

The vast majority--96%--of the refugees in Phu-Yen are ethnic Vietnamese; the remaining 4% belong to the Hroi (3%) and Rhade (1%) Montagnard tribes. The Montagnard refugees are found in only two districts: Son Hoa, where they comprise a little over 20% of the refugee population, and Dong Xuan, where they represent just under 6% of the population. Montagnards compose roughly the same percentage of the total Phu-Yen refugee population as they do of the overall population of the Province. However, it is possible that additional tribesmen from Phu Duc District have taken refuge in neighboring Phu-Bon Province. The ethnic breakdown among refugees reflects the general ethnic composition of the Province.

Religion

The bulk of the refugee population is about evenly divided between Buddhists (45%) and ancestor worshippers (39%), with Catholics (8%), Cao-Daists (5%), and animists (3%) having lesser representation.

Cao-Daists appear to be overrepresented, comprising 5% of the refugee population but only 2.5% in the general population of the region.

Roman Catholics appear to be somewhat underrepresented among the refugees, comprising only 8% of that population compared to the estimated Catholic affiliation of 13% of the overall area population and 10.5% of the national population.[1]

Literacy

38.5% of the total refugee population and 55% of the heads of households consider themselves literate. Sex and age are important variables in determining literacy: 47% of all males are literate, as opposed to 30.9% of all females. Persons in the 15-29 age bracket have a rate of 65.4%, with males in this category reported as having 84.2% literacy and females a rate of 52.5%.

The female literacy rate is consistently lower than that of males, but the differential is most accentuated for ages 40 and older. This is predictable in view of the lack of emphasis on education for women in rural Viet-Nam prior to World War II. (See Figure 1.)

Two additional variables relating to the literacy of the refugees are religious and ethnic group affiliation. Catholic refugees report a significantly higher literacy rate than the norm for all religions (see Table 1). Montagnard refugee heads-of-household report a literacy rate of 18% compared to a rate of 57% for ethnic Vietnamese (see Table 2). The numbers of Catholics and tribal people included in the refugee population are not large enough to shift the overall literacy rate to any significant extent.

Table 1. Literacy Rate by
Religious Group (Refugee Heads of Households)

	Buddhists	Ancestor Worshippers	Roman Catholics	Cao-Daists	Animists	All Religions
Literate	54%	56%	65%	60%	23%	55%
Illiterate	46%	44%	35%	40%	77%	45%

Table 2. Literacy Rate by
Ethnic Group (Refugee Heads of Households)

	Vietnamese	Montagnards	All Refugees
Literate	57%	18%	55%
Illiterate	43%	82%	45%

The relatively high literacy rate reported by the refugee population is contrary to the stereotype of populations of underdeveloped Asian countries being predominantly illiterate. Since no objective test of literacy was given to the refugees, it is possible that the number of literate persons is somewhat exaggerated.

Figure 1. Comparative Literacy Rates of Male and Female Refugees

(By 5-Year Age Group)
(n = 6160)



Totals:	% Literate	% Illiterate
Males	47	53
Females	30.9	69.1

However, the validity of this data is supported both by the frequency distribution across age groups in the sample (presumably older persons would be as likely to provide biased responses as younger refugees, yet there is a marked difference in the extent that literacy is reported) and by evidence collected for another rural population by an independent investigation. A 1958 survey of an adult rural population by the Fundamental Education Center reported literacy rates somewhat higher than those of the Phu-Yen refugee report (see Table 3)[2].

The high extent of literacy reported for the refugees has important implications both for Allied psychological operations in support of the pacification effort and for economic assimilation and utilization of the refugee population. Certainly, as Hendry notes for Khanh Hau, in a population possessing even rudimentary reading skills "the learning process can continue and new ideas can be introduced through printed materials which the people can use."[3] (See also Appendix A, Item 1.)

Table 3. Comparative Adult Literacy Rates: Phu-Yen Refugees and a N[illegible] efugee Rural Population[4]

Age	% Males		% Females		% Both Sexes	
	Refugees	Nonrefugees	Refugees	Nonrefugees	Refugee	Nonrefugees
15 - 44	84.7	93.9	55.6	71.3	67.1	81.4
45 and older	59.1	70.0	10.2	18.6	34.1	42.7
Total	74.1	86.3	41.0	55.6	55.1	69.5

Age and Sex

Figure 2 presents in standard pyramid form the age and sex distribution of the refugee population. Two characteristics are notable: (1) the high number of males ages 0-14, compared to a "normal" sex balance, and (2) the underrepresentation of persons of both sexes ages 15-34.

A normal ratio for the 0-14 age group is 101 males per 100 females; Thailand has a ratio of 102, Cambodia, 103, and Malaya, 104.[5] This contrasts with the refugee population, which has 109 boys to 100 girls, and with the only

available data on nonrefugee Vietnamese, that reported for 1958 by Hendry as 111 to 100 in Khanh Hau.[6] The causal factors which produced this demographic phenomenon in the Vietnamese population have not been determined.

Several factors contribute to the underrepresentation of young adults: (1) the non-conflict-related migration of rural young people to urban areas, characteristic of most developing countries; (2) military recruitment and conscription, both VC and GVN; (3) war losses; and (4) evasion of conscription. The factor which appears dominant in the Phu-Yen refugee situation is military recruitment and conscription. Refugees in Phu-Yen reported that 121 persons ages 15-34, formerly members of their households, were now serving in GVN military units. Comparable data is not available on refugee family members serving with the insurgents, but without doubt many of the 133 youths listed as being absent from their families but not in the military have actually been recruited or conscripted into Viet-Cong units. A considerable number of young people have also been killed as a result of the war. Eighty-five males (55 of them serving in GVN) and 15 females in the 15-34 age group have been killed during the insurgency.

Comparison of the number of males age 15-34 now in the refugee population (511 persons) with those reported as separated from their households (193) or killed in war (85) reveals that 35.2% of all males reported as composing this age group in the premigration population have been removed from the present refugee population. Even if a composite pyramid of the population is constructed by adding reported war casualties and separated household members to the refugee population (see Figure 3), the 15-29 age group is distinctly underrepresented. This may partly reflect the refugees' failure to report persons serving in the Viet-Cong and partly result from a lowered birthrate during World War II and the French-Viet-Minh struggle in the 1940's and early 1950's (persons in this age span would have been born between 1939 and 1951). In this regard, Hendry attributes a deficit in persons in the 11-12 year old category in his 1958 census to a lessened birthrate in 1945-1948, when conflict was most acute in Long-An.[7]

Figure 2. Population Pyramid

Refugee Population of Phu-Yen Province



Figure 3. Composite Population Pyramid

Refugees and Former Members of Household (Separated and War Casualties)



War losses and separation resulting from migration have also affected other age groupings in the population but to a lesser extent than is the case for young persons.

The refugee population as a whole has a sex ratio of 90 males per 100 females. For refugees in the 15-29 age group, the ratio is decreased to 69 males, and in the 20-34 age group the sex ratio is only 51 men per 100 women.

In percentage terms, males comprise 47.4% of the total refugee population; 40.7% of persons between 15 and 49 years of age; and 33.9% of the population age 20-34.

The same tendencies in age and sex distribution are reported for a nonrefugee population in the delta, but with a considerably better balance between males and females. The sex ratio for the overall village population in 1958 was 96 but decreased to 82 for the 15-28 age group and to 79 for persons 21-34 years of age. Males represented 48.9% of the total population, but only 44.1% of the population in the 21-34 age group.[8]

Analysis of data from a 1965 USAID/ORC-conducted registration of persons living in government refugee camps in Binh-Dinh Province shows sex distribution tendencies generally similar to those for the Phu-Yen refugee population.[9] The Binh Dinh camp population has a sex ratio of 89, with a ratio of 74 for the 15-49 age group and 48 for the 20-34 grouping. Thus, the Binh-Dinh refugee population has a slightly higher percentage of males in all age categories than is the case for Phu-Yen, but has a lower percentage in all categories than the nonrefugee population of Khanh Hau Village in the delta (see Table 4).

Table 4. Sex Ratios and Male Percentage of Population for Phu-Yen Refugees, Binh-Dinh Refugees, and a Nonrefugee Village in Long-An

	All Ages		15-49*		20-34**	
	Sex Ratio	Males as % of pop.	Sex Ratio	Males as % of pop.	Sex Ratio	Males as % of pop.
Phu-Yen Refugees	90	47.4	69	40.7	51	33.9
Binh-Dinh Refugees	89	47.0	74	42.4	58	36.6
Khanh Hau Village (nonrefugees)	96	48.9	82	45.0	79	44.1

*15-48 for Khanh Hau

**21-34 for Khanh Hau

Marital Status and Household Size

Data on marital status by age and sex reveals a consistently higher percentage of females than males who are widowed. In view of the marked deficit of unmarried males in the population there exists a potential for serious strain on the social fabric, although to some extent the excess females may be absorbed by an increase in the number of polygamous marriages (a traditional, although illegal, practice in rural Viet-Nam). (See Appendix A, Item 2.)

The number of children ages 0-4 per 1,000 women ages 15-49 provides indirect evidence on the fertility of a population. The Phu-Yen refugee population has a child-woman ratio of 713, compared to a ratio of 688 for the nonrefugee population of Khanh Hau.[10]

The mean refugee household size is 5.2 persons; the mode is 5. In contrast, Hendry reports a mean size of 5.5 persons for households in Khanh Hau, with 5 the mode,[11] a difference suggesting that one effect of migration on Vietnamese social structure is a reduction in the number of people composing a

household (see Appendix A, Item 3). A side-by-side plotting of comparative data on refugee and nonrefugee household size distribution confirms that there is a tendency towards reduction in family size. This is not surprising, as one-quarter of the refugee households are reported to have had one or more family members separated from them at the time of migration (see Table 5).

Table 5. Disruption of Households by Refugee Movement
(n = 1179)

	Number	Percent
Intact Households	878	74.5
Households with one or more separated members	301	25.5
Total	1,179	100
Households with one separated member	199	16.9
Households with two separated members	61	5.2
Households with three separated members	23	1.9
Households with four or more separated members	18	1.5

Premigration Economic Characteristics

Occupation

71% of the refugee heads of household had formerly been employed in the agricultural sector of the economy as farmers, laborers, tenant farmers, or gatherers. If fishing is added, 80% of the refugees were engaged in food-producing activities. Laborers and craftsmen constituted a total of 13% of the respondents, and 1.0% were unemployed. Only 6% of the refugees had been employed in the service sector (merchants, government cadre, and soldiers) of the economy. (See Figure 4.)

Hendry reports a similar distribution of occupation for delta villagers. "Upwards of two-thirds of heads of households regard [farming] as their main occupation. The only other primary occupation to claim a sizeable number of heads of households is that of laborer, from one-fifth to one-fourth. All other occupations, however important in other terms, are proportionately small."[12]

The impact of refugee movement on occupation is discussed in Chapter V.

Figure 4. Principal Premigration Occupation of Head of Household
(n = 1187)



Land Tenure Patterns

Land tenure practices are divisible into three basic patterns: households owning all the land they work; households owning some land and renting additional land; and households using wholly rented land. 56.9% of all refugee households fall in the first category, 8.5% in the mixed owning and renting group, and 8.6% wholly in the renting class. Thus a total of 74% of all refugee households had access to agricultural land in one form or another (see Table 6).

Table 6. Premigration Land Tenure Patterns
(n = 1152)

	No Land Owned	Land Ownership (in hectares)		
		0.1-1.9	2.0-3.9	Over 3.9
Number of respondents in each category renting land	99	69	27	2
Number of respondents in each category not renting land	299	348	222	86

A survey of 46 nonrefugee households in two hamlets in Phu-Yen revealed that 51.1% owned all the land that they worked, 27.7% supplemented their plots by renting additional land, and 14.9% were wholly dependent on rental land. Thus some 93.6% of all households in this population had access to farm land.

Land tenure patterns in Phu-Yen are in sharp contrast with the nonrefugee population in the delta village of Khanh Hau, where only 16.8% of all households owned land and 54.3% were tenant farmers, with a total of only 62.1% of the village households having access to tillable land.[13]

Land Ownership

The majority (65.5%) of refugee households had owned farm land, and some (8.5%) of these also rented supplemental land. Plots ranged in size from 0.1 hectares to 20 hectares, with a mean area of 2.4 and a mode of 1.5. Owners of very large plots (20 hectares or more) would probably not be represented in the sample, since persons of such wealth most likely would not reside in refugee settlements.

Adequate comparative data on land ownership by nonrefugee populations in Phu-Yen are lacking, although the limited information available suggests that the tenure pattern for the refugees does not diverge from that traditional in Central Viet-Nam. One source states that "In parts of this area [the Central Lowlands] three-fourths of the farmers owned their land, with holdings averaging from 2 to 5 acres. In the whole Central area, not more than 50 individuals owned as much as 125 acres."[14]

Of the 49 nonrefugee households surveyed in Phu-Yen, 37 owned land. Plots ranged in size from 0.2 hectares to 4.0 hectares with a mean area of 1.32 hectares and a mode of 1.0.

According to a French survey conducted prior to World War II, 93.9% of the land owners in Central Viet-Nam held plots smaller than 2.5 hectares and 99.9% owned plots less than 25 hectares in size.[15]

Comparison of the Phu-Yen refugee population, a nonrefugee population of Phu-Yen, and the nonrefugee population in Central Viet-Nam reveals that the refugees on the whole own slightly larger plots than the nonrefugees, but the distributional patterns appear quite similar. (See Appendix A, Item 4.)

The pattern of land ownership of the refugees in Phu-Yen is in sharp contrast to that reported by Hendry for the delta. There, prior to the 1958 agrarian reform, only 16.8% of the peasants owned land (compared to 65.4% among the Phu-Yen refugees). Further, there were extreme inequalities in the distribution: only 13.2% of the village landholders owned over half (53.1%) of the arable area.[16] (See also Appendix A, Item 5, which presents comparative Lorenz curves of

distribution of land ownership for the Phu-Yen refugee population and the Khanh Hau nonrefugee population.)

The wide extent of land ownership in Phu-Yen makes one question the frequently cited view that maldistribution of the land is one of the primary factors behind peasant support of the Viet-Cong. Certainly the statement by one analyst of the insurgency that "South Viet-Nam is actually one of the places in the world where drastic land reform is most badly needed"[17] is not supported by data on refugee land tenure patterns in Phu-Yen. Agrarian reform may, in some areas of Viet-Nam, offer one method of winning the support of the peasantry, but it is clearly not the panacea it often is claimed to be. (See Figure 5.)

Land Tenancy

17.1% of the refugee households rented land; half of these were renting to supplement plots which they owned. Rented plots range in area from 0.1 to 6.9 hectares, with a mean size of 1.3 hectares. (See Figure 6.)

While data collected on rental rates is not satisfactory for detailed analys it indicates that rental rates run from one-third to one-half of the reported harves (see Appendix A, Item 5).

Ownership of Major Capital Goods

61.8% of refugee households were reported as having owned their major means of production. 46% (554) of the households owned buffalo or cattle and 7.5% (90) owned sampans. Other capital goods listed were sewing machines and fishing nets (see Table 7).

Figure 5. Premigration Land Ownership
(n = 756)



Figure 6. Premigration Land Tenancy
(n = 199)



Table 7. Premigration Ownership of Capital Goods
(n = 1193)

Item	Number of Households Citing	% of all Refugee Households Citing
Boat or sampan	90	7.5
Sewing machine	5	0.4
Fishing nets	43	3.6
1 head of cattle	37	3.1
2 head of cattle	250	21.0
3 head of cattle	49	4.1
4 or more	191	16.0
Cattle, number unspecified	27	2.3

Refugee Productive Capability

Assuming that only persons between the ages of 15 and 49 are capable of sufficient productive activity to create a surplus beyond their own needs, and that persons outside this age range are consumers rather than producers, it is possible to calculate the comparative productive capability ratios of various populations. Following this approach it can be calculated that the refugee population has 268 producers per 1,000 people; i.e., each refugee producer must support himself plus 2.7 other people. While no comparable data for a nonrefugee population in Phu-Yen is available, Khanh Hau, a village in the Mekong Delta, had, in 1958 (i.e., the pre-insurgency period), 435 producers per 1,000 population:[18] each villager of productive age had to support himself plus 1.3 others. This compares favorably with the ratio of 454 per 1,000 for neighboring Cambodia, but is considerably lower than the 492 producers per 1,000 population reported for Thailand.[19] (Different employment patterns make comparisons with the U. S. population difficult, but if 20-64 is taken as the productive age grouping for an industrial economy, the U. S. has a ratio of 522 producers per 1,000 population.[20]

It is evident from the above that the refugee population has a considerably greater number of nonproductive individuals than is the norm for rural Vietnamese society and thus, even if effectively "resettled," is likely to remain a population at least partly dependent on outside aid to meet its productive deficit.

Ninety-six percent of the refugees are reported to be able-bodied, i.e., free of major physical defects. In determining able-bodiedness, the interviewers asked if any members of the interviewee's household were currently incapable of working; this criterion was used to classify persons as physically disabled. It is probable, given Vietnamese attitudes toward health and labor, that a considerably greater number of persons are physically disabled by U. S. standards than are reported as such in the survey. Expectedly, the ratio of disabled to able-bodied persons increases with age, with only three-fourths of persons 60 and older reported as being able-bodied. (See Appendix A, Items 7 and 8.)

Summary

- Of the Phu-Yen refugees studied, 96% are ethnic Vietnamese; the remainder are Rhade and Hroi tribespeople. Buddhists form 45%, ancestor worshippers 39%, Catholics 8%, Cao Dai 5%, and animists 3%. This roughly approximates the general population of the area, except that the Cao Dai are slightly overrepresented and the Catholics slightly underrepresented.

- Almost half of the refugees are children 14 and under; one-third are of productive age--15-49; one-sixth are older than 49. There are more children and old people than in the general rural Vietnamese population, and both males and females in the 15-35 age group are greatly underrepresented. In the 15-29 age group, there are only 69 males per 100 females, compared to 90 males to 100 females in the overall refugee population and 96 males to 100 females in the general population.

- The mean refugee household size is 5.2 persons, smaller than that of the nonrefugee population; one-fourth of the families reported separating from one or more members of their family at the time of moving. There are more small children per woman than in the nonrefugee population.

- Nearly 40% of the refugees are literate, and males have a higher literacy rate than females: in the 15-29 age group, 84% of the males and 53% of the females are literate.

- There are more nonproducers than in the nonrefugee population: each refugee of productive age (15-49) must support 2.7 other people, compared to a 1.3 ratio among nonrefugees. Only 4% of the total refugee sample were physically disabled, but this included one-fourth of those 60 and older.

- 80% of the refugees were formerly employed in food-producing industries; only 6% were employed in the service sector of the economy. Three-quarters of the households had access to farm land in their native villages and 65% owned the land they worked. Distribution of land was on a relatively broad and egalitarian basis--the mean holding was 2.4 hectares and the mode 1.5.

Footnotes

[1]According to a recent study, "The Religions of South Viet-Nam in Faith and Fact" (Navy Chaplains Corps, Southeast Asia Religious Project, typescript, n.d.), pp. 123, 133, there are an estimated 60,000 Cao-Dai (out of a national membership of 617,000) in the II Corps area. Thus Cao-Daists represent approximately 2.5% of the regional population of 2,383,000.

[2]James B. Hendry, The Small World of Khanh Hau (Chicago: Aldine, 1964), p. 13. Reliable demographic data for a nonrefugee population in Central Viet-Nam is unavailable. As far as the authors are aware, the only reasonably reliable census of a rural village anywhere in Viet-Nam is that reported for 1958 by Hendry for Khanh Hau, a village of some 3,000 persons located in the delta province of Long-An. In the absence of other sources, Hendry's report has been utilized throughout this chapter to provide comparative data on the nonrefugee Vietnamese rural population.

[3]Ibid., p. 25.

[4]Source for Long-An: Ibid., pp. 23-24.

[5]Calculated on age/sex distribution reported in the United Nations Demographic Yearbook 1962 (New York, 1963), pp. 166-170.

[6]Hendry, The Small World of Khanh Hau, op. cit., p. 13.

[7]Ibid., pp. 13-20.

[8]Ibid., p. 15.

[9]The data for this analysis are taken from United States Agency for International Development, Office of Refugee Coordination, Viet-Nam Refugee Status Report, July 1 - September 30, 1966 (Saigon: USAID, 1966), Annex 1, p. 3, "Sample Registration of 20 Camps - Refugees by Age Groups and Sex."

[10]Hendry, The Small World of Khanh Hau, op. cit., p. 14.

[11]Ibid., p. 12.

[12]Ibid., p. 129.

[13]Ibid., pp. 34, 45. The total percentage of villagers having access to land may actually be smaller than that cited as Hendry does not provide figures on households that both owned and rented land.

[14]Special Operations Research Office, U. S. Army Area Handbook for Vietnam (Washington, D. C., 1962) p. 356.

[15]Price Gittinger, "Agrarian Reforms," in Richard Lindholm (ed.), Viet-Nam: The First Five Years (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1959), p. 206.

[16]Hendry, The Small World of Khanh Hau, op. cit., p. 37.

[17]Ralph R. White, "Misperception and the Vietnam War," Journal of Social Issues, XXII (July 1966) p. 25.

[18]Gerald Hickey, Village in Viet-Nam (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 51.

[19]United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1962, op. cit., p. 166.

[20]Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Department of Commerce, 1965), p. 6.

CHAPTER III. CAUSES OF MOVEMENT

Introduction

There has been a notable tendency in commentaries on the Vietnamese war to attribute the insecurity which results in refugee movement to a single major causal factor. Because Vietnamese peasants are frequently characterized as being tightly bound to their ancestral lands, it is assumed that only a severe calamity could cause them to move. This assumption reinforces the tendency to ascribe all refugee movement to a single causal factor, preferably one supporting the viewpoint of the person choosing it.

For instance, many American critics of the U. S. position in Viet-Nam assert that refugee movement is due entirely to the single factor of American bombing--why else, it is inferred, would a land-loving peasant leave his home? As The New Republic recently phrased it: "The U. S. is now dropping as high a bomb tonnage on Viet-Nam as...on Germany at the peak of World War II. This costly effort has created one million refugees."[1] On the other end of the spectrum are those who characterize Viet-Nam's refugee movement as a product solely of Viet-Cong terrorism and see it as eloquent testimony of the Vietnamese peasant's rejection of communism.

Obviously, such simplifications do justice neither to the complexity of factors that influence refugee decisions, nor to the historic fact of considerable population mobility in rural Viet-Nam. Those holding these stereotypes both underestimate and overestimate the significance of refugee movement: they underestimate the variety of motives that might underly a decision to migrate and exaggerate the uniqueness of rural migration in Viet-Nam.

The history of Viet-Nam offers examples of mass population displacement sufficient to cast considerable doubt upon the existence of any significant peasant resistance to migration. Viet-Nam in its present boundaries developed as a nation only because of the relentless "March to the South" by colonists from the initial ethnic Vietnamese enclaves in the Red River Valley.[2] This migration, lasting close to a thousand years, ended only in 1757 with the Vietnamese

occupation of the tip of the Ca-Mau peninsula, and has been followed by at least three other important internal shifts of population: (1) the transport of agricultural laborers from Tonkin to work on the French rubber plantations of Cochin and Annam in the 1920's and 30's,[3] (2) the shift of nearly one million refugees from North Viet-Nam to south of the 17th Parallel after the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1954, and (3) the post-1957 movement of coastal Vietnamese into the land development centers on the High Plateau under the auspices of the Diem regime.[4]

A researcher who made an extensive study of Khanh Hau village in the delta also disputes the "prevalent view of Vietnamese society [which] regards the people as closely bound to their ancestral villages, reluctant to move no matter what incentives," presenting evidence that there has been a continuing voluntary emigration to nearby urban areas. Some 44% of a 100-household sample reported having relatives leave the village during the preceding 15-year period.[5]

Certainly all this would seem to underscore the point that rural migration is not new to Viet-Nam and that many widely held assumptions concerning the present movement of refugees need not necessarily be true.

Refugees' Stated Reasons for Movement

Although the overwhelming majority moved basically to escape the insecurity of conflict-related circumstances, the final decision to move represents a response to a complex series of interrelated factors. The average refugee interviewed cited at least two reasons for moving--occasionally as many as three or four. Each refugee head of household was asked at length what factors influenced his decision to move. Because of the complexity of the subject, open-ended questions were used so that refugees could cite as many factors as they felt were relevant. No provision was made for a rank ordering of the reasons cited; hence, the relative significance of each factor must be inferred from the frequency with which it is cited.

In categorizing the responses, an initial distinction was made as to whether movement was "voluntary"--based on the refugee's own estimate of the situation--or "involuntary"--regardless of his willingness to stay. An overwhelming majority of the refugees--93.8%--reported that they were not physically forced to move. Of the 6.2% who said they were, most were brought out during the course of Allied military operations in their villages. Many of those who were forced to move also expressed a dissatisfaction with conditions in their villages that might have induced a voluntary decision to move. For example, they would complain about undergoing deprivations and hardships--the kinds of factors that often influence other refugees to leave--but indicate that their actual move resulted from an Allied military operation.

As one former farmer said: "I wanted to move before, but I couldn't under Viet-Cong control. Then when the U. S. troops came to my village, they gathered us and burnt all houses, so I must move; but I felt it was a good chance to move, although I lost all my possessions." In short, the extent to which "force" was actually employed against the 6.2% who reported being "forced to move" varied considerably, from the semivoluntary forced movement of the farmer above to that of persons who were literally captured at gun point and brought out to relocation sites by helicopter during military operations.

For each reason for moving cited by refugees, a "causal agent" was also recorded. Most frequently this agent was explicitly named by the refugee, but occasionally it was implicit in the context of the reason (such as aerial bombardment whose specific source--GVN or U. S.--was unseen but inferred to be Allied). Refugees were asked whether the Allied agent they were citing was U. S., Korean, or GVN. When this was unclear, the agent was classified as "Allied (unspecified). Also, distinctions were made when the VC or GVN or Allied were being cited alone or in an interface situation; separate categories were established for each.

It is significant to note at the outset that the VC are the more frequently cited by the refugees as agents. As shown in Figure 7, the Viet-Cong were cited by 84.9% of the refugees as affecting their decision to move. The Government is explicitly cited by 24.4% of the refugees, and when grouped with the other Allies (including U. S. and Korean), is cited by 67.9% of the refugees. In

Figure 7. Causal Agents of Movement
(n = 2185 citations)



*Percentages are based on frequency of citation. 1,193 refugees gave 2,185 citations, or 1.8 per refugee.

Summary:
Viet-Cong = 84.9
Allies = 67.9
Interface = 21.8
Other = 8.0

short, the VC are cited as causal agents with 20% greater frequency than the GVN and Allies. This contradicts the notion that refugee movement in Phu-Yen is entirely the result of GVN and Allied military activity; further, the high citation of the VC cannot be construed as a reflection of the interviewees' desire to "say what was expected"--refugees in Dinh Tuong Province apparently were not at all reluctant to specify the Allies and GVN as causal agents (80.8% did so; see p. 44).

A few miscellaneous causal agents--relatives, friends, religious or political leaders--were also cited by 8% of the refugees.

For purposes of analysis, the causal agents and reasons cited by refugees were categorized under three general headings:

1. Military Activities
   - Artillery and Bombardment
   - Ground Military Operations
   - Forced Movement

2. Fear of Terrorism and Coercion
   - Terrorism and Reprisals
   - Coerced Activities and Levies

3. Economic and Social Factors
   - General Fears and Hardships
   - Social Considerations

These reasons for movement are discussed in detail below, but a summary illustration of the frequency of citation of each general category is shown in Figure 8.

Military Activities

Various military activities were by far the most frequently cited factors, mentioned by 86% of the refugees as influencing their decision to move; half of the total number of citations were related to military activity. These include the effects of artillery and bombardment, ground military operations, and forced movement (usually the result of military operations). (See Table 8.)

Figure 8. Reasons for Movement
(n = 2185 citations)



*Percentages are based on frequency of citation. 1,193 refugees gave 2,185 citations, or 1.8 per refugee.

Table 8. Military Activities and Agents Cited as Influencing Decision to Move
(n = 1193 refugees, 2185 citations)

Reasons	Citations*		Causal Agents			
	No.	% of Refugees	Viet-Cong	GVN	US-Korean	VC-GVN-Allies
Artillery and Bombardment						
Fear of artillery and bombardment	215	18.0	0	2.1	15.6	0.3
Family/neighbors were killed/wounded	26	2.1	0.1	0.5	1.4	0.1
House/possessions were destroyed	118	9.9	0.1	1.3	7.9	0.6
Source of livelihood disrupted	31	2.6	0	0.5	1.9	0.2
VC presence led to bombardment	41	3.5	3.5	0	0	0
Ground Military Operations						
Fear of battle actually underway	42	3.5	0.5	0	0.2	2.8
Fear of impending or future conflict	138	11.5	1.3	0.3	0.4	9.5
Family/ neighbors killed by ground ops.	42	3.5	1.0	0.2	2.1	0.2
House/possessions destroyed by ops.	99	8.2	2.6	0.8	4.3	0.5
Used ground ops. as excuse to leave	204	17.0	0	12.9	3.9	0.2
Forced Movement	75	6.2	0.1		4.6	0.0

*Percentages are based on frequency of citation. 1193 refugees gave 2185 citations, or 1.8 per refugee.

Artillery and Aerial Bombardment

A frequently cited military factor was fear of artillery and aerial bombardment. Most often this fear was expressed in a generalized fashion, but occasionally refugees would specify some experience or event that gave compelling substance to the fear. For example, while 18% of the refugees expressed a general fear of artillery as a factor influencing their decision to move, nearly 10% specified that their house or possessions had been destroyed, and 2% specified that members of their family or neighbors had been killed or wounded by bombardment. Another 2% indicated that artillery and bombardment disrupted their source of livelihood (these refugees often said that they spent so much time huddling in shelters, they had no time to work or could not effectively work the land during the day).

As to be expected, the Allies (GVN and U. S.-Koreans) were the principal causal agents associated with artillery and bombardment. However, the survey questionnaires were not designed to assess, nor did the responses reveal, refugee "attitudes" towards the bombing--whether blame-anger-fatalism or some other emotion was attached to the identification of the Allies as the principal causal agent. It is significant, however, that 3.5% of the refugees specifically cited "VC-caused" artillery or bombardment, distinguishing a cause-effect relationship between Viet-Cong presence and Allied response.

Ground Military Operations

The relation of ground military operations to refugee movement is seen in that nearly half of the refugees cited these as reasons for moving. However, not all of these effects were negative: 17% of the refugees said that military operations served as an opportunity or as a catalyst for movement. For many refugees ground operations merely provided a final stimulus to move--they served to telescope all the various other reasons that had been weighing upon them and finally produced action.

> My hamlet [Phu Quy in Hieu-Xuong District] was governed by the Viet-Cong for two years. They forced me to work for them, carrying food, rice, weapons etc. It is very hard living and I wanted to move a long time ago. But I thought that I could not live if I moved from my rice field, so I try to live in old hamlet without complaint. One

> day Korean troops came and the airplane above told people they should move and enjoy the better living in a secure area with help from the government. So I believe and came. But until now I have received nothing. I can work hard, but have no job to do.

Furthermore, GVN and Allied troops frequently encouraged villagers to move during operations--either by loudspeaker broadcasts from airplanes or by talking to the people while moving through their villages. As indicated in the discussion of the nature of encouragement and discouragement which follows, the troops either warned the populace of impending military engagements or advertised incentives--noting that the villagers were now living in "insecure areas" subject to artillery and Viet-Cong harassment, but if they moved into GVN-controlled areas they would receive aid. This activity is partially reflected in that 11.5% of the refugees cited fear of impending or future conflicts as a reason for moving and the GVN and Allies are the principal related causal agents.

In short, of those citing ground military operations as a factor influencing their decision to move, a majority were not forced out or immediately physically threatened by the operations. Of the rest, 3.5% said they left because of fear of harm from a battle actually underway, and 3.5% said that members of their family or neighbors had been killed by military operations. In addition, a number of refugees (8.2%) cited that their house or possessions had been destroyed by ground operations.

As might be expected, the principal causal agents cited by refugees for ground military operations were the GVN and U. S.-Korean troops. However, the Viet-Cong were cited as the causal agent by 5.4% of the refugees, and 13.2% cite both the Viet-Cong and the Allies as being responsible for battles underway or for possible future conflicts.

Forced Movement

As stated above, only 6.2% of the refugees were physically forced to move, and forced movement accounted for only 3.4% of the total factors influencing decisions to move.

Fear of Terrorism and Coercion

Over two-thirds of the refugees cite fear of terrorist or coercive acts as being factors in their decision to move. And of the refugees who cite such factors, the Viet-Cong are listed as the causal agents by all but 2.3% (see Table 9).

Activities such as forced labor and levies were particularly important causal factors in refugee movement. Especially irksome to many refugees was the Viet-Cong policy of enlisting villagers to serve as laborers: making punji sticks, digging tunnels, ditches, trenches, serving as porters, and so on. One-fifth of the refugees cited forced labor as one of the reasons for moving, and a few (.7%) listed performance of dangerous battlefield work. As one refugee from Tuy-An explained: "The Viet-Cong compelled people in my village to work for them too much--digging trenches, carrying rice. People couldn't live, couldn't work their own land, since they worked so much for the VC. My family and I only escaped by the chance of the tet [truce]."

Refugees also resented the "political re-education" sessions which the Viet-Cong forced many villagers to attend: 7.2% cited this as one reason for moving. The character of the refugees' comments about these so-called "political re education" sessions indicates that the Viet-Cong used them not only as propaganda but also as a threat against persons suspected of pro-GVN activity or sentiments. Some refugees reported being detained in the hills for months in order to attend, serving as laborers during the day and being "educated" in the evenings. Relatives of GVN soldiers and officials were particular targets for such sessions. One refugee explained in detail:

> My five sons are civil servants, so when the Viet-Cong came to my hamlet they forced me to undergo 're-education' and learn about the 'political struggle' for three months outside my hamlet. I and seven neighbors were allowed to bring only rice--enough to eat in three months, with one kilo of rice for eight persons per day. In the morning and afternoon we were forced to work for them, cultivating, planting, harvesting or cooking for the VC soldiers. At noon and at night we learned about the 'political struggle'--about the assassin U.S. soldiers and many other news of the world: Laos, Cuba, Indonesia. They said all the peoples in Asia and Africa resisted the U.S. empire, and they promised peace will be all over the country

Table 9. Terrorism and Coercion and Agents Cited as Influencing Decision to Move
(n = 1193 refugees, 2185 citations)

Reasons	Citations*		Causal Agents			
	No.	% of Refugees	Viet-Cong	GVN	U. S.	Korean
Coerced Activities and Levies						
Forced labor	244	20.4	20.4	0	0	0
Forced to perform battlefield work	9	.7	.7	0	0	0
"Political education" sessions	86	7.2	7.2	0	0	0
Forced to pay "taxes"	82	6.9	6.9	0	0	0
Fear of conscription	37	3.0	3.1	0	0	0
Terror and Reprisals						
Threats of terror, murder, unspecified harm	127	10.6	8.3	0.1	0	2.2
Imprisoned or threat of imprisonment	23	1.9	1.7	0.1	0	0.1
Reprisals against GVN officials/ relatives	201	16.9	16.9	0	0	0
Religious persecution	8	0.6	0.6	0	0	0

*Percentages are based on frequency of citation. 1,193 refugees gave 2,185 citations, or 1.8 per refugee.

> in a short time because they will win the war to force the Americans out of Viet-Nam. I wanted to ask questions about their lessons, but they force persons who don't learn to stay in session longer and work harder. Even so, three of us were obliged to be sent to learn another course. I returned to my hamlet afterwards and one day GVN troops came and I followed them.

A number of refugees (3.1%) also reported moving because they feared they would be conscripted by the Viet-Cong. Obviously this concern was particularly felt by younger men. As one 29-year-old refugee explained: "I moved because the Viet-Cong often came to my hamlet and caught many young men to follow them; I am young too, and very afraid they catch me. So my wife and I left to come to a secure area, where she does business [as a small vendor] and I am now a policeman."

Thirty percent of the refugees cited threats of terrorism, murder, or reprisals; over half of those citing these factors were GVN officials or their relatives. The nature of Viet-Cong reprisal actions is made clear through the comments made by the refugees themselves:

> I was a village cadre [can-bo Lien Gia, or leader of a group of ten houses]. The Viet-Cong forced me to study 'revolutionary theory' for 13 days. Then when they learned that my nephew is studying in a government military training centre in Saigon, they threatened me. When I learned that they wanted me to again go to a 're-education' course, I left my house.

A 28-year-old widow whose husband was killed while serving as a Popular Forces soldier stated:

> The Viet-Cong burnt my house because my husband was a government soldier. Afterwards my neighbors helped build a new house. But the VC came again and burnt it and threaten to imprison me. My neighbors told me that I should move to a safer place to grow-up my children.

Another widow reported:

> My husband was a 'rural construction cadre' so that the Viet-Cong often came to spy at my house at night. When my husband came home once they forced him to follow them to the forest. Later, some woodcutter from my hamlet saw my husband dead and took me to him. I think I can no longer stay anymore. . . .

Rarely cited (only 1.9%) were fears of imprisonment; the causal agent cited most frequently were the Viet-Cong. However, two refugees said they were threatened with imprisonment by the government and Koreans. One hapless refugee was captured and imprisoned by both sides:

> The Viet-Cong were in my village when government troops came. Planes bombed and mortars fell and houses in my village were destroyed and people killed. The VC retreated and I was suspected to be a Viet-Cong. I was put in jail by the GVN troops. But after two months I was free and returned to my village. But because the troops had left, the VC had returned. They captured me because they suspected I now worked for the government. They kept me in prison for 15 months. Finally I escaped and brought my family out.

Economic and Social Factors

Twenty-eight percent of the refugees mentioned various economic and social considerations that influenced their decision to move. Several (7.2%) expressed a general sense of disaffection from living under Viet-Cong control, while a few (3.4%) specified that Viet-Cong presence led to economic hardships. While most of these economic hardships were the result of the Viet-Cong forced labor and taxation reported above, a few refugees expressed a more generalized feeling that the presence of the Viet-Cong had led to such widespread economic hardship that they had no alternative but to leave. Some complained of being "cut off" from marketing agricultural products, while others felt that Viet-Cong "requests" for labor were preventing them from carrying on private productive activity. (See Table 10.)

A small percentage (4.4%) of the refugees explained that they left primarily because government representatives withdrew from their village and they feared the Viet-Cong would soon move in. The shock of GVN withdrawal itself was enough to cause some refugees to leave. As one 52-year-old laborer explained: "I was surprised one day when all the members of the village council, as well as the Popular Forces soldiers, suddenly left. I was afraid of what might happen. If it was necessary for all the government people to leave, I felt I should also."

Table 10. Economic and Social Factors and Agents

Cited as Influencing Decision to Move
(n = 1193 refugees, 2185 citations)

Reasons	Citations*		Causal Agents			
	No.	% of Refugees	Viet-Cong	GVN	VC-GVN-Allies	Other
Fears/Hardships of VC Activity						
General disaffection from VC	85	7.2	7.2	0	0	0
VC presence led to economic hardships	41	3.4	3.2	0	0.2	0
GVN withdrew and VC moved into native hamlet	53	4.4	0	0	4.4	0
Social Considerations						
Left because neighbors left	32	2.6	0.4	0.1	0.1	2.0
Joined relatives who were refugees	26	2.1	0.4	0.1	0	1.6
GVN told people to leave	50	4.1	0.1	4.0	0	0
Left to find better life	30	2.5	0.5	0.1	0.2	1.7
Sense of insecurity (unspecified)	20	1.7	0.7	0	0.3	0.7

*Percentages are based on frequency of citations. 1,193 refugees gave 2,185 citations, or 1.8 per refugee.

A number of miscellaneous social factors influenced a small percentage of the refugees to move. 2.6% of the refugees said they left simply because all their neighbors left, while another 2.1% left mainly to join relatives who were already in refugee settlement areas. A few--2.5%--expressed their motivation to leave in a positive way: they left to find a better life. However, even this was largely predicated upon the same negative factors and dissatisfactions shared by other refugees, although it is interesting that they viewed migration in a more positive fashion.

A small number (1.7%) of refugees also expressed an unspecified sense of insecurity as a reason for moving.

Comparison of Causal Agents

As mentioned previously, the Viet-Cong were more frequently cited as causal agents of the refugee movement than were the Allies. However, it is interesting to contrast the contexts within which the different groups are cited as agents.

As causal agents, the Viet-Cong are more frequently associated with coercion and terrorism than the GVN, but the GVN is more frequently associated with military activities. (See Appendix A, Item 9.)

When the reasons for movement are contrasted with the citations of the Allies as causal agents (see Appendix A, Item 10), it is clear that most Allied citations are in the category of artillery and ground operations. In the category of forced movement, U. S. and Korean troops have been the causal agents more frequently than GVN troops. But in the area of coercive acts, the U. S. has no mention while 20% of the Korean citations and 7% of the GVN's fall there. Phrased differently, when the total number of citations of the Allies (U. S.-Korean) as causal agents is broken down, 83% of the citations are connected with military activity (artillery and ground operations), 10% with reasons of forced movement, 5% with coercive acts of the Koreans, and 2% with miscellaneous reasons for movement.

Comparison with Dinh Tuong

A number of revealing differences in stimuli for refugee movement emerge when this data on Phu-Yen is contrasted with that obtained a few weeks later in Dinh Tuong Province in the delta (see Table 11). For example, refugees in Dinh Tuong cite artillery and bombardment as a reason for moving far more frequently than do refugees in Phu-Yen. Although the general fear of artillery is reported at approximately the same level, 19.8% of the refugees in Dinh Tuong report family members or neighbors being killed or wounded by artillery, while only 2.1% mention this in Phu-Yen. There is also a difference of 10 percentage points between the frequency with which Dinh Tuong refugees and Phu-Yen refugees report that their houses or possessions were destroyed by artillery. Dinh Tuong's refugees seem also to have fared slightly worse in the area of ground military operations: 7.6% reported family or neighbors killed, whereas only 3.5% cited this in Phu-Yen. Seventeen percent of the refugees in Phu-Yen cite using military operations as an opportunity to leave (usually with some encouragement from passing troops), whereas less than 1% of the Dinh Tuong refugees took advantage of an operation to flee their villages.

Of course, much of this contrast is explained by the different military situations prevailing in Phu-Yen and Dinh Tuong. No large Allied military units were operating in the Dinh Tuong area at the time of interviewing, whereas the Allies in Phu-Yen had been conducting extensive operations for some months. The delta war was then much more of a static war, with the ARVN relying on artillery more than operations. The absence of frequent and large clearing operations in the delta is also reflected in the fact that in Phu-Yen a considerably greater percentage of refugees were able to use such operations as an opportunity to leave.

Table 11. Reasons and Agents Causing Movement:

Contrast Between Phu-Yen and Dinh Tuong Refugees

(Phu-Yen, n = 1193; Dinh Tuong, n = 272)

Reasons	Percentage of Refugees Citing*		Principal Causal Agents					
			Viet-Cong		GVN		Allies	
	Phu-Yen	Dinh Tuong	Phu-Yen	Dinh Tuong	Phu-Yen	Dinh Tuong	Phu-Yen	Dinh Tuong
Artillery and Bombardment								
Family/neighbors killed/wounded	2.1%	19.8%	0	0	0.5%	6.2%	1.4%	13.6%
House/possessions destroyed	9.9	29.4	0	0	1.3	9.3	7.9	19.8
Ground Military Operations								
Family/neighbors killed by ground ops.	3.5%	7.6%	1.0%	2.9%	0.2%	0.3%	2.1%	0
House/possessions destroyed by ops.	8.2	4.7	2.6	2.2	0.8	0.3	4.3	0
Used ground ops. as excuse to leave	17.0	0.6	0	0	12.9	0.3	3.9	0.3
Forced Movement	6.2%	3.6%	0.1%	1.8%	1.5%	1.8%	4.6%	0
Coerced Activities and Levies								
Forced labor	20.4%	4.4%	20.4%	4.4%	0	0	0	0
Forced to pay "taxes"	6.9	3.3	6.9	3.3	0	0	0	0
"Political education" sessions	7.2	2.6	7.2	2.6	0	0	0	0
Terror and Reprisals								
Threats of terror, physical harm	10.6%	4.4%	8.3%	4.4%	0.1	0	2.2%	0
Reprisals against GVN officials/rels.	16.9	5.5	16.9	5.5	0	0	0	0
Imprisonment, threats of imprisonment	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.8	0.2	0	0	0
GVN withdrew and VC moved into native hamlet	4.4%	6.6%	0	0	4.4%	6.6%	0	0

*Refugees could cite more than one reason; however, percentages are calculated on the frequency with which each reason was cited.

Another interesting area of contrast is provided by reports of coercion and terror as stimuli to become refugees. The Viet-Cong were mentioned as employing such pressures with less than one half the frequency in Dinh Tuong than in Phu-Yen. This is particularly reflected in the number of citations of coercion as a reason for moving. For example, 20.4% of the refugees in Phu-Yen cite "forced labor" as a reason for leaving, but in Dinh Tuong only 4.4% do. Yet only half as many refugees in Phu-Yen as in Dinh Tuong reported paying Viet-Cong taxes. And threats of terror or physical harm (principally by the Viet-Cong) are cited by only 4.4% of the refugees in Dinh Tuong, whereas 10.6% report this in Phu-Yen.

These contrasts are especially significant in that they serve to increase confidence in the validity of the data. One of the pitfalls frequently attributed to questionnaire-based studies, particularly in Asia, is that in asking villagers why they have done something, they are more likely to say what they think you want to hear than what they actually think. It was asserted by some that this would tend to make the refugees in Viet-Nam cite the Viet-Cong more frequently than the GVN, since they would fear to say unpleasant things about the government. However, no such reticence is apparent. No standard frequency of responses regardless of the situation appears; rather, there are considerable contrasts between two distinct regions, both in terms of citations of agents and the frequency with which these agents are associated with different reasons for moving.

Comparison with Nonrefugee Motivation

To fully understand the causes of refugee movement one must also study the nonrefugees, asking the question: "Why did some people leave their village while others stayed?" However, as important as such information may be, it is not easily obtained in the current context of Viet-Nam. Security conditions generally make it dangerous, if not impossible, to interview people remaining in areas from which many refugees have migrated.

Circumstances did once permit the HSR interviewer team to visit briefly two hamlets (Phu-An and Dong-My) from which a larger than average number of refugees had previously originated. A special questionnaire was prepared and submitted to 49 nonrefugees[6] to determine their reasons for staying and their views on why their neighbors had left. This data provides confirmation of certain motivational factors already identified and also permits refugee movement to be seen from a different perspective.

The nonrefugees were first asked why they thought so many of their neighbors had left to become refugees in settlements around Tuy-Hoa. Many of the same factors cited by the refugees as reasons for moving were also listed by the nonrefugees, and with almost the same frequency. As Table 12 indicates, 95% of the nonrefugees speculated that one of the reasons their neighbors left was due to Viet-Cong actions--forced labor, taxes, VC presence leading to bombing--but they particularly noted that GVN officials and their relatives had left because of Viet-Cong reprisals. The nonrefugees also cited fear of artillery and bombardment of the Allies (36%), and various economic and social factors (36%) as being reasons why others left.

When the nonrefugees were asked why had they stayed while so many of their neighbors had left, economic and situational factors were cited by 71%. Most said they did not want to abandon their land, house, or livestock and feared that life would be harder and uncertain elsewhere. A number said they preferred to farm under difficult conditions than to be general laborers threatened with unemployment in resettlement areas. (See Appendix A, Item 11.)

Significantly, in contrast to the refugees, a number of nonrefugees cited security considerations as a reason for staying. Some expressed an optimistic view that the security situation would improve because they expected the Viet-Cong to go soon, while 18% were satisfied with the current level of security.

A number of social factors were also cited, especially a feeling of attachment to the land--ancestors lived there, husband lived and died there. A few expressed concern at moving with small children, and some felt that they were too old to move. However, 14% said they were simply satisfied with life in their hamlet.

Table 12. Nonrefugee View of Refugee Motivation
(n = 49)

Reasons why refugees left (as provided by nonrefugees)	Number of Citations*	% of n
Viet-Cong Actions	47	95%
Threats of terror, murder, physical harm	16	32%
Fear of conscription	1	2%
Reprisals against GVN officials/relatives	9	18%
Religious persecution (of Catholics)	1	2%
VC presence caused bombing	6	12%
Coercive acts: taxes, forced labor	9	18%
Unspecified hardships	5	10%
GVN/Allied Actions	18	36%
Fear of artillery and bombardment	13	26%
Artillery destroyed property	2	4%
Artillery killed civilians	2	4%
Artillery disrupted livelihood	1	2%
Economic-Social Factors	18	36%
No farmland/left to find jobs	8	16%
Difficult to earn livelihood	6	12%
Had relatives could move in with	1	2%
GVN promised aid	3	4%

*Nonrefugees could cite more than one reason; however, percentages are calculated on the frequency each reason was cited by the total number of nonrefugees (n = 49).

This preference for rural life is not unique to the nonrefugees in Phu-Yen. Hendry, in his study of Khanh Hau village in the delta, also asked villagers if they would be willing to move; of the 69% who said they did not want to move, their reasons largely echo the nonrefugees interviewed in Phu-Yen:

> Nearly half (46.7%) gave answers that reveal a link to the village in some respect, but they ranged from attachment to the village (6.7%) and desire to be near the ancestral tombs (5.6%) to less strong statements, e.g., the respondent was satisfied with his present life (12.2%), preferred farming (7.7%), like rural life (14.4%), or was the only son (1.1%).[7]

Hendry concluded that for the majority their stated unwillingness to move centered principally upon a preference for rural life, rather than attachment to a particular village or plot of land. In addition, he noted that one-fourth of his sample expressed unwillingness to move because they were too old or physically weak, while another 14.4% felt they simply had no hope of succeeding in a town or city.

Interestingly, in interviewing the nonrefugees in Dong My hamlet in Hieu-Xuong District, it was discovered that approximately half had previously been refugees but had returned. The reasons they gave for returning were also revealing; most centered upon security and economic considerations. A number said they were convinced that the hamlet had become sufficiently secure through the actions of Allied troops (GVN and Korean) and they felt it was now possible to return. But concomitantly, there was the economic consideration that life had been harder in resettlement areas: some cited the fact that farmland was not available and there was unemployment, others indicated that living conditions were generally harder in the refugee center, and one said that anticipated government aid was never given. Of course, Dong My was not very far outside of the then-secure area of Hieu-Xuong District, and the increased activity of the Korean forces was in fact steadily expanding the perimeter of that area. As the respondents suggest, a tolerable level of security had been attained for some. At the same time there were a large number of refugees from Dong My still settled in the District town. Most were Catholics resettled on land around a church and were being encouraged by the priest to stay: it was argued that the level of security, despite the Korean presence, was still not sufficient. Clearly, security for some is not security for others.

Encouragement or Discouragement of Movement

A third of the refugees reported that they had been encouraged in some manner to move from their homes. This encouragement came primarily from the GVN (57.7%) and Allied (20.5%) military (see Appendix A, Items 12 and 13). A substantial number (11.3%) report that their relatives, friends or neighbors were the encouraging agents, while 9% cite GVN civilian cadre or local village officials.

The nature of the encouragement was mainly in the form of advice to move voluntarily to safer locations in order to avoid possible future military operations. Some were induced to move with promises of assistance and a better life. However, some refugees were "encouraged" to move with explicit threats against noncompliance. As mentioned earlier, such "forced" movement usually occurred during the course of military operations.

Only 15% of the refugees report being discouraged from leaving their homes, and in all cases the Viet-Cong was cited as the discouraging agent. The nature of the Viet-Cong discouragement was mostly threats of reprisal if people were caught leaving. However, some refugees were warned of GVN/Allied maltreatment of refugees. As one refugee woman reported: "Viet-Cong cadres warned people in my village that the American soldiers would either execute them or send them to America to be slaves." Another refugee said the Viet-Cong told him that when Americans took refugees in helicopters they actually were taking them out over the ocean to throw them in.

Only a few report being forcibly detained by the Viet-Cong. Some said they were threatened with "re-education" courses if they were caught leaving. Interestingly, only a few refugees reported that the Viet-Cong threatened to confiscate their property if they left. Elsewhere this has been reported as a basic technique of Viet-Cong population control.

Summary

● Refugees cite a complex of factors contributing to their decisions to move, with most respondents citing two or more reasons. Various military activities were cited by 86% of the refugees, and 68% cite terroristic and coercive acts as reasons for moving. Bombing and artillery specifically were cited by only 32% of the refugees, and only 6% indicated that they were physically forced to move during military operations.

● The Viet-Cong is the causal agent most frequently associated with refugee movement--cited by 84% of the refugees--while Allied forces are cited by 67% of the respondents.

● Almost 17% of the refugees were GVN civilian or military cadre or their families who fled because of threats of Viet-Cong reprisals.

● One-third of the refugees reported being encouraged to leave their villages, principally by Allied military forces and friends and relatives.

● 15% of refugees reported Viet-Cong efforts to discourage them from moving.

● When asked why their neighbors became refugees, nonrefugees gave reasons coinciding with those actually cited by the refugees themselves.

Footnotes

[1]"How to Win the War," The New Republic (Sept. 10, 1966), p. 8.

[2]Joseph Buttinger, The Smaller Dragon (New York: Praeger, 1958) and Bernard Fall, "Commentary on Bui Van Luong" in Richard Lindholm (ed.), Viet-Nam: The First Five Years (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1959), p. 54.

[3]Ellen Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina 1940-1955 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1966), pp. 66-67.

[4]Neil Jamieson, Study of Land Development Center Program (Saigon: Unpublished manuscript, 1965).

[5]James B. Hendry, The Small World of Khanh Hau (Chicago: Aldine, 1964), p. 26-27.

[6]Persons referred to as nonrefugees are actually of three classes: those who never left their villages, those who left but returned while other refugees did not, and those who work crops near their villages during the day but move to secure areas at night. Those interviewed were members of the first two categories only. See Appendix A for the D-1 Questionnaire used in interviewing.

[7]Hendry, The Small World of Khanh Hau, op. cit., p. 26.

CHAPTER IV. CHARACTERISTICS AND DYNAMICS OF MOVEMENT

Introduction

This chapter presents data on the time and incidence of refugee flow in Phu-Yen, the geographical patterns of movement, the specific characteristics of the movement, and the relationship of refugee movement to the phases of insurgency in Phu-Yen.

Characteristics of Movement

Times of Peak Movement

Some refugee movement has been occurring in Viet-Nam since the beginning of the current insurgency (see Figure 9). In Phu-Yen, relatively minor refugee movement began to occur as early as 1961 and mounted at a low but relatively steady rate after that until 1965, when significant migration into government-controlled areas began and increased rapidly throughout the year. A peak in the flow occurred in November 1965, followed two months later by an even sharper peak in January 1966. Thus, of refugees still in settlement areas in August 1966, nearly half (41.9%) of the total moved during these two peak periods of October-November 1965 (15.8%) and January-February 1966 (26.1%). Only 9.6% of the refugees reported leaving their homes prior to 1965, while 38.8% left during 1965 and over half, 51.6%, during the first six months of 1966. (Refugees who moved earlier than 1965 may be underrepresented in the sample, since many of these people have either returned to their villages or been sufficiently assimilated into local society that they are no longer identifiable as refugees.)

These peak points in the generation of refugees largely coincide with the intensification of the military activity in the province. The marked Viet-Cong build-up of mainforce units and the subsequent attempt to employ a quasi-conventional military strategy (beginning in the spring of 1965) were checkmated by the introduction of Allied troops in the fall of 1965. The second peak of January-February

Figure 9. Rate of Refugee Generation in Phu-Yen by Date
(n = 1193)



1966 coincides with the "rice harvest protection campaign" launched by Korean Marines and U. S. 101st Airborne troops in Hieu-Xuong and Tuy-Hoa Districts.

There were some important differences in the times of peak refugee movement for the different districts of Phu-Yen. Even in the two neighboring coastal districts of Hieu-Xuong and Tuy-Hoa, a different pattern of movement emerges: in Tuy-Hoa the movement peaks in November 1965, and in Hieu-Xuong it reaches its high point two months later in January 1966. This is largely due to the fact that in Tuy-Hoa, American field units began operation in the fall of 1965, while in Hieu-Xuong the "rice harvest protection campaign" of early 1966 was the first major Allied operation. An even greater difference in the time of peak refugee movement is apparent in the two inland districts of Son Hoa and Dong Xuan. In Son Hoa the movement is late, peaking in March-April 1966 (52% of the district's refugees moved during those two months), whereas in Dong Xuan the rate of generation is quite steady, although there is a slight peak early in 1965 (28% of the district's refugees moved in May-June 1965). However, this was considerably earlier than the peak of movement for the province as a whole and may reflect the impact of large mainforce Viet-Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units that reportedly began operating in the area in early 1965. Provincial officials state that in the spring of 1965 the inland districts were (as they still tend to be) the most insecure in Phu-Yen. Certainly Dong Xuan, bordering as it does the highland sanctuary of the insurgents and straddling the supply routes of mainforce Viet-Cong units, would very early have felt the impact of an increase in Viet-Cong military activity.

The remaining two districts, Tuy-An and Song-Cau, generated refugees at a relatively constant rate, with only slight peaks corresponding generally with the provincial pattern. (See Appendix A, Item 14.)

Geographical Patterns of Movement

Refugee movement in Phu-Yen has been almost wholly within the province and primarily within the district. Only three families (0.2% of the sample) came from outside Phu-Yen: two were from neighboring Binh-Dinh Province and one from Quang-Ngai Province. No information was available on movement by

Phu-Yen people into neighboring provinces. Since most of the provincial borders are difficult to cross, it is doubtful that migration across the borders occurred with any frequency. Phu Duc was the only district with easily passable borders, and some of its tribal population may possibly have crossed into Phu-Bon Province.

The great majority of refugees are natives of the same districts in which they are now settled. For example, of the refugee families who originated in villages in Tuy-Hoa District, 99% have relocated within the district. Dong Xuan and Hieu-Xuong are the only districts with less than 90% originating and resettling within the same district.

Expectedly, the interdistrict migration that did occur was from peripheral areas of the province toward the provincial capital. Of the refugees settled in Tuy-Hoa, 47% are from other districts, principally Dong Xuan and Hieu-Xuong.

The World War II and Korean War image of refugees as long columns of people trekking vast distances to escape from the paths of advancing armies does not apply to Phu-Yen, where refugees are traveling relatively short distances in relatively short periods of time.

Extent of Depopulation

The effect of the refugee movement on population density in GVN-controlled areas is highly visible, with some hamlets in the Tuy-Hoa area exhibiting an increase of over 100% in less than a year (see Chapter V). Indirect sources must be exploited to determine the nature of demographic shifts in these zones, and refugees offer one such source of information.

Item 17 in Appendix A presents estimates of the population remaining in villages in those Viet-Cong controlled and contested areas which have experienced refugee emigration. Caution is necessary in assessing this data, however, since the census figures used make no distinction between rural and urban populations within village boundaries. Presumably, in villages where the GVN controls the administrative center most refugee movement has been from outlying hamlets into the village headquarters. Thus, the actual magnitude of the population movement

out of Viet-Cong controlled areas may be considerably greater than is indicated by this data.

The decrease in village populations due to refugee emigration ranged from 1.0% to 58%. The mean rate of depopulation is 14.7% and median, 13% (see Figure 10 and Map 2).

Clearly refugee migration has not resulted in the wholesale depopulation of rural Phu-Yen. All but a few villages retain large civilian populations which can be exploited by the guerrillas. Refugee migration in Phu-Yen has not yet reached proportions sufficient to eliminate all effective VC population resources, as some Vietnamese and American officers had hoped it had, nor in planning Allied firepower can those who do remain be considered Viet-Cong.

Figure 10. Frequency Distribution of Villages by Percentage of Population Decrease
(n = 46)



MAP 2 ESTIMATED RATE OF DEPOPULATION OF VILLAGES IN PHU-YEN

Distance, Duration, and Means of Travel

The median distance traveled by Phu-Yen refugees from their homes to the relocation area was only 13 km (7.8 miles), and three-fourths of the refugees traveled no more than 18 km to the settlement sites.

The duration of travel was also short: over half (56%) of the refugees reached their new settlement site within 9 hours of leaving their home villages, and most of the rest (32%) arrived within one day.

An overwhelming majority--95%--traveled during the day. In this respect Phu-Yen refugees differ from those in the delta province of Dinh Tuong, where 15% reported moving at night.

The principal means of travel was walking (63%); 1 % used lambretta scooters or other motorized transport, and 7% used small boats or sampans (the figure for sampans is predictably higher [20%] in Song-Cau District, where fishermen form a large percentage of the refugee population).

(See Appendix A, Items 18-20.)

Composition of Travel Groups

The majority of refugees moved only with their immediate family members, but 44% indicate that their family accompanied (or was accompanied by) other hamlet neighbors. Only 2% moved alone. This fact suggests that there has been at least some carry-over of premigration village structure into the resettlement areas. This seems especially characteristic of the inland districts, where Montagnards have tended to move as village units. Thus 69% of the refugees in Dong Xuan and 56% in Son Hoa Districts report moving with covillagers--a considerably higher percentage than in the coastal districts, which have no Montagnard population.

Table 13. Composition of Refugee Travel Groups
(n = 1191)

Moved only with family members	610	51.2%
Moved with family and covillagers	533	44.8%
Moved alone	26	2.2%
Moved only with covillagers	20	1.7%
Other	2	0.1%

Dynamics of Movement

It is probable that close examination of the refugee population in terms of its various sociological subcategories would reveal differences in the patterns of movement for each grouping. Large landholders, for example, appear to become refugees relatively earlier than others. Refugees from NLF "liberated" areas more frequently cite Viet-Cong taxation or labor conscription as a factor in their decision to migrate than do refugees from marginal zones, where military activity may be the principal stimulus to movement.

This study of movement was not designed for detailed investigation of the migration patterns of various subclasses of the refugee population; however, on the basis of the data, it is possible to distinguish some tentative patterns of refugee movement in Phu-Yen, patterns which indicate that refugee movement appears to be closely correlated with the five phases the insurgency in that area has passed through.[1]

The Insurgency in Phu-Yen

During the resistance war against the French, Phu-Yen was a stronghold of the Viet-Minh. Phu-Yen had been a stronghold of the Viet-Minh after the Geneva Armistice. Viet-Minh regulars withdrew to North Viet-Nam, taking with them many local cadres and guerrillas who returned in the late 1950's to provide cadre for nascent Viet-Cong forces. Aided by underground cadres left behind in 1954 and faced with little significant GVN presence, they rapidly asserted insurgent control over large areas of the province.

One of the government's first attempts to establish substantially secure areas in the province was Operation Sea Swallow, in 1962,[2] which enjoyed short-lived successes: the town of Tuy-Hoa and nearby hamlets were "secured," civilian defense forces trained, armed civic action teams organized, and strategic hamlets established. Two years after the operation was launched, however, most of the defense groups had become ineffective and most of the strategic hamlets were either overrun or infiltrated by the Viet-Cong. This was brought about primarily by the introduction of large, well-armed units of North Vietnamese regulars (NVA),

and insurgent control was not significantly challenged again until the Tuy-Hoa-based 47th ARVN Regiment was bolstered by U. S. and Korean forces in late 1965.

One of the first joint campaigns in the province was the rice harvest protection campaign (Operation Van Buren) in January 1966.[3] It had been found that the Viet-Cong were using rice from the Tuy-Hoa Valley to supply units throughout the Central Highlands, while the government was forced to import some 600 tons of rice per month to feed the population of Tuy-Hoa. To deny this rice source to the guerrillas, Korean Marines, U. S. Army units, and ARVN forces physically guarded the paddies during the harvest.

The operation was successful; by the conclusion of the harvest in mid-February some 30,000 tons of rice had been marketed under government auspices (compared to only 12,000 tons in 1965), and the insurgents' control in the valley districts was greatly reduced. Unwanted results of the operation, however, included extensive property damage and a considerable movement of refugees into the Tuy-Hoa area. Hence a follow-on project was proposed to "rehabilitate" the refugees and to provide economic stability in the province by sending them back to their secured farms (see Appendix D). This project lost momentum with a change of province chiefs and at this writing is still in planning.

In late 1966, the long-entrenched guerrilla forces and the NVA units continued to pose a threat, but much of the populated area of the province had been classified as "secure" by sector authorities (see Map 3). In many areas considered secured, however, the insurgent infrastructure appeared to be relatively intact. The 47th ARVN Regiment and Hieu-Xuong District-based Korean Marine Brigade continue to conduct pacification operations within the province, and Allied mobile combat units enter Phu-Yen frequently on spoiling missions against suspected NVA buildups.

Regional and Popular Force units provide garrison security and reaction capability at district level, and two Vietnamese/U. S. Special Forces Camps in the inland districts are garrisoned by locally recruited Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG). In addition, several political action teams (PAT) have been deployed in the province to begin the task of building viable communities in the secured zones.

Map 3. Official View of the Pacification Situation in Phu-Yen Province



Source: ARVN Sector S-2
July 1966

Relationship of Movement to Phase of Insurgency

While the specific dates at which the events of the insurgency occur are different in each district of Phu-Yen, the sequence of events and of the rate of generation of refugees is identical, and the various factors influencing a refugee's decision to migrate are clearly related to the phases of the insurgency. For example, except for persons in certain social categories (e.g., GVN cadre), the desire to escape from physical insecurity is probably not a major motivation for becoming a refugee in the early phases of insurgency. However, after bombing and artillery shelling become a frequent occurrence in rural areas, physical survival obviously becomes a major concern to everyone, regardless of social class. Similarly, insurgent taxation, a relatively light burden in the initial phases of warfare, becomes increasingly onerous as Viet-Cong logistic needs mount with the military escalation in Phase III.

There is evidence that people belonging to different social categories tend to move at different stages of the insurgency. GVN cadre and their relatives, because of a justified fear of Viet-Cong reprisals against them, tend to flee from their homes when the guerrillas initially succeed in occupying an area. For example, one refugee from a hamlet in An-Tho village, Tuy-Hoa District, reported that after the Viet-Cong occupied his hamlet all members of the defeated self-defense forces fled to a GVN-controlled village.

Large landowners also appear to move at an earlier time on the average than do middle and poor peasants; there also appears to be a slight correlation between level of income and time of movement (see Appendix A, Items 21 and 22).

Data on correlations of other sociological factors with time of movement is lacking. It seems probable, for instance, that Catholics flee encroaching insurgent control earlier than do Buddhists, but there were not enough Catholics in the study sample to verify this hypothesis.

The following tentative description of "Patterns of Movement" is meant to indicate the kind of analysis that could be developed and applied to the problem of

planning for and coping with refugee movement. The material is presented in summary form on Table 14.

The Pattern of Refugee Movement in Phu-Yen

The insurgency in Phu-Yen described above can be divided into five fairly distinct phases, loosely labeled as follows: I, Insurgent Terrorism-GVN Countermeasures; II, Insurgent Offensive-GVN Retreat; III, Insurgent Control; IV, Large-Unit Conflict; and V, Pacification. The size of and motivation for refugee movement appear to be closely related to the development and intensity of the insurgency.

Phase I: Insurgent Terrorism-GVN Countermeasures. In the first phase, the insurgents initiated terrorist activity aimed at destroying the GVN presence in rural areas of Phu-Yen while gaining the support of the peasantry by eliminating "corrupt" officials and large landholders. The first refugees were wealthy persons and higher level officials moving from the villages to the security of the district towns or the province capital. The GVN responded to the Viet-Cong threat to rural stability in Phu-Yen with a major counterinsurgency effort, involving the construction of strategic hamlets and the formation of local self-defense units. This effort initially stabilized the situation (at least on the surface).

Phase II: Insurgent Offensive-GVN Retreat. Under continuing insurgent pressure, wide-scale disintegration of government defenses set in, and the guerrillas again moved to the offensive, defeating the civil guards and destroying the strategic hamlets. The first large group of refugees was generated at this time as GVN hamlet-level civil and military cadre and their relatives were forced to flee to the district towns to avoid VC reprisals.

Phase III: Insurgent Control. The insurgents solidified their position, establishing combat hamlets and proclaiming areas of Phu-Yen as "liberated." An extensive population control apparatus was set up, severely restricting free movement of persons. Refugee movement tapered off, consisting only of persons the Viet-Cong considered undesirable and allowed to leave (the old and infirm) and persons identified with the GVN, who were compelled to risk escape. They trickled into the now insecure district towns, where the battered ARVN was

Table 14. Refugee Movement and Phase of Insurgency

Phase of Insurgency	Type of Insurgent Activity	Type of Counter-insurgent Activity	Type of Refugee	Motivation for Leaving	Size of Movement
I. Insurgent Terrorism-GVN Countermeasures	Terrorism aimed at destroying GVN presence	Defensive, aimed at establishing strategic hamlets, defense corps	GVN officials, large landholders	Fear of terrorism	Very low
II. Insurgent Offensive-GVN Retreat	Large-scale offensive against hamlets and self-defense corps	Defensive and inadequate; abandonment of strategic hamlets, disbandment of self-defense corps .	Hamlet cadre, defense corps personnel	Fear of Reprisals	Low
III. Insurgent Control	Introduction of mainforce units, "liberating" areas and establishing population control	Defense of district towns	Old and infirm, GVN cadre	Desire to join relatives, fear of reprisals	Very Low
IV. Large-Unit Conflict	Defensive, protection of population control	Offensive, with conducted search and destroy operations	All categories of non-Viet-Cong supporters	Deterioration of rural conditions, fear of military activity, opportunity to escape	High
V. Pacification	Defensive, in hiding	Offensive, searching	All categories, including defecting VC and families, poorer or more conservative	Same as in IV	Medium

restricted to defensive positions against the mainforce units.

Phase IV: Large-Unit Conflict. Insurgent control tremendously increased the pressure on the rural population: taxes and labor demands escalated, conscription replaced voluntary recruitment, and coercion was substituted for persuasion. The Allies responded by introducing American and Korean units, and the intensity of military operations in the province increased, with a consequent increase in danger to the civilian population. A series of Allied spoiling operations launched into NLF "liberated" areas both restored a sense of security to the district capitals and disrupted the insurgent population control apparatus sufficiently to allow refugees to escape at will. Large numbers of rural people used the opportunity, and the major refugee flow occurred.

Phase V: Pacification. NVA and Viet-Cong mainforce units were sought in their mountainous refuge areas by large mobile Allied units, and refugees continued to move out of these areas into the margins of the slowly expanding zones of government pacification. At the same time refugees generated during the earlier phases were slowly beginning to move back from the district towns into their native villages as these were pacified.

(See also Appendix A, Item 23.)

Summary

- Refugee movement in Phu-Yen has been almost wholly intraprovincial and primarily intradistrict; the small amount of interdistrict movement was largely toward the provincial capital of Tuy-Hoa. As this suggests, the median distance traveled by Phu-Yen refugees from their homes to their relocation area is short: the mean distance was only 13 km (7.8 miles), and three-fourths of the refugees traveled 18 km or less.

- Duration of travel was also short: over half (56%) reached their new settlement site within 9 hours, and most of the rest arrived within one day. An overwhelming majority (95%) traveled wholly during the daytime, differing from refugees in Dinh Tuong Province, 15% of whom moved after dark.

● The principal means of travel was walking, cited by 63%; 13% used lambr' 'a scooters or other motorized transport and 7% used small boats.

● The majority of refugees--51.2%--moved only with their immediate family members, and 44% indicate that their family traveled with other hamlet neighbors; only 2% moved alone. This indicates at least some carry-over of premigration village structure into the resettlement areas.

● If the pattern of insurgent-counterinsurgent activity which occurred in Phu-Yen proves applicable elsewhere, the type and number of refugees can be generally foreseen. The factors operating in each phase singly would appear to operate even where the sequence of events varies. Among the more obvious indications are the following.

1. When VC activity is fairly low level and specifically directed at GVN representatives, the general population does not feel sufficiently threatened to migrate. The number of refugees will be very low, consisting of those specifically threatened.

2. When VC activity becomes more intense and succeeds in destroying government defenses, those connected with the defenses, fearing reprisals, will seek to escape before VC control is fully established. The general population still does not feel sufficiently threatened to move, and the number of refugees, while higher than that in Phase I, is still low.

3. When the VC are firmly in control, it is extremely difficult to escape, although motivation to do so is constantly increased: along with the increased VC troop strength come increased burdens on the population--heavier taxation, conscription, and forced labor. But while more of the general population now feel threatened, for most of them the dangers involved in escaping are too great, and refugee movement is again very low.

4. When the VC population control is sufficiently disrupted by intensive counterinsurgent military activity, large numbers of the general population will use the opportunity to get out, to escape the burdens of the VC and to get away from the dangers of the military activities.

5. When the counterinsurgents are expanding the pacified areas, refugee movement continues at a medium rate, coming from the marginal areas where military activity remains intense, and the refugees now include VC defectors and families.

Figure 11. Hypothetical Rate of Refugee Generation



Footnotes

[1] A forthcoming task of the HSR Refugee Study Project will be to correlate data collected in Phu-Yen on the time of movement of refugees with CincPAC Data Bank information on military activity in the hamlets of the province.

[2] Denis Warner, The Last Confucian (New York: Macmillan, 1963), pp. 178-193.

[3] Capt. Larry R. Lubenow, "Objective Rice," Infantry, (Nov.-Dec. 1966), pp. 41-42.

CHAPTER V. RELIEF AND RESETTLEMENT CHARACTERISTICS

Introduction

The most critical aspect of refugee movement is undoubtedly the relief and resettlement phase. To harried Vietnamese provincial officials, the refugee problem is almost wholly the pressing problem of "what to do with them once they are on the doorstep." Yet the policies and attitudes of Vietnamese officials toward the refugee situation--both at the national and provincial levels--have not been clearly defined. Since mid-1965 province officials have been guided in handling and resettling refugees by a number of varying and occasionally contradictory policies. Government policies took different shapes in each province as different officials applied personal interpretations to the national directives on refugee assistance and resettle ent.

Many of the difficulties of policy makers can be attributed to the suddenness with which the number of refugees grew, as well as to the unavailability in Saigon of reliable information on which to base plans for handling and resettling refugees. One of the goals of this study was to develop such information by investigating what impact becoming a refugee has had on the lives of the persons involved, their adaptation to their new situation, and the host community's reaction toward the influx of refugees.

This chapter contains information about the official governmental policies and practices relevant to the refugee situation in Phu-Yen, discussing some of the factors and attitudes that worked to shape refugee assistance policies and the relief and resettlement programs that have been attempted. In addition, relief and resettlement have been viewed from the perspective of the refugees: how much aid they actually receive, why they are where they are, and in what kind of conditions they live. Equally important is the economic and social impact of refugee settlement on the host communities. Finally, information is presented on the refugees' adaptation to resettlement life.

The chapter concludes with a brief summary of Phu-Yen official comme on the success of the provincial refugee program.

Government Organization, Policies, and Attitudes

National Level

The standard functional agencies of government--from agriculture and police to finance--are represented at the provincial level in Phu-Yen. Each agency is responsible to a ministry in Saigon and in theory follows general, nationwide policies, although these may be modified or even contravened under the immediate direction and influence of a particular Province Chief. But prior to 1965, there was no single governmental agency either in Saigon or at the province level responsible for refugee assistance. Aid given to refugees was at the discretion of the individual province chiefs, and the Central Government, in an attempt to encourage the refugees to return home, at that time would provide only emergency subsistence relief. By the beginning of 1965, however, the Central Government reached the decision that some longer range program of relief and resettlement had to be implemented.

Official responsibility for refugees was divided between the Ministry of Social Welfare and the Ministry of Rural Construction (or "Revolutionary Development"). At the outset there was no clearly defined division of responsibilities, and little coordination of programs or plans occurred between these two agencies; but by the end of 1965 a de facto division of labor was officially recognized in their budgeting: Social Welfare was responsible for initial monetary and welfare assistance, but after a certain time, if it was determined that the refugees could not return to their villages, the Ministry of Rural Construction provided resettlement payments.

Government officials, however, still regarded refugees primarily as a liability. As a USAID report[1] noted, two concerns influenced the administration of the program in 1965. The first was that of introducing safeguards to prevent misuse of funds for relief payments, with the consequence that funds were often

released too late to serve the purpose for which they were allocated. The second preoccupation was that of encouraging refugees to return home by creating "temporary" facilities designed to be adequate only for short-term occupancy. As the rate of inflow of refugees far exceeded the rate of return or resettlement, these temporary facilities often became grossly overcrowded, resulting in health and public safety hazards.

By late 1965, the Ministry of Social Welfare had begun to increase its staff and assign special refugee representatives to certain provinces with large refugee concentrations, such as Quang Nam, Binh-Dinh, and Phu-Yen. However, there was still a lack of clarity as to the assignment of ministerial responsibility. Occasionally refugees would receive resettlement payments but no temporary aid, while other times they would receive temporary aid but no resettlement payment. Finally, in an attempt to remedy the situation, a single governmental agency for handling refugees was established.

In February 1966, a Special Commissioner for Refugees was established in the Prime Minister's Office, to be responsible for all phases of refugee assistance and resettlement. The Commissioner was empowered to establish an office and to co-opt certain budgetary and personnel resources of the Ministries of Social Welfare and Rural Construction. Considerable time was expended in developing the internal organization of the new commission, and as of July 1966 the new Special Refugee Representative in Phu-Yen was not yet fully operative.

By the end of the summer of 1966, the Refugee Commission's organizational process appeared complete, and the newly designated Commissioner issued a statement indicating that considerable rethinking of the government's refugee policy was being undertaken. In summer 1967 assistance to refugees was administered through the office of the Special Refugee Representative, who was responsible both to Saigon and the Province Chief. An American Assistant Province Representative from USAID has been working, first under USAID's Office of Refugee Coordination, then under the Office of Civil Operations, and now under CORDS' Refugee Division, to provide material and advisory support.

Province Level

Official opinion in Phu-Yen has been consistently divided on the full range of refugee questions--on resettlement and assistance policies, handling of refugees, amounts and kind of aid, and even on who should be recognized as a "refugee." Attitudes of officials on the refugee problem were gathered during both formal and informal interviews with GVN and U. S. provincial authorities responsible for refugee affairs.[2] The principal view of most Vietnamese officials interviewed was that refugees represented an overwhelming drain upon limited local resources. This was a particular concern in outlying districts of Phu-Yen, which are dependent on long and vulnerable supply lines. The problem was especially acute during the initial stages of refugee movement in the fall of 1965 and winter of 1966, when the logistics of refugee aid were still grossly inadequate (and the large American buildup had just begun).

The centralization of decision-making authority which characterizes the Vietnamese bureaucratic system contributed to a reduction in the efficiency with which district officials (however well motivated) met the increasing refugee problem. Distribution of relief payments and supplies were delayed until a representative of the Province Chief could arrive in the District to personally oversee the disbursement. Given the shortages of personnel and transportation, it was often months before relief supplies could be given out in the remote districts.

Undoubtedly these factors did much to predispose the attitude of government authorities, particularly at the district level, against further refugee movement. But there were also a number of other attitudes that frequently served to influence policies concerning refugees. Several officials, for instance, expressed the moral concern that it was wrong and inconsistent with Vietnamese tradition for refugees to receive money without doing "an honest day's work." This was

invoked to justify a policy of providing only limited supplies on a temporary basis as the sole kind of government assistance. Many officials expressed the fear that refugees would stay permanently if adequate temporary shelters and resettlement facilities were provided. In turn, others (mostly Americans) argued that living conditions in the refugees' home villages were far more attractive than life in the refugee camps, and that there was no reason to think they would not return to their homes as soon as possible.

Occasionally, suspicions were voiced that refugees were part of a Viet-Cong "plot" to undermine the government. Refugees, it was said, could provide cover for the infiltration of Viet-Cong agents and that they threatened to upset the social-political harmony of urban areas. But more basic was a general, unstated, and ill-defined suspicion of the refugees themselves: it was felt that since most came very recently from Viet-Cong areas they must, ipso facto, represent a threat. This attitude was particularly felt toward those refugees who came out, or were forced out, during military operations. The province chief stated it succinctly: "How can we trust them? They have lived with the Viet-Cong for a rather long time. And they didn't come out because they wanted to."

Official Encouragement or Discouragement of Refugee Movement

The ambivalence officials felt toward refugees was especially clear when they were asked whether the government had "either encouraged or discouraged people in Viet-Cong areas to move to secure areas." Significantly, there was no consistent policy in Phu-Yen, at least as practiced at the district level. Of the thirteen respondents to the questionnaire, four indicated no government action either way; three said the government encouraged people to return to their village; four said the government encouraged refugees to move; one said the government discouraged refugees; and one did not know. While one District Chief reported that "we encourage people to move to secure areas by mounting operations and sending out civil affairs teams to call people out," another District Chief said "we discourage them because there are no facilities or program(s) for refugees if they did come."

The uncertainty many officials felt is reflected in one district chief's comment: "Only those who hate the Viet-Cong or have experience with the VC really want or beg us to provide transportation for them to move out. Yet, by helping them, we put more charge on our shoulders and fall into the VC trap. We want to see them return to their villages as the 'return-to-the-village' campaign is intended." (See Appendix D.) Another phrased the pros and cons this way: "Refugees may overburden the government system in some respects, but at least they deprive the Viet-Cong of human resources." But some authorities saw no advantage to hosting refugees. One district official recounted with regret that the government had unintentionally encouraged refugees when it told people during a "rice harvest protection campaign" to move out for three days. "Unfortunately," he said, "most never returned after the three days." Another official reported that in his district "the government tries to make them stay in the villages by threatening not to classify them as refugees."

It can, of course, be argued that it is not necessary that policy be consistent for all districts: people may be encouraged to become refugees in one district while in another it may be wise to encourage them to return home. Yet there is a need to insure that policy goals are understood by those responsible for their implementation. Refugees already represent some 8% of the total population of Viet-Nam--17% in Phu-Yen--and the problems of determining whether to discourage or encourage refugees and specifying the circumstances that favor one action or the other are important enough to warrant careful study.

"Return to the Village" Campaign

There was one effort in Phu-Yen to prepare a comprehensive, long-range plan for handling refugees. Inspired by the need to get the farmers who moved as a result of the rice harvest protection operation back to their rice lands, top provincial officials launched a "return to the village" campaign (see Appendix D) to induce the refugees who had moved into the Tuy-Hoa area to return home. The campaign contained plans for reconstructing villages in the Tuy-Hoa and Hieu-Xuong Valley for mobilizing large numbers of cadre, for securing villages with the new Popular Force units, for transporting refugees back home--but

none of the plans fully materialized. In fact, the month that the plan was reported to Saigon as being in operation was the peak point in the generation of new refugees. Months later, after the campaign had clearly failed to reach its intended objectives, "return to the village" was still invoked as the "solution" to the Tuy-Hoa refugee problem. It had not succeeded, it was argued (with some justification), because Corps had failed to supply the province with resources necessary to implement it. (Phu-Yen was at the time a low priority province in II Corps and consequently General Vinh-Loc is reported to have refused to endorse the "return to the village" campaign.)

An unfortunate effect of the "return to the village" proposal was the focusing of official attention on reversing the direction of refugee flow: attention and resources were diverted from meeting the pressing demands of refugees arriving each day, stalling for months the construction of any new government temporary shelters.

Refugee Aid Practices

Although Phu-Yen Province followed no single, uniform refugee policy in 1965-66, and official opinion towards refugees varied greatly, there were nonetheless some areas of agreement. For example, although there was no standard definition of a "refugee," there was a common tendency among all officials interviewed to advocate a very loose definition. Most officials stated that any Vietnamese who came to government-controlled areas from what were deemed as "insecure areas" should qualify as a refugee. Most did not require that the refugee prove his need of assistance; it was simply assumed that if he had abandoned his home, he had also abandoned his source of livelihood--hence his need for government assistance was implicit. Two officials, however, qualified this by indicating that if refugees brought out their means of production, or could return home frequently, they could be denied assistance. The only limitation that was insisted upon by ten of the thirteen officials was that it had to be proved, through some kind of "investigation," that refugees came from insecure areas and were not Viet-Cong.

As of August 1966 no single definition of a "refugee" had been formally adopted at the Saigon level either, although a number of definitions were employed by USAID's Office of Refugee Coordination to guide their representatives in the field. These were broad in scope and generally defined a refugee as "a displaced person who is outside of his normal area of residence and who cannot return to his home area for fear of persecution or physical injury." He is eligible for U. S. aid if he has: "1) voluntarily fled from Communist territory, been displaced through military action or Viet-Cong terror, or been made homeless by flood conditions; 2) been screened by the appropriate security forces; 3) been registered by the Social Welfare cadre; and 4) resides in an area designated as a refugee area or resides temporarily with relatives or friends in an area not normally considered his firm place of abode."

In contrast, however, to official permissiveness in defining "refugees," there were great difficulties in assisting people classified, by whatever criteria, as refugees. This may have partially reflected the inability of provincial officials to aid refugees--due to shortages of supplies and allotted relief funds, particularly at the district level--but it also reflected a failure to realistically assess the nature and magnitude of refugee movement. Some time lag is expected between the time a refugee moves and the time he is finally tallied in official statistics, but the disparity between GVN, USAID, and this study's estimates of the cumulative refugee population for Phu-Yen is nonetheless considerable. Whereas at the end of July 1966, Ministry of Social Welfare figures for Phu-Yen indicated the same total of 44,689 refugees that it had reported for nearly a year, USAID's Refugee Representative was reporting a considerably higher cumulative total of 73,788 while HSR, on the basis of interviews with hamlet as well as district officials, estimated the province total at 54,455, which may be low, since an undetermined number of refugee families probably returned home before the survey was taken. This would seem to substantiate the view of some USAID officials that Vietnamese administrators generally underestimated the size of the refugee population--hence, the refugee problem--during this period.

The terms "temporary" and "resettled" refugee were fairly casually employed in Phu-Yen. Although eventually there were specific policies established in Saigon, first by the Ministry of Welfare and then by the Special Commissioner for Refugees, outlining the categories and amounts of aid for refugees, administration of these policies in Phu-Yen was not uniform. Technically (as of August 1966), a "refugee" is entitled to aid as follows. Upon his initial classification as a "temporary refugee," he is eligible to stay in government-provided shelters, if available. A family is eligible for 10 piastres per day per person (or 4 piastres per day and 400 grams of rice per day--i.e., 13 kilograms per month). Persons capable of working are entitled to receive this aid for one month; those over 60 or disabled and children under eight years of age are eligible for three months. After a period of no more than three months in a "temporary" status, a refugee family becomes classified as "relocated" or "resettled" and is eligible for a resettlement payment of 3,500 piastres and 50 kilos of rice per family per month for six months (or 3,000 piastres).

There can be little doubt, however, that these specifications for refugee aid were rarely applied in Phu-Yen. The exigencies of the situation--poor logistics, inadequate aid authorizations, and scarce manpower to administer the aid--compelled each district chief to spread limited resources in the broadest manner possible. The result was that relatively few refugees in Phu-Yen received the full assistance allotments legally due them. Hence, in Phu-Yen, the categories of "temporary" and "resettled" refugee were useful largely for complying with the information requirements set by the government in Saigon.

Probably the only refugees in Phu-Yen to receive the full amount of legally authorized aid were those in the temporary shelters at Chop Chai and Dong Tac (camps located near Tuy-Hoa city). They were generally given the specified relief payments and, after a period of varying length, most were given space in the "resettlement" camps of Dong Tac and Ninh Tinh. But by any calculation this group of refugees represented an extremely small portion of the estimated province total, probably no more than 7%.

For a refugee to be officially registered as such was a lengthy and complicated process, especially prior to the mid-1966 ruling of the Refugee Commissioner which simplified the registration process.[3] To receive aid a refugee had to have a registration card on which the amounts of aid he received could be entered. The issuance of this card was preceded by a security investigation by district police and by considerable paperwork.

As noted earlier, the total number of refugees registered in Phu-Yen is somewhat uncertain. In February 1966, USAID reported that a cumulative total of 43,874 refugees had received regular piastre payments, out of the province officials' reported total of 48,468. According to these figures, 90% of the refugees in Phu-Yen had been registered and received aid. However, this contrasts sharply with the data obtained from this survey. As shown in Table 15, only 61.2% of the refugees reported receiving any government aid, while 38.8% reported receiving no aid at all. This figure is 30% lower than USAID's estimate. More important, however, is that contrary to both USAID and GVN figures, over a third of the refugees in Phu-Yen report having received no aid at all. While data from this item on the questionnaire may be biased due to the tendency for respondents to underestimate the aid they actually received in hopes of obtaining more, the general results are substantiated both by personal observations in refugee settlements and by interviews with officials at the hamlet and district level.

Further, it is interesting to note how long it takes for a refugee to receive government aid. As Table 15 illustrates, the longer a refugee stays in resettlement areas the greater chance he has of receiving government aid. Of those refugee families in resettlement areas over six months (approximately half of the sample), 74% have received aid while only 26% have not. But of those who have been in resettlement areas less than six months, only 48% report receiving aid, while 52% say they have received no aid.

Table 15. Government Aid Received

vs. Length of Stay
(n = 1176)

Period in Resettlement	Total Number of Refugees	Received GVN Aid	No Aid
Under 1 month	21 (2%)	15 (71%)	6 (29%)
1 - 3 months	158 (13%)	78 (50%)	80 (50%)
4 - 6 months	424 (36%)	200 (47%)	224 (53%)
Over 6 months	573 (49%)	425 (74%)	148 (26%)
Totals	1,176 (100%)	718 (61%)	458 (39%)

Nature of Refugee Aid

Not surprisingly, of those receiving aid, most (85.1%) say they received food stuff; less than half (45.9%) report monetary assistance. Analysis of the breakdown at the district level between money and food as the kind of assistance received illustrates that the farther a district is from the provincial capital, the less likely it is to dispense money as refugee aid.

In Tuy-Hoa and and Hieu-Xuong Districts (near the province capital) the balance between the distribution of money and food is nearly equal. But the difference in the inland districts is considerable: in Son Hoa, of those who received aid, money is cited by only 8.8%, and food by 59.3%; in Dong Xuan the difference is even greater, with money cited by only 4.7% and food by 92.8%. This partially reflects administrative distance: provincial authorities will not allocate funds for refugee allotments, but will allow USAID to supply and transport relief foodstuffs. This difference is also due to the fact that inland districts are "cut off" and inflation in food prices is considerable; hence a food allotment is more valuable than the authorized ten piastres.

Responses of refugees in Son Hoa District indicate that more have received government aid there than in any other district. Only 6.1% of the refugees

there report receiving no aid at all, while 93.9% say they have received some kind of aid. This is in contrast to all other districts where from 40% to 50% of the respondents report receiving no aid; Son Hoa is over 30 percentage points higher than the province as a whole. This district's record in aiding refugees is due in large part to energy and effectiveness of its district chief. As in so many respects throughout Viet-Nam, an administrator with sufficient initiative can turn a more or less hopeless situation into a hopeful one.

Selection of Settlement Sites

Only 14% of the refugees in Phu-Yen are located in government refugee "camps" or resettlement areas. Most refugee families have relocated in existing hamlets surrounding the major provincial towns, where they have moved in with relatives or friends (approximately 36%) or built temporary homes next to the houses of villagers whom they know or on land provided by the local hamlet or village chief. Over half (54%) said they had friends/relatives already living at the resettlement site, while 49% said they had made previous visits to the settlement area. Undoubtedly this familiarity with the resettlement site--the fact that a familiar face would likely be there--not only influenced the selection of the site, but may have given the added degree of confidence necessary to actually leave home and become a refugee. This is further reflected in that the principal reason (36.8%) given by refugees for selecting a resettlement site was that friends and relatives were already located there (see Appendix A, Item 24).

Other factors important in influencing the selection of resettlement sites were that GVN authorities arranged the site (18.8%), that hamlet or village chiefs advised or gave the land to them (11.1%), and, more generally, that the land was simply "available" (11.7%). Another important factor conditioning the refugee's selection of a resettlement area was the availability of employment (cited by 10.6%). That security reasons are not specifically mentioned as frequently as might be expected is due perhaps to the fact that security is implicit in whatever site a refugee chooses since they are all in close proximity to the relative security offered by the major provincial towns. Even so, in selecting the exact location within or around those towns, 8.5% of the refugees explicitly considered security as a factor.

There are some notable contrasts between the different districts of Phu-Yen in the reasons given for selection of resettlement sites--most particularly between Son Hoa and Song-Cau Districts (see Appendix A, Item 25). In Son Hoa, a considerably greater percentage (45.6%) of refugees indicated that the relocation site had been arranged by the government than is the case for the province as a whole. In Song-Cau, on the other hand, only 6.3% of the refugees reported that the GVN had arranged the resettlement site, while 49.1% cited friends or relatives already there. This is a reflection of the policy followed by the Song-Cau district chief, who took pride in having no government temporary camps in his district. He felt that temporary camps too easily degenerate into refugee "slums," so he, in effect, required refugees to relocate in or next to existing houses. "It is a good policy," he argued, "to require them to build only of thatch and to live like their neighbors, instead of [in] ugly relocation camps built of tin."

Living Conditions in Settlements

There are three basic kinds of refugee settlements in Phu-Yen: 1) government-built "camps"; 2) individually constructed houses in existing hamlets; and 3) entirely new settlements constructed by groups of refugees that have moved together and established a new hamlet nearer the security of a district town.

The most visible refugees in Phu-Yen are those relocated in camps around Tuy-Hoa. Technically, there are two kinds of government camps--"temporary camps" and "resettlements." But just as the distinctions between the classifications of "temporary" refugees and "resettled" refugees are blurred, so too are the distinctions between the two types of settlements. In theory the "temporary" camps shelter refugees only for the three-month period during which they receive temporary aid. If after that time they are still unable to return to their native hamlet, they are entitled to receive a resettlement payment and to construct a new home (in Phu-Yen the government rarely gives refugees the money; instead, it provides space in resettlement areas). The only physical distinction between the temporary and resettlement camps is that in the temporary camps refugees

all live together in one long house, while in resettlement areas each family has an individual compartment. The construction is the same: galvanized sheeting attached to bamboo frames.

Living conditions in the camps verge on squalor and certainly substantiate the Song-Cau district chief's description as "refugee slums." The temporary camps represent the worst living conditions: noise is constant, bands of children are literally everywhere, and families are denied any privacy. Because there are only two temporary shelters in the province they are inevitably overcrowded, with thirty or more families sharing one long house. The construction is simple: concrete floors, tin sheets for walls and roof and split bamboo sleeping platforms with no partitions. In addition, there are several wells, a sheltered concrete slab which serves as a communal kitchen, and a large concrete, tin-sided latrine (which was unused and unusable after the first month because refugees refused to clean it).

The resettlement areas are not very different. The corrugated metal long houses are divided into individual family units and no cement is used for floors. A few wells are provided, but there are no latrines. One of the first resettlement areas to be constructed (Dong Tac Resettlement) appeared exceptionally shoddy after only six months, largely because its metal sheets had rusted (reportedly because the district chief, who has since been relieved of duty, purchased inferior tin siding, pocketing the rest of the allotted money for himself). Many American observers criticize the use of tin for refugee camps, for in the hot, dry season of Central Viet-Nam even the occasionally brisk sea breeze fails to cool what become tin "hot-houses." But although thatch is cooler, tin is actually preferred by many Vietnamese villagers, principally because it is a status symbol of sorts and, more importantly, because it need not be changed and repaired each year.

The worst feature of both the temporary and resettlement sites is that they have been built upon sand. This is perhaps unavoidable in the Tuy-Hoa area, where all arable land is already occupied. But in the case of resettlement areas, this fact undermines the presumed goal of "resettlement": to relocate a displaced

villager, who normally depends upon the land, in such a way that he may again be self-sufficient. Unfortunately, the sandy settlement areas of Tuy-Hoa do not provide even the possibility for small gardens.

The observable plight of refugees relocated in camps tends, however, to distract attention from the majority of refugees, who are less visible, blending into existing hamlets around major provincial towns. As Figures 12-19 show, most of these refugees have built houses similar in most respects to the small thatched huts they left behind in their native hamlets. In the Tuy-Hoa Valley area these refugees have been accommodated by local hamlet and village chiefs (usually following the directives of the district chief), who have temporarily given them land on the outskirts of the hamlet. Their thatched homes are distinguishable from those of the native residents only in that the thatch is brighter because it is new, and because their houses are more closely situated and grouped. In Song-Cau District, however, the "grouping" is less marked, and refugee houses tend to be thoroughly distributed throughout existing hamlets.

The third kind of refugee resettlement pattern--of entire hamlets relocating elsewhere--occurs mostly in the inland districts of Son Hoa and Dong Xuan (particularly among Montagnards). These settlements are usually grouped in hamlets around the district town, or, in the case of Dong Tre, around a U. S. Special Forces camp. Again, construction is simply a modification of the normal hamlet pattern: for the Vietnamese, thatched dirt-floor huts; for the Montagnards, thatched bamboo houses raised on stilts. Although there is generally some arable land available, it is insufficient to support the increased population, and scarcity of food is still acute in the inland districts.

Impact of Refugees on the Community

Except for refugees located in camps, a casual observer is unlikely to notice the majority of refugees in Tuy-Hoa; despite a few noticeably temporary looking thatched huts in the "suburbs" of the city, the surrounding hamlets seem hardly disturbed. In fact, however, the impact of the refugees upon the older residents has been marked.

One measure suggestive of the impact of refugees on settlement areas is the sharp population increase in hamlets around Tuy-Hoa. The influx of refugees has increased the population of some hamlets by over 100%: Binh Hoa in Tuy-Hoa city increased by 112%, and in Hieu-Xuong, Phuoc Binh increased by 121% and Phuoc Loc by 112%. The average population increase in the 20 hamlets surrounding Tuy-Hoa was nearly 50%. (See Table 16 and Map 4.)

In interviews with 19 hamlet chiefs and deputy hamlet chiefs in the Tuy-Hoa area, economic problems were the most frequently mentioned results of refugee resettlement. Inflation was the principal problem cited. This is not surprising, since there are more people now competing for a relatively static quantity of goods. The Tuy-Hoa housewife is clearly aware of this, as demonstrated by a brief economic survey undertaken during this study by Robert L. Sansom. In twenty-one interviews with residents of one hamlet outside Tuy-Hoa, over half of the respondents cited refugees as the reason why prices have increased. As Sansom writes, "One 21-year-old housewife actually stated (in literal translation) that 'prices had gone up because consumption had increased in Tuy-Hoa while production had decreased.'"

Hamlet chiefs stated that unemployment and food shortages were other economic problems resulting from the immigration of refugees. All affected the refugees more than the local residents. The increase in unemployment was seen as the result of refugees (most of whom were formerly involved in agriculture) moving into hamlets where all available farmland was cultivated and no real need existed for additional sources of labor. In three hamlets the majority of the residents were said to own land, and only in one hamlet could any of the landowners provide jobs for refugees as agricultural laborers. In another hamlet the residents were predominantly tenant farmers and therefore could provide no jobs for refugees; in fact, the refugees were seen as competitors for the limited employment opportunities available to native residents.

The hamlet chiefs also cited problems of sanitation and education; inadequate local facilities could not cope with the substantial new burdens presented by the refugees. In the area of education, this is reflected in the fact that only 14% of the refugee children in Phu-Yen between the ages of 5 and 19 are attending

Figure 12. Dong Tac Resettlement Camp near Tuy-Hoa



Fourteen percent of the Phu-Yen population live in government camps or resettlements.

Figure 13. Montagnard Family in Dong Tre

Most refugees in Phu-Yen have built shelters in existing hamlets. Note bomb shelter in front of house.

Figure 14. Resettled Montagnard Village



Montagnards tend to move as village units. This tribal village resettled at Dong Tre Special Forces Camp.

Figure 15. Resettlement of Refugee Fishermen

Occasionally an entire Vietnamese hamlet population moves to a new location, as did these fishermen on Hon Chua Island.

Figure 16. Construction of Montagnard House



A Hroi tribesman in Cung Son District builds a home of thatch and bamboo (Fig. 16) in the distinctive style of Montagnard houses on stilts (Fig. 17).

Figure 17. Typical Montagnard House on Stilts



Figure 18. Refugee Houses before Viet-Cong Attack

The Viet-Cong burned refugee houses in Ap Phuoc Binh and ordered the people to return to their native villages. Instead, the refugees salvaged such possessions as survived the fire and built new shelters.

Figure 19. Makeshift Shelter Built Following Attack



Table 16. Population Increase in Tuy-Hoa and Hieu-Xuong Districts Caused by Refugee Movement

Hamlet	Native Population	Refugee Population	Percent Increase
1. Hon Chua	0	2,675	100.0*
2. Lien Tri	910	192	21.1
3. Phuoc Hau	2,616	1,675	64.0
4. Ninh Tinh	1,425	923	64.8
5. Phuoc Khanh	1,556	177	11.4
6. Dong Phuoc	2,493	1,233	49.5
7. Tuy-Hoa City			
Binh Hoa	3,991	4,496	112.7
Binh Loi	1,939	1,763	90.9
Binh My	5,350	1,855	34.7
Binh Tinh	7,728	4,517	58.4
8. Phu An	1,332	92	6.9
9. Dong Binh	897	180	20.1
10. Ngoc Lang	1,800	1,507	83.7
11. Phong Nien	2,048	225	11.0
12. Phuoc Binh	3,100	3,755	121.1
13. Phuoc Loc	3,300	3,725	112.9
14. Phu Lam	5,295	2,070	39.1
15. Dong Tac	1,899	275	14.5
16. Dong My	2,464	1,200	48.7
TOTALS	50,143	32,535	64.8

Source: Interviews with Hamlet Chiefs

*The case of Hon Chua hamlet is unique: located on Hon Chua Island it was an unpopulated area until refugees started immigrating from coastal hamlets (mostly My Quang).



Map 4 Population Increase
Caused by Refugee Movement
(Tuy-Hoa and Hieu-Xuong Districts)

school. This percentage is approximately in line with the general estimate for all of Viet-Nam, according to the USAID Viet-Nam Refugee Monthly Report for April 1966, which states that only 15% to 20% of the refugee children are presently in school as against 60% to 70% of the children for the general population.[4] Not unexpectedly, males are given preferential treatment by their families, with 50% more boys in school than girls (see Table 17). Although the construction of temporary schools in refugee settlement areas to supplement existing facilities has the highest priority of both the GVN and USAID, the low percentage of children attending school reflects that the program has not made notable progress in Phu-Yen.

Table 17. Percentage of Refugee Children Attending School (n = 2618)

Ages	In School			Totals	
	Male	Female	Both Sexes	Male	Female
5-9	13.2% (78)	7.3% (39)	10.4% (117)	100% (590)	100% (533)
10-14	24.3% (122)	16.6% (76)	20.6% (198)	100% (501)	100% (457)
15-19	18.9% (44)	4.1% (12)	10.4% (56)	100% (1324)	100% (304)
Totals	18.4% (244)	9.8% (127)	14.1% (371)	100% (1324)	100% (1294)

Although these and other problems were reported by hamlet chiefs, there was no mention of social friction resulting from the refugee influx. Three hamlet chiefs specifically commented on the absence of friction. One of these chiefs was from a fishing village, and since the refugees were also fishermen and there was no shortage of sea space, the refugees were welcomed and absorbed. In the second case, the refugees were organized and living as a separate hamlet. The third chief mentioned that the refugees had been scattered throughout the hamlet and harmoniously shared hamlet facilities.

Security considerations also worried the hamlet chiefs. Two were worried that because some of the refugees worked outside of the hamlet--occasionally in their old village--they may have had continued contact with the Viet-Cong. Another suspected the motives of the refugees: he felt that because they had all left their homes because of bombings, rather than to escape the insurgents, they may have actually sympathized with the Viet-Cong. One hamlet chief also noted that the sharp increase in the hamlet's population created control problems for the local police. Finally, one hamlet chief confessed that he did not stay in the hamlet at night because the Viet-Cong essentially "controlled" it after dark, probably, he said, receiving support from some of the refugees.

Refugee Adaptation to Resettlement Life

It is difficult to know how traumatic it actually is for a Vietnamese family to become refugees--to estimate the impact of migration upon them economically, socially, and psychologically and to determine what difficulties they face in adapting to resettlement life. As indicated in Chapter IV, refugees in Phu-Yen move only a short distance, and consequently are usually familiar with the area they are moving to--indeed, half have friends or relatives there upon whom they can perhaps rely for help. Despite this fact, moving to a new area inevitably exercises disruptive effects on people and requires them to adapt to a new living situation. In addition to the socio-economic aspects of refugee adaptation discussed here, there is clearly a psychological dimension to adaptation, but its study is less amenable to the mass survey, quantitative approach used here. Unfortunately,

little research has focused on the impact of refugee "camp" life upon Vietnamese family life. It is the subjective reaction of most visitors to resettlement camps (such as those in Tuy-Hoa city) that there has been a significant toll on certain Vietnamese social values: there are indications of increased lack of juvenile discipline, family separations, debilitating idleness, and interfamily conflicts. During the lengthy and frequent visits to the same camps in Tuy-Hoa, the authors more than once observed emotion-charged fights between housewives forced by camp conditions to live unbearably close to each other.[5]

One indication of the economic impact felt by refugees is that one-third of the refugee families reported losing all their possessions when they moved. The remaining report retaining at least minimal possessions: 65% say they retained clothing, 53% food stuffs, and 32% money. Only 20% of those retaining possessions say they were able to save livestock, and 10% furniture. Largely because most refugees were farmers, only 7%--mostly craftsmen--report retention of any major means of production (see Appendix A, Item 26).

Although most refugees moved a relatively short distance, they appear to be largely cut off from their native hamlets. Only 16% of the refugees report making return visits to their home (see Appendix A, Item 27). The principal reason given for such trips was to collect possessions they left behind. For this purpose, most found only one trip necessary, although a few made two to five trips. There were also a few refugees in Phu-Yen (mostly in the Tuy-Hoa Valley area) who were able to return to their home land to harvest crops: 22 reported frequent visits. Undoubtedly, some of these trips were made possible during the "rice harvest protection campaign" of January-February 1966, launched by provincial officials using Vietnamese, Korean, and American military units.

Changes in Occupation

One of the principal adaptations refugees from rural areas face when relocating is the requirement to find new employment. Most had been involved in agricultural occupations; since land was no longer available to them, they had to find different jobs.

Hence, it is not surprising that significant changes in refugee occupations were reported after migration (see Figure 20). Whereas 69% of the refugee labor force had formerly been employed in the agricultural sector, e.g., farmers, tenant farmers, and agricultural laborers, after relocation only 8% were still involved in agriculture. In short, 61% of the refugees were forced to seek new types of employment. Since most refugees were farmers without specific skills, they had little option but to find jobs as unskilled laborers or remain unemployed. There has been a 15% increase in the numbers of general laborers and a 32% increase in persons in unemployed status.

Other changes in occupations were shown in the increased number of craftsmen (mostly basketweavers) and small merchants (mostly women selling small items such as vegetables). Interestingly, there was only a slight increase--about 4%--in the number of GVN military personnel. However, only those in the local defense forces would reside in the refugee community; data on the separated members of the family indicate that 130 individuals are reported serving in GVN military units elsewhere.

It is clear that unemployment is the major postmigration "occupation." Not readily evident from this data is the additional fact that though a substantial percentage of the refugees reported that they were not actually unemployed, most were underemployed, in many cases actually working only one or two days per week.

Using occupational change as an indicator of the economic impact of relocation upon refugees, it would seem that the net result of migration was the creation of considerable unemployment--or at least underemployment; a fairly sizable labor pool is now only partially occupied. And given the fact that many refugees received no aid, it would be expected that all this would reflect itself in a significant drop in refugee income.

Figure 20 Changes in Refugee Occupation Since Migration
(Ages 20-70)



Current Income

As expected, relocation did affect the income of refugees, but the significance of this is not completely clear. As an indicator of the economic effects of relocation, an index of current monetary income has a number of limitations. For example, it is likely that the bulk of premigration income was in kind rather than in cash. In contrast, current income is almost exclusively in piastres. Hence, when calculating daily income a refugee was more likely to underestimate his premigration income than his current income. Error may have also been introduced by the fact that the interviewers were largely called upon by the refugees to make such estimates on the basis of paddy production figures. In the other direction, there may have been some tendency for refugees to try to underestimate their current income so as to show greater need for assistance.

Within these limitations, a number of interesting trends are nonetheless shown in calculations of premigration vs. current daily income. As shown in Figure 21, the current mean daily income per household is 49 piastres or under. (At the current official rate of exchange, 80 piastres equal US $1.00 while on the open market the rate varies from 160-185 piastres per U. S. dollar.) Most refugee households had incomes under 99 piastres per day (one third report earning 59-99 piastres), or slightly less than one dollar a day, a situation which would seem to pose considerable hardship.

However, more significant than the aggregate change in income is the direction of change at the individual level. Interestingly, responses of some refugees indicate that they have experienced an increase in daily income. This is particularly the case for refugees who were formerly in the lower income brackets. As Figure 22 illustrates, of those refugees who earned under 25 piastres a day before moving, 63% report that their income has increased since becoming refugees. In the 25-49 piastre bracket, 26% report their income has increased, while in the 50-74 bracket, only 13% have increased their income. However, those who reported a relatively high premigration income now indicate that they have suffered a considerable drop in their daily earnings. Of those who earned over 149 piastres a day, 94% have experienced a decrease since

Figure 21. Cumulative Frequency Curve: Current Daily Income

(n = 1068)



relocating, and of those who earned 75-149 piastres before moving, 75% have experienced loss of income.

The size of these increases/decreases in daily income can be seen in Table 18. For example, of the 63% who reported earning under 25 piastres per day before migration but who have since experienced an increase in income, 22% say their income has jumped from under 25 piastres to 50-74 piastres--a minimum increase of 100% in their income. Of those who previously earned 25-49 piastres per day, 18% also doubled their income. Of those from higher income groups who have experienced losses of income, those who formerly made over 149 piastres per day suffered the largest reductions: 14% dropped to under 25

Figure 22 Change in Daily Income Since Migration
(n = 990)



Current Income:

- decreased from premigration income
- no change
- increased over premigration income
- (%) percentage of change indicated in parentheses

piastres per day, 32% below 49 piastres, and 30% below 74 piastres--losses of up to 50% in income.

Table 18. Percentage of Change Reported in Income Since Migration
(n = 990)

Present Daily Income (in piastres)	Premigration Daily Income (in piastres)					Totals	
	Under 25	25-49	50-75	75-149	Over 149	No.	%
Under 25	36.4%	24.6%	16.6%	13.6%	14.6%	192	19.4%
25-49	26.0%	48.8%	38.0%	30.0%	32.0%	372	37.6%
50-74	22.1%	18.1%	32.3%	31.9%	30.1%	272	27.5%
75-149	15.6%	6.9%	10.4%	23.0%	17.5%	132	13.3%
Over 149	0	1.5%	2.7%	1.4%	5.8%	22	2.2%
100% = n	n = 77	n = 260	n = 337	n = 213	n = 103	990	100%

These reported changes in income--of some in the lower economic groups increasing their daily income--suggests that contrary to popular American opinion there may be some incentive for some refugees to stay in their new settlements rather than return to their native hamlet. This data, coupled with that reported elsewhere on refugee aspirations, tends to lend some credibility to the view frequently expressed by Vietnamese officials that refugees might stay rather than return home. Among many Americans (initially including the writers), there was a tendency to dismiss this argument as being only an excuse used by officials to justify doing nothing for refugees. Normally an American would take one look at the living conditions of refugees, particularly of those in camps, and conclude that it would be impossible for anyone to actually want to stay in such a situation. To a foreigner it seemed self-evident that the refugees were much worse off than

their rural neighbors. Although this may be the case with most refugees, the data does indicate that some individuals have actually benefited (in terms of daily income) by becoming refugees. This would appear to constitute an incentive for some refugees not to want to return to their native hamlets, at least for the present time.

However, it should be borne in mind in evaluating this finding that it is uncertain whether or not the refugee's small increase in income may not be offset by inflation and the increased costs of living detached from his land. Since costs are always higher in and around provincial towns than in rural areas, it may well be that in terms of purchasing power the refugee was actually better off in his native village despite this increase in current piastre income.

But with regard to the 30% of the population whose income was over 75 piastres before migration, and who suffered losses in income by becoming refugees, there is little doubt that there exists a powerful economic incentive for returning home at the earliest possible opportunity.

Refugee Expectations and Aspirations

Refugees were queried as to where they expected to reside in the future, and, if given an element of free choice, where they would like to reside in the future. It should be noted that this question on expectations vs. aspirations produced perhaps the least reliable responses of any question on the questionnaire. Indeed, to the surprise of the authors and to the dismay of the interviewers, it was found that all too often refugees made little or no distinction in their own minds between "expectations" and "aspirations." Often the question (the last one on the questionnaire) was explained at length, but even then the interviewees still could not distinguish between what they expected would happen and what they wanted to happen--there was frequently an expression of fatalism that it really made no difference what they wanted. Hence, the question was sharply narrowed during the survey to ask only about where the respondent wanted/expected to reside. In doing so, many responses were not coded and occasionally the interviewers "forced" responses to more or less fit one category or another. This accounts for the fact that for 37% of the sample there are no responses listed.

As shown in Table 19, the large majority said they expected they would remain in the present location but would like to return to their native village in the future.

Table 19. Expectations vs. Aspirations

	Expectations		Aspirations	
	No.	%	No.	%
Stay in present locations	1,091	91.5	124	10.4
Return to native hamlet	27	2.2	477	40.0
Move to new location	22	1.8	47	3.9
Uncertain	39	3.3	100	8.4
No response listed	14	1.2	445	37.3
	1,193	100	1,193	100

In short, it is clear that an overwhelming majority of refugees expect that they will remain precisely where they are. But it is interesting that of those stating what they want to happen, a significant percentage actually want to stay where they are (10%), or are at least uncertain (8.4%). Precisely who these people are--or, rather, what characteristics distinguish them--are revealed to some extent in Appendix A, Items 28 and 29, which show the relationship of land ownership and premigration occupation to future aspirations.

For example, those who own the largest amount of land are most likely to aspire to return to their native village. But of those owning no land, a significant percentage (20%) said they wanted to stay in the resettlement area, while 16% were uncertain. Thus, the less land a refugee owns the less likely he is to want to return to his hamlet.

Those refugees having nonagricultural occupations express the greatest interest in either staying where they are or moving elsewhere (or are simply undecided). However, those who have occupations tied to the land express a significantly greater interest in returning to their land. It is interesting that the occupational category expressing the most interest in moving elsewhere is that of former government civilian officials.

What appears to represent a degree of fatalism about the future is illustrated by comparison of future aspirations with expectations (see Appendix A, Item 30). Of those refugees stating that they want to return to their home, 94.1% actually expect that they will remain where they are. In contrast, of those who aspire to move elsewhere, 17% actually expect that they will move. This is perhaps a reflection of hopes generated by the refugee interprovincial resettlement program that was first launched in Phu-Yen. In May 1966 the GVN (with USAID support) resettled 150 refugee families from the Tuy-Hoa area to the new Bai Gieng Resettlement area near Cam Ranh Bay. During the project, efforts were made to spread word of the program in refugee camps, so that even after the first shipment many refugees were still expressing interest in it (particularly in the Song-Cau area).

Officials' Assessment of the Refugee Program

Vietnamese and American officials were asked (in the course of completing the A-3 questionnaire) whether they were satisfied with the present program for handling refugees and, if not, what changes would they suggest. The results indicate that only one of the 13 respondents actually felt the program was satisfactory. But when asked what plans they had, or program changes they foresaw for the future, eight made no response or had no changes to suggest.

Although the responses varied greatly in their assessments of the critical problems still facing the refugee program, they generally fell under three areas: 1) providing employment; 2) providing training programs; and 3) increasing attention to the refugees. The texts of the responses are revealing:

1. Of course I am not satisfied. But within our limited capacity we are trying to do the best we can. I am hoping that with the new programs of construction supervised by American companies here, refugees may get work and so get a better life.[6] Our most difficult problem is that most refugees are farmers or agricultural laborers; they have no special skill and land here is only enough for natives to farm.

I think refugees, whatever they are now, are temporary because they always wish to return to their village and we cannot provide for them for a long time. Job opportunities are scarce and they are unemployed. In the future we should make them work even for the aid and assistance they get.

Assistance in the district is not as rapid and as complete as it should be, mainly because provincial authorities do not respond quick enough. Greater effort should be placed on solving the unemployment problem; at present the district community has absorbed more refugees than it is capable of handling.

2. We are in a dilemma; to continue supporting refugees is a great problem which sometimes makes me feel overwhelmed, but if we stop help or assistance it will cause resentment among them. But as a result of our present program we are making refugees become lazy.

   It is better to provide refugees with a means which will enable them to help themselves and make a living rather than giving them money and commodities, because we cannot afford to provide such things forever.

   A means of production should be provided to enable the refugees to make a living themselves. At present they are being treated like beggars being handed money.

3. Nothing is really being done to handle the problem. A program should be launched to really reach the people. There should be <u>one</u> overall relief agency to keep track of where the aid goes.

   There is no criterion for refugees and no way to get them off relief rolls, hence, I'm not satisfied with the program. I should set up decent camps and give classes on what the government can do to help them.

   Local government should both be prodded and supported in getting a refugee program established, for there is hardly anything resembling a "program" now. Such a program should provide for classification of refugees, resettlement and relief activity.

   Since refugees have been promised much and given nothing, they have lost confidence in the high officials. They need rice and we give them candy and toys. So far, the relief

> program has not been carried out continuously or seriously. The refugees in this area are forgotten. How can a change be suggested if no one will pay any attention?

And finally, as one assistant district chief stated:

> The refugee program of the district chief is good, but he is not sufficiently supported, and many of his good ideas fail.

As officials looked towards the future, most felt that there would not be any significant increase in the number of refugees--that refugee movement in Phu-Yen had reached, if not passed, its peak. Several felt that "we have reached the limit of our absorptive capacity." If refugees have not come out by now, some felt, then they do not deserve aid--they are probably pro-Viet-Cong anyway. As one district chief said: "We will not admit any more refugees in the district because they have been in Viet-Cong territory for so long, they only come out now because the VC force them to in order to provide them with a channel of supply. The VC now badly need rice, and any aid to refugees will funnel it to them."

Instead, most officials were concentrating on how to induce refugees to return to their homes. The dormant "return to the village" campaign was still being resurrected. As a U. S. subsector advisor said: "We need to spur the back-to-the-village program, offering incentives to go." He did not specify the incentives.

Officials were also asked what psychological operations had been directed at refugees. Eight reported that no psyops efforts had been undertaken, and one confessed he did not know if they had a program or not. Of the four who responded positively, two said the extent of the psyops program was to support the "back to the village" campaign, while the third said it consisted of a psyops representative "calling meetings at refugee camps several times, including showing movies." However, the fourth said that there had been an effort "to keep refugees informed about GVN policies." In short, there appeared to be no organized communications effort with the refugee population, nor any sense that refugees are a significant or readily accessible target for psyops activity.

In the area of civic action projects, officials reported that some activity had been undertaken in their area, but that it had consisted mostly of distributing "gifts." The sector advisor's assessment was that the civic action programs, such as they were, were having "marginal effect because they were not well coordinated.' He suggested that "Sector should have a card file listing all potential civic action projects so that they could match projects with unit capabilities at different times." He felt that they should emphasize the self-help aspects of such projects, and "play up the Vietnamese role in them."

Most officials felt that refugees were having no impact upon the Chieu-Hoi defection program as is reported in some other provinces. The three who responded affirmatively did indicate, however, that in a few instances they knew of Viet-Cong husbands who had followed their families to the security (and GVN control) of district towns.

Summary

- Over one-third of the refugees said they have received no government aid. The remainder report receiving varying amounts of assistance, principally foodstuffs and money. Most of these receiving aid have been in settlement areas for over six months.

- Most refugees have resettled in existing hamlets around the six major provincial towns; only 14% have been relocated in government sponsored resettlement camps.

- Hamlets around the province capital have experienced a mean increase in population of nearly 50% with three reporting increases over 100% due to refugee immigration. The refugee influx has resulted in inflation, increased unemployment, and the overburdening of community facilities.

- Only 14% of the refugee children are enrolled in schools.

- Relocation has caused marked changes in the occupation of refugee heads of household. Most shifted from agricultural occupations to general labor.

- Approximately 33% of the refugee heads of household are unemployed.

- The average daily income of refugees is less than 99 piastres per day.

- Some refugees who were in the lower income brackets before migration are now earning more money, while those who were previously in the higher income brackets have suffered considerable losses in income. These changes in income suggest that there may be incentive for some refugees to stay in settlement areas rather than return to their native hamlets.

- When refugees were asked where they would like to reside in contrast to where they expected to reside in the future, a large majority (92%) said they expected to remain in refugee settlements, but would like (63%) to return to their native hamlet.

Footnotes

[1]U. S. Agency for International Development, Office of the Refugee Coordinator, Viet-Nam Refugee Status Report, January-March 1966. (Saigon, Viet-Nam: U. S Agency for International Development, 1966), pp. 3-8.

[2]Formal interviews were conducted using Questionnaire A-3 (see Appendix A). Thirteen respondents from Phu-Yen completed the questionnaires: the Province Chief, four District Chiefs and one Assistant District Chief (from the Districts of Tuy-Hoa, Hieu-Xuong, Song-Cau and Dong Xuan), the MACV Senior Sector Advisor, two Subsector Advisors, one U. S. Special Forces Civil Affairs Officer, the GVN Ministry of Social Welfare Representative, the Refugee Commission Representative, and the USAID Assistant Province Representative for Refugees.

[3]Prior to this step by the Refugee Commission one of the principal complaints both of Vietnamese and American provincial personnel was the unwieldy and complicated registration process for refugees. One of the first efforts of USAID's Office of Refugee Coordination was to eliminate the extensive paperwork involved in registering refugees, which had often delayed refugee relief payments for up to six months. For a discussion of how involved the process could be, see a report by Capt. James D. Austin and 2nd Lt. John D. Sagers to Military Assistance Command in Viet-Nam, Sector Advisor, Quang-Ngai Sector, Refugee Control Activities in Quang Ngai Province, Viet-Nam, August 15, 1965.

[4]For a discussion of the problem, see U. S. Senate, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, Hearings 89th Congress, 2nd Session, July-August 1966 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 53 ff.

[5]Aware of this problem, USAID's Office of Refugee Coordination detailed an American welfare representative to survey a few of the camps to assess what social welfare activities might feasibly be undertaken in resettlement camps. His preliminary report is contained in Gardner Munro, "Memorandum to the Refugee Coordinator," USAID/ORC, Saigon, March 1966.

[6]This view was shared by many of the refugees also. For in responses to their future aspirations, a number saw that Americans were accompanying the interviewers and used the opportunity to say they wanted "a job with the Americans" more than anything else. Considering the high unemployment, this was, of course, an honest aspiration, particularly since American construction firms were hiring refugees.

CHAPTER VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE REFUGEE MOVEMENT FOR THE PACIFICATION EFFORT IN PHU-YEN

Introduction

Since control of human resources has major significance for all aspects of insurgency (see Table 20), refugees have potentially great importance in counter-insurgency efforts. In practical political terms, the most immediate consideration of the refugee situation is its effect on the success or failure of rural pacification efforts being conducted in the provinces. Yet when provincial officials and their American advisors were questioned as to the effects that refugees were having, or potentially could have, on the pacification program in Phu-Yen, their responses (summarized in Item 31, Appendix A) indicated that such a question has not been systematically considered. Phu-Yen officials are in no sense unique in this regard; for in none of the 14 provinces visited by the writers had either responsible GVN officials or their American advisors made any but the most superficial efforts to investigate and assess the significance of the refugee movement for the counter-insurgency effort. Speculation abounded, but data-based conclusions were totally lacking. This is not surprising in view of the inadequacy of available data on the refugees and the lack of agreement on priorities among pacification projects.

In considering this question when interviewed by the authors, Vietnamese officials and their American advisors in Phu-Yen advanced a number of ideas regarding the effect refugee movement was having on the province pacification program. These ideas are presented here in terms of eighteen "propositions" and evaluated on the basis of the survey data and other relevant evidence.

Propositions Concerning Effects of Refugee Movement on Pacification

Proposition 1. "Refugee movement offers a cover for the introduction of Viet-Cong agents into GVN-controlled areas."

A number of GVN hamlet chiefs stated that refugees posed serious security and population control problems. However, the Viet-Cong do not appear to have systematically utilized refugee movement to infiltrate cadre into GVN areas.

Table 20. Population Resources in Revolutionary Warfare

ASSETS	LIABILITIES
Provide own force with intelligence	Provide enemy force with intelligence
Serve as "screen" for own force: i.e., cause enemy to exercise constraint in applying military force	Place constraint on own force operations, i.e., operations may lead to enemy reprisals against population
Provide conscripts/volunteers for forces Provide labor support force	Over-utilization of civilians can generate popular resentment against own side
Provide economic/logistic basis for own force. - taxes and contributions - economic production and trade - production of "export"surplus	Civilians are a drain on scarce resources (medicines, food, housing leadership and technical cadre) Require jobs Excessive demands of labor force can generate popular resentment
Adherence/control of population demonstrates "legitimacy" of own force (essential both for own force morale and international image)	Maintenance of population control system utilizes scarce resources Dissident elements can sabotage own force

Some unplanned "infiltration" has occurred as low-level civil cadre become caught up in the refugee flow. Thus, a refugee from Hoa My Village, in Hieu-Xuong District, stated that 'all the people in the village, including the [Viet-Cong] village cadres, were so afraid of the Korean troops that most of them left the area to take refuge in Tuy-Hoa City"[1] [emphasis added]. While it is debatable whether such refugee cadre will continue to actively serve the NLF, they do represent a potential source of instability in areas of refugee concentration. In sum, however, the deliberate infiltration proposition is not strongly supported by the available evidence.

Proposition 2. "Refugee movement represents deliberate insurgent 'shedding' of the nonproductive elements of the population of 'liberated' areas."

Only 0.5% of refugees in the sample cited Viet-Cong encouragement as a factor influencing their decision to move, and these persons were forced to move out of areas of tactical military significance which the VC were seeking to clear of all civilians. Examination of the demographic data does reveal that there is a higher percentage of individuals in the nonproductive age bracket in the refugee population than is the case for a "normal" rural Vietnamese population: each refugee of productive age must support himself plus 2.7 others, while in a comparable nonrefugee population the ratio is 1.3. This could be taken to infer that the insurgents are retaining the more productive elements of the rural population. For example, a Special Forces intelligence sergeant at Dak-To, Kontum Province, informed one of the writers that almost all of the estimated 13,000 Montagnard refugees that had fled into the area after the fall of Dak-Sut in the summer of 1965 were either children or old people. The Viet-Cong had prevented young adults from becoming refugees and conscripted them as forced laborers. Yet in view of the continued military drain on productive-aged manpower in both GVN- and Viet-Cong-controlled zones it is probable that these populations have about equal productive capabilities.

Proposition 3. "Refugee movement, by disrupting rural social structure, increases the long-range 'revolutionary potential' of Vietnamese society."

Refugee movement in Phu-Yen has not resulted in the creation of a large underemployed and dissatisfied urban mass such as that formed in Qui-Nhon, nor

are there large numbers of refugees living in the anomic conditions of temporary regroupment camps. In Phu-Yen most refugees (86.0%) are more or less integrated into hamlets with at least some pre-existing political and social structure. However, unemployment and underemployment are serious problems, the general refugee standard of living is low, and the traditional strong family structure appear seriously weakened in at least some of the settlements. A longer range threat to social stability is implicit in the fact that relatively few refugee children are receiving even basic education--only 14% of children of school age are reported as enrolled in classes.

It is too early to make a full evaluation of the structural impact of refugee movement on Vietnamese society, but to an outside observer it seems obvious that it will have major and lasting consequences. However, it should be remembered that mass population displacement is recurrent in Vietnamese history, from the thousand-year long "March to the South," which created modern Viet-Nam, to the comparatively recent voluntary emigration from rural to urban areas characteristic of developing nations.

Certainly all this would seem to underscore the fact that rural migration is not a new phenomena in Viet-Nam, and one must be cautious not to exaggerate the long-range social significance of the refugee aspect of this movement, however serious its current impact may appear.

Proposition 4. "Depopulation of rural areas deprives the guerrillas of their civilian 'shield,' thus allowing the government to utilize its firepower advantage without constraint."

The clearing of civilians from combat zones is frequently cited by military personnel as the principal loss to the guerrillas and the major benefit to the counterinsurgents stemming from refugee movement. They argue that after refugees have left an area all people remaining are either Viet-Cong or sympathizers and the area can now be subjected to the full weight of Allied firepower without the restraint formerly imposed by the presence of civilians. (One of the authors was present at a meeting of provincial officials and their American advisors, in a delta province, when a decision was made to employ herbicides on crops in a Viet-Cong-controlled district. The senior American advisor had previously

refused to request such spraying but changed his mind when he was convinced by the Vietnamese that all civilians had left the area as refugees and that farming was now being carried on by guerrilla units.)

Available demographic information does not support this. As is shown on Map 3, considerable numbers of civilians remain in every village in Phu-Yen. Only eighteen (19.5%) of the villages have lost more than 30% of their residents and no village has suffered greater than 60% depopulation. Regardless of the political allegiance of the nonrefugee remnant adult population, there are still large numbers of women, children, and old people in the rural areas of Phu-Yen.

Proposition 5. "Depopulation disrupts the insurgent intelligence network."

There can be no doubt that in areas where the civilian population has left en masse, the guerrillas are deprived of one of their best sources of intelligence on Allied military operations. However, since total depopulation is not typical in rural Phu-Yen, much of the Viet-Cong rural intelligence system can be assumed to be still functioning. In fact, its performance may actually be better since refugee movement may have removed the least reliable elements (from the insurgent point of view) from the population.

Proposition 6. "Refugee movement reduces the size of the insurgent conscription and labor force pools."

The refugees unquestionably represent a major loss of manpower to the insurgents. Even though the percentage of military-age males within the refugee population is low, the refugee movement in Phu-Yen has drained an estimated 5,000 men of military age from the pool easily accessible to Viet-Cong recruiters. In terms of persons capable of providing labor services, the loss is far larger: an estimated 21,000 persons have been lost from the insurgent labor force. This manpower drain would be a serious problem at any time but is especially critical at this stage of the war, when military escalation has radically increased the requirement to provide labor support for the NVA units and the rising rate of guerrilla casualties has increased the demand for replacements. (An NLF Province Committee document recently captured in Phu-Yen reportedly states that in late 1966 only 659 men had been recruited out of a reporting-period quota of 3,000.)

Loss of population is also likely to severely damage the staying power of the insurgents. When shrinkage of the population base is occurring coincidentally with an increase in manpower requirements and tax rates, a vicious cycle develops--new refugees are generated by the ever-increasing demands made upon the peasantry by local cadre striving to fulfill unrealistic quotas. Such a cycle has clearly been set into motion in Phu-Yen.

Proposition 7. "Refugees augment the human resources available to the GVN."

Corollary to the preceding proposition is that the refugee population in Phu-Yen offers a major new manpower pool to the GVN. As noted above, there are an estimated 5,000 men of military age in the refugee settlements--a substantial addition to a depleted draft pool. ARVN, Regional Forces/Popular Forces and Civilian Irregular Defense Group recruiters have not ignored the refugee population, but civil authorities have made only limited efforts to exploit its potential as a labor force and unemployment is a major problem, with 33.4% of refugees age 20 to 70 having no work.

Proposition 8. "Refugee movement reduces rural productivity."

In the last full year before emigration, refugees in the sample reported harvesting an aggregate crop of 783 metric tons of paddy. Projected to the total refugee population this represents a harvest of 12,600 metric tons. Loss of this productive capability cannot easily be replaced. Rice cultivation is labor-intensive, and it is unlikely that, even under the best of conditions, the population remaining in the "liberated" areas could maintain agricultural production at premigration levels. In addition, working conditions have deteriorated and military escalation has caused an increasing drain of manpower into nonproductive activity (construction of fortifications, serving as porters for NVA units, etc.), further reducing the man hours devoted to productive activity. Refugees have also stated that fear of attack by aircraft kept them from working their fields except in the early morning or late afternoons with a consequent diminution in farm production.

While reduction in rural productivity has been most seriously felt by the Viet-Cong, it has also been harmful to the GVN. Formerly at least some of the

rice grown in the "liberated" areas was sold to urban buyers; this source of supply must now be replaced by importing rice from outside the province with a consequent increase in the burden on the government logistic system. However, the GVN can replace (at least in the short-run) its losses; the insurgents cannot.

Proposition 9. "Refugee movement narrows the insurgents' tax base and reduces their revenues."

Refugee movement in Phu-Yen represents a major loss to the Viet-Cong tax base. At an absolute minimum, the refugees provided the guerrillas with 600 metric tons of paddy per year and probably more than twice this amount. At a daily consumption rate of one kilogram per man this would represent sufficient rice to feed from 1,600 to over 3,000 guerrillas for one year. As Phu-Yen was supplying rice to the entire Central Highlands, loss of this source of supply represents a major blow to the insurgents.

Refugees were reluctant to answer questions on taxation and consequently this data is not considered highly reliable. However, the expectable tendency would be for people who had paid VC taxes to deny the fact or to understate the amount paid. Hence, the figures presented here are probably extremely conservative. 289 households (24.2% of the sample) admitted paying NLF taxes. The average tax was 227 kilograms (or nearly 500 pounds) of paddy per household. If this rate is projected to 24% of all the refugee families in Phu-Yen, the total VC tax loss is estimated at 598,000 kilograms.

Many refugees also formerly paid taxes to the GVN, reporting an aggregate land tax of approximately 8,080 piastres for the last year prior to migration (the GVN tax rate is very low). Refugees in carrying out their normal economic activity probably contributed much larger revenues to the GVN than the sum represented above. However, the loss of taxes is far more serious to the insurgents than to the GVN, given continued American economic assistance.

Proposition 10. "Refugee movement causes the insurgents to divert resources into population control efforts."

Little direct evidence is available on how the insurgent leadership is responding to the problem of refugee emigration from their "liberated" areas.

It would seem likely, however, that increased attention is being paid to population control measures. Some 15% of the refugees reported being discouraged from moving by the Viet-Cong. Most were threatened with reprisals if caught fleeing, and a few reported that the VC threatened to confiscate their property.

It is doubtful that more stringent population control measures would prevent emigration, since a large part of refugee movement occurs at times when Allied operations have disrupted the insurgent administrative apparatus.

Proposition 11. "Refugee movement removes people from the easy reach of NLF propaganda."

Much of the Viet-Cong's success in manipulating the rural population is attributed to the intensive and continuous attention given to agitation/propaganda efforts. As Pike has written, "almost every act of the NLF was conceived as an act of communication.... It [the NLF] shaped a communication weapon and used it to strike at the vitals of the GVN. Its victories and defeats were essentially the result of successful or unsuccessful communications efforts."[2] The movement of refugees into GVN-controlled areas has decreased their accessibility to Viet-Cong agit-prop cadres. Although propaganda is still disseminated (refugees reported, for instance, that armed propaganda squads were making frequent night-time visits to a refugee camp located less than a mile from the 101st Airborne Brigade's base in Tuy-Hoa), the volume of communication is much reduced.

Proposition 12. "Refugee movement increases the accessibility of the population to government psychological operations."

In theory, movement of people into GVN-controlled areas should increase their exposure to government propaganda. Unfortunately, this has not proven the case in Phu-Yen. To the best of the writers' knowledge no major psychological operations program directed at refugees was ever formulated or implemented in the province.

The psychological operations programs that were conducted consisted of placing pictures of victims of Viet-Cong terrorism in a refugee camp schoolhouse, painting anti-Viet-Cong slogans on shelter walls, and distributing posters illustrated with pictures of the province chief giving relief supplies to refugees; the

last mentioned probably had a reverse psychological effect among the nearly 40% of the refugee population which had not been aided in any way by the GVN.

In sum, the accessibility of the population to government psychological operations has been increased, but the opportunity has not yet been fully exploited by the GVN.

Proposition 13. "Refugee movement represents a psychological loss to the NLF and a psychological opportunity to the GVN."

Although difficult to measure empirically, both the Viet-Cong cadres' self-image and the perception of the NLF by others must be altered by the fact that large numbers of peasants are voluntarily moving from "liberated" areas into GVN-controlled areas. (Counterflow from government areas into Viet-Cong zones is so minor as to be imperceptible.) Data from other insurgencies suggest that if a sense of rejection by the population develops among the guerrillas, morale will rapidly deteriorate and defections increase. Interestingly, Phu-Yen and neighboring Binh-Dinh Province, which have some of the highest percentages of refugees in Viet-Nam, also report very high defection rates from the Viet-Cong.

Refugee movement--the fact of the people of Viet-Nam "voting with their feet" against NLF rule--could also adversely affect the international image of the Viet-Cong, although this does not appear to have occurred yet to any significant extent.

Just as the 1954 movement of nearly one million refugees from Tonkin to South Viet-Nam to escape Communist rule provided the young republic with enormous psychological operations capital, the proportionately greater movement of refugees from NLF "liberated" areas into GVN zones may offer a similar propaganda opportunity to the government and its allies; however, the opportunity has not been effectively used, either internationally or internally. Propaganda directed at the U. S. public has been emphasizing the humanitarian aspects of refugee relief rather than focusing on those aspects of the phenomenon which reflect unfavorably on the Viet-Cong, although USAID has attempted to collect incidents on VC terrorism directed at refugees.

Little propaganda has been generated inside Viet-Nam on the refugee issue either. Refugees are officially referred to as dong-bao ty-nan cong-san (literally: compatriots who have fled communism), but this theme is not exploited to any great extent. Although there are dangers in publicizing refugee movement (just as to acknowledge terrorism is to confess the inability of the government to protect its adherents), carefully planned psychological operations should be able to circumvent these hazards. However, neither in Phu-Yen nor at the national level was any major effort evident to exploit the propaganda opportunities offered by refugee movement.

Proposition 14. "Refugee movement demonstrates the inability of the government to provide security to the rural population."

Refugee movement is highly visible evidence of the inability of the government to protect the rural population from the Viet-Cong. For a people as pragmatic as Vietnamese peasants appear to be, the message implicit in refugee movement is a clear one--"The GVN is not able to protect even its supporters from the insurgents, so one had best withhold making any overt commitment to the government." The existence of such an attitude was manifest in many refugee camps where the population, despite a stated hostility to the Viet-Cong, refused to participate in local self-defense forces. The Viet-Cong last year also had to face similar attitudes of "fence-sitting" among the population in the "liberated" areas. Several refugees commented that Viet-Cong defensive efforts (combat hamlets, etc.) had proved useless in protecting civilians against air attack and large Allied operations, and the NLF had thus lost claim to their support.

It is uncertain whether continued government military successes will convince the refugee population that it is now prudent to make an overt commitment to the GVN. However, at the time of research there were no signs of such a shift in popular attitudes.

Proposition 15. "Population regroupment resulting from refugee movement offers tactical military advantages to the GVN."

It is a military axiom that a short perimeter requires fewer defenders than a long one. Refugee movement, by regrouping the civilian population from a large number of rural settlements into a few large nuclei, can, in effect, reduce

the perimeter which must be defended. Further, such reduction in perimeter length is accomplished without the often politically counterproductive need to forcibly regroup the population as was done in implementing the strategic hamlet program of the Diem regime. However, there are only a few areas in Phu-Yen where refugee movement has been of sufficient magnitude to achieve such regroupment.

Ideally such shortening of the perimeter would free troops from static defense duties for offensive operations against insurgent mainforce concentrations. More importantly in Phu-Yen, the introduction of Korean and American forces has greatly augmented the Sector offensive capability. If large insurgent units can be broken up (as appears to be occurring in Phu-Yen), then the perimeter of the secure area can be extended using the classic oil-spot approach. Refugees can be resettled in self-defended hamlets and the guerrillas isolated to the desolate mountain areas where, deprived of the support of the rural population, they will wither. The critical "if" in the situation, however, is the destruction of the NVA and Viet-Cong mainforce units. One of the authors spent considerable time in a series of self-defended villages that had been established with refugee populations regrouped around a Special Forces camp in the Central Highlands. On his first visit the area was a model pacification effort. Two months later the defensive system was visibly crumbling despite the best efforts of an unusually capable "A" detachment. There had been no overt change in the situation except that large NVA units had moved within striking distance of the settlements and the people in the hamlets knew it. Consequently, there was a mass refugee movement out of the area into the provincial capital.

In sum, the refugee movement appears militarily beneficial to the GVN, although exploitation of the situation is largely dependent on extraprovincial factors (such as the extent to which the insurgents continue to commit major NVA forces to the area and the availability of Allied mobile forces for counteroperations).

Proposition 16. "Refugee movement creates major social and economic problems in settlement areas."

Refugees have increased the population of many hamlets around Tuy-Hoa by more than 100%. This has overburdened the administrative and social welfare systems and contributed to serious inflation. Refugees also compete with native inhabitants for a limited number of jobs, causing wages for unskilled labor to fall: in the Tuy-Hoa area the wage for transplanting rice has fallen from 30 piastres to 15 piastres per day because of the influx of refugees.

The resentment felt by natives toward refugees may be tempered by the fact that 54% have kin or friends among the refugee population settled in their hamlets, but the potential for future Communist agitation exists unless the GVN can alleviate the economic pressure caused by the refugee presence.

Proposition 17. "Refugee movement creates a landownership problem which is difficult for the GVN to resolve."

As the secured zones expand, serious problems are likely to arise with regard to ownership and tenure rights to land abandoned by refugees, especially in areas where NLF land redistribution was carried out. People who have remained in rural areas and who have expropriated idle land are unlikely to welcome the return of GVN forces accompanied by the original property owners. (Initial peasant support for the Viet-Cong against the Diem government is often attributed to the latter's restoration to refugee landlords of plots redistributed by the Viet-Minh.) As far as the writers know there has been no planning on the part of provincial officials on ways of handling this touchy problem and no overall land tenure policy has been promulgated for Phu-Yen.

Proposition 18. "Refugee problems cause the government to divert scarce resources from other counterinsurgency programs to relief activities."

Probably the major impact to date of refugees on the Phu-Yen pacification effort has been the resultant diversion of resources into refugee relief and resettlement programs. Large quantities of supplies and major sums of money have been expended on relief efforts, and the already strained logistic system has been further taxed (for example, special convoys, requiring extensive road-clearing operations, have been run to deliver refugee supplies to Cung-Son). But more

important, scarce administrative cadre (both Vietnamese and American) have been co-opted to manage the expanding refugee relief apparatus. It appears, however, that this apparatus was established with little or no prior consideration of the opportunity-costs implicit in such commitment of manpower. In future planning for refugee relief and resettlement careful consideration should be given to the manpower costs of alternative approaches to solution of the problem. For as is demonstrated by the differential success of the various Phu-Yen district chiefs in coping with refugee relief, the skill and dedication of the administrator appears as important to the ultimate realization of the objective as the comprehensiveness of his plan or the quality of material resources available to him for carrying it out.

Summary

● Clearly, refugee movement represents a major liability to the insurgent in Phu-Yen. It has directly attacked their basis of power in the rural areas without offering the Viet-Cong new exploitable opportunities of sufficient value to balance this loss of control of the population. In turn, refugee migration has presented the government with a major "negative" gain: by reducing the strength of the guerrillas--by simply denying them a resource--refugee movement has, in effect, bettered the GVN position in Phu-Yen.

● Refugee movement could, however, present the GVN with a "positive" asset. Yet, it is precisely here that the balance sheet suffers: the counterinsurgents have generally failed to take advantage of the latent opportunities inherent in the refugee problem. In Saigon, the slogan is that "refugees are an obligation and an opportunity," but in Phu-Yen the refugees are generally seen only in term of the considerable burden they represent to the provincial government, while their potential as a pacification resource is ignored. Thus the province has suffered a double loss: it has had to divert resources to meet the problems presented by the refugees, and it has failed to exploit a potential human resource offered it.

● In sum, refugee movement has been more harmful to the Viet-Cong than to the GVN position in Phu-Yen. But refugees have not represented an unalloyed gain to the Allies; rather, they have placed heavy new burdens on a provincial administration unprepared to exploit the opportunities offered by the refugee movement. Thus refugees are a liability for the Viet-Cong, but they are not yet a positive asset for the government.

Footnotes

[1]RAND Corporation, Studies of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, Interview File Number AGR-56, Saigon, 1966, p. 26.

[2]Douglas Pike, Viet-Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966) pp. 119-120.

APPENDIX A

SUPPLEMENTAL MAPS, TABLES AND FIGURES

1. Refugee Literacy Rates
(n = 6160)

	Male n = 2920		Female n = 3240	
Age	Literate	Illiterate	Literate	Illiterate
0-4	0.4% (2)	99.6% (491)	0.7% (3)	99.3% (456)
5-9	14.1% (83)	85.9% (505)	9.8% (52)	90.2% (480)
10-14	59.2% (296)	40.8% (204)	46.4% (212)	53.6% (245)
15-19	78.4% (182)	21.6% (50)	62.0% (188)	38.0% (115)
20-24	89.0% (65)	11.0% (8)	68.2% (103)	31.8% (48)
25-29	93.6% (73)	6.4% (5)	61.9% (112)	38.1% (69)
30-34	88.2% (112)	11.8% (15)	61.2% (128)	38.8% (81)
35-39	80.3% (126)	19.7% (31)	48.1% (99)	51.9% (107)
40-44	90.6% (106)	9.4% (11)	27.6% (45)	72.4% (118)
45-49	81.5% (110)	18.5% (25)	22.0% (28)	78.0% (99)
50-54	68.5% (87)	31.5% (40)	7.1% (8)	92.9% (105)
55-59	58.1% (50)	41.9% (36)	19.2% (20)	80.8% (84)
60-64	46.8% (44)	53.2% (50)	2.0% (2)	98.0% (96)
65-69	32.1% (18)	67.9% (38)	1.9% (1)	98.1% (51)
70 +	33.3% (19)	66.7% (38)	0.0%	100.0% (85
Total	47.0% (1373)	53.0% (1547)	30.9% (1001)	69.1% (2239)

2. Refugee Population

by Age, Sex, and Marital Status

Ages	Males				
	Number	Unmarried	Married	Separated	Widowed
0-4	16.9% (495)	100.0% (495)	-	-	-
5-9	20.2% (590)	100.0% (590)	-	-	-
10-14	17.1% (501)	100.0% (501)	-	-	-
15-19	8.0% (233)	90.1% (210)	9.9% (23)	0.0%	0.0%
20-24	2,5% (73)	38.4% (28)	58.9% (43)	0.0%	2.8% (2)
25-29	2.7% (78)	7.7% (6)	89.7% (70)	0.0%	2.6% (2)
30-34	4.3% (127)	5.5% (7)	91.3% (116)	0.0%	3.1% (4)
35-39	5.4% (158)	2.5% (4)	94.3% (149)	0.6% (1)	2.5% (4)
40-44	4.0% (117)	1.7% (2)	97.4% (114)	0.0%	0.9% (1)
45-49	4.6% (135)	2.2% (3)	96.3% (130)	0.7% (1)	0.7% (1)
50-54	4.3% (127)	0.0%	91.3% (116)	0.0%	8.7% (11)
55-59	2.9% (86)	0.0%	94.2% (81)	0.0%	5.8% (5)
60-64	3.2% (94)	1.1% (1)	90.4% (85)	0.0%	8.5% (8)
65-69	1.9% (56)	0.0%	83.9% (47)	0.0%	16.1% (9)
70-74	1.3% (37)	0.0%	73.0% (27)	0.0%	27.0% (10)
75 +	0.6% (20)	5.0% (1)	60.0% (12)	0.0%	35.0% (7)

2 (Continued)

Females					
Ages	Number	Unmarried	Married	Separated	Widowed
0-4	14.2% (462)	100.0% (462)	-	-	-
5-9	16.4% (533)	100.0% (533)	-	-	-
10-14	14.1% (457)	100.0% (457)	-	-	-
15-19	9.4% (304)	83.6% (254)	15.5% (47)	0.3% (1)	0.7% (2)
20-24	4.7% (151)	17.9% (27)	72.8% (110)	0.7% (1)	8.6% (13)
25-29	5.6% (182)	4.4% (8)	83.5% (152)	1.1% (2)	11.0% (20)
30-34	6.4% (209)	3.3% (7)	87.1% (182)	0.5% (1)	9.1% (19)
35-39	6.4% (207)	1.4% (3)	85.5% (177)	0.0%	13.0% (27)
40-44	5.0% (163)	1.2% (2)	84.7% (138)	1.2% (2)	12.9% (21)
45-49	3.9% (127)	0.8% (1)	83.5% (106)	0.0%	15.7% (20)
50-54	3.5% (113)	0.9% (1)	71.7% (81)	0.0%	27.4% (31)
55-59	3.2% (104)	0.0%	68.3% (71)	0.0%	31.7% (33)
60-64	3.0% (98)	1.0% (1)	46.9% (46)	0.0%	52.0% (51)
65-69	1.6% (52)	0.0%	30.8% (16)	0.0%	69.2% (36)
70-74	1.3% (43)	0.0%	2.3% (1)	0.0%	97.7% (42)
75 +	1.4% (42)	0.0%	11.9% (5)	0.0%	88.1% (37)

3. Comparative Size of Refugee and Nonrefugee Households

(Refugee household n = 1179. Nonrefugee household n = 590)



Source: Hendry, Small World of Khanh Hau, op. cit., p. 12.

4. Comparative Distribution of Landownership: Phu-Yen Refugee and Central Vietnamese Non-refugee Population (pre World War II)



Key:

- Phu-Yen
- Phu-Yen Non-refugees
- Central Viet-Nam

Source:

Lindholm (ed.)
Viet-Nam, op. cit.
Table 13, p. 206

5. Lorenz Curve: Comparative Distribution of Landownership of Phu-Yen Refugees and a Delta Village Population



Key:

Phu-Yen Refugees:
Nonrefugee delta population

Source:

Hendry, Table 3-3, p. 37

6. Land Rental Rates by Rice Harvest
(n = 113)

Rent paid (in gia)	Paddy harvested (in gia)								
	Under 25	25-49	50-74	75-99	100-149	150-199	200-299	300-499	500 & Over
Under 25	5	13	5	3	5			1	
25 - 49	1	5	9	12	8	1	2	2	
50 - 74			2	1	9		3	1	
75 - 149					3	7	6	1	
Over 149							3	3	2

7. Physical Condition of the Phu-Yen Refugee Population

(n = 6150)

Age	Male		Female		Total Population	
	Able	Disabled	Able	Disabled	Able	Disabled
0-4	99.4% (491)	0.6% (3)	99.8% (459)	0.2% (1)	99.6% (950)	0.4% (4)
5-9	99.0% (582)	1.0% (6)	99.8% (531)	0.2% (1)	99.4% (1113)	0.6% (7)
10-14	98.8% (489)	1.2% (6)	98.9% (449)	1.1% (5)	98.8% (938)	1.2% (11)
15-19	98.7% (229)	1.3% (3)	99.3% (302)	0.7% (2)	99.1% (531)	0.9% (5)
20-24	97.2% (70)	2.8% (2)	100.0% (150)	0.0%	99.1% (220)	0.9% (2)
25-29	96.2% (75)	3.8% (3)	98.4% (179)	1.6% (3)	97.7% (254)	2.3% (6)
30-34	94.5% (120)	5.5% (7)	98.1% (205)	1.9% (4)	96.7% (325)	3.3% (11)
35-39	95.5% (150)	4.5% (7)	96.1% (196)	3.9% (8)	95.8% (346)	4.2% (15)
40-44	96.6% (113)	3.4% (4)	94.5% (154)	5.5% (9)	95.4% (267)	4.6% (13)
45-49	96.3% (130)	3.7% (5)	92.1% (117)	7.9% (10)	94.3% (247)	5.7% (15)
50-54	94.4% (119)	5.6% (7)	90.2% (101)	9.8% (11)	92.4% (220)	7.6% (18)
55-59	87.2% (75)	12.8% (11)	89.4% (93)	10.6% (11)	88.4% (168)	11.6% (22)
60-64	74.5% (70)	25.5% (24)	76.5% (75)	23.5% (23)	75.5% (145)	24.5% (47)
65-69	83.9% (47)	16.1% (9)	75.0% (39)	25.0% (13)	79.6% (86)	20.4% (22)
70-74	75.7% (28)	24.3% (9)	79.1% (34)	20.9% (9)	77.5% (62)	22.5% (18)
75 +	80.0% (16)	20.0% (4)	54.8% (23)	45.2% (19)	62.9% (39)	37.1% (23)
Total	96.2% (2804)	3.8% (110)	96.0% (3107)	4.0% (129)	96.1% (5911)	3.9% (239)
	n = 2914		n = 3236		n = 6150	

8. Characteristics of Able-Bodied Males, Ages 15-40, Composing the Refugee Population in Phu-Yen

	Males						
Ages	Total	Literate	Illiterate	Employed	Unemployed	Married	Unmarried
15	11.5% (79)	64.6% (51)	35.4% (28)	43.0% (34)	57.0% (45)	-	100.0% (79)
16	8.6% (59)	88.1% (52)	11.9% (7)	66.1% (30)	33.9% (20)	1.7% (1)	98.3% (56)
17	6.1% (42)	83.3% (35)	16.7% (7)	69.0% (29)	31.0% (13)	16.7% (7)	83.3% (35)
18	4.5% (31)	83.9% (26)	16.1% (5)	83.9% (26)	16.1% (5)	29.0% (9)	71.0% (22)
19	2.6% (18)	2.9%* (17)	-	83.3% (15)	16.7% (3)	33.3% (6)	66.7% (12)
20	2.6% (18)	77.8% (14)	22.2% (4)	94.4% (17)	5.6% (1)	27.8% (5)	72.2% (13)
21	2.2% (15)	93.3% (14)	6.7% (1)	93.3% (14)	6.7% (1)	66.7% (10)	33.3% (5)
22	1.5% (10)	90.0% (9)	10.0% (1)	80.0% (8)	20.0% (2)	70.0% (7)	30.0% (3)
23	1.9% (13)	100.0% (13)	-	69.2% (9)	23.1% (3)*	61.5% (8)	38.5% (5)
24	2.0% (14)	100.0% (14)	-	92.9% (13)	7.1% (1)	85.7% (12)	14.3% (2)
25	1.6% (11)	100.0% (11)	-	100.0% (11)	-	72.7% (8)	27.3% (3)
26	1.9% (13)	100.0% (13)	-	84.6% (11)	15.4% (2)	84.6% (11)	15.4% (2)
27	1.2% (8)	75.0% (6)	25.0% (2)	100.0% (8)	-	100.0% (8)	-
28	3.2% (22)	90.9% (20)	9.1% (2)	100.0% (22)	-	95.5% (21)	4.5% (1)

*Data on one refugee unavailable

8 (Continued)

Ages	Total	Literate	Illiterate	Employed	Unemployed	Married	Unmarried
29	3.1% (21)	95.2% (20)	4.8% (1)	100.0% (21)	-	95.2% (20)	4.8% (1)
30	4.7% (32)	90.6% (29)	9.4% (3)	90.6% (29)	9.4% (3)	90.6% (29)	9.4% (3)
31	3.1% (21)	81.0% (17)	19.0% (4)	90.5% (19)	9.5% (2)	95.2% (20)	4.8% (1)
32	3.2% (22)	86.4% (19)	13.6% (3)	90.9% (20)	9.1% (2)	90.0% (20)	9.1% (2)
33	3.5% (24)	91.7% (22)	8.3% (2)	95.8% (23)	4.2% (1)	87.5% (21)	12.5% (3)
34	3.1% (21)	100.0% (21)	-	95.2% (20)	4.8% (1)	100.0% (21)	-
35	7.6% (52)	77.0% (40)	23.0% (12)	92.3% (48)	7.7% (4)	96.2% (50)	3.8% (2)
36	5.0% (34)	91.2% (31)	8.8% (3)	88.2% (30)	11 8% (4)	97.1% (33)	2.9% (1)
37	3.5% (24)	75.0% (18)	25.0% (6)	95.8% (23)	4.2% (1)	100.0% (24)	-
38	3.5% (24)	91.7% (22)	8.3% (2)	95.8% (23)	4.2% (1)	91.7% (22)	8.3% (2)
39	2.3% (16)	87.5% (14)	12.5% (2)	93.8% (15)	6.2% (1)	87.5% (14)	12.5% (2)
40	6.9% (41)	82.9% (34)	17.1% (7)	92.7% (38)	7.3% (3)	97.6% (40)	2.4% (1)

9. Reasons for Movement Where Either Viet-Cong or GVN Were Principal Causal Agent



Key: ■ Viet-Cong (1015 citations)
▒ GVN (291 citations)

*Percentages are based upon the total citations of each causal agent (number of citations are in parentheses).

10. Reasons for Movement Where Allied Troops were Causal Agent



Key to Causal Agent:
- U. S. Troops (73 citations)
- Korean Troops (131 citations)
- Allied (unspecified) (317 citations)
- GVN Troops (291 citations)

*Percentages are based upon the total citations of each causal agent (number of citations are in parentheses).

11. Nonrefugees' Reasons for Staying in Native Hamlet
(n = 49)

Reasons for Staying	Number of Citations*	% of n
Economic Factors	35	71%
Did not want to abandon land, household household/livestock	24	48%
Feared property would be confiscated	2	4%
Fear d life would be harder elsewhere	5	10%
Pr erred farming to general labor in esettlement areas	4	8%
Social Factors	24	48%
Satisfied with life in native hamlet	7	14%
Too old to move	3	6%
Do not want to move with small children	5	10%
Ancestors lived here	5	10%
Husband lived/died here	3	6%
Know of no place to go	1	2%
Security Factors	12	24%
Expect Viet-Cong to go soon and/or security to improve	3	6%
Satisfied with security	9	18%

*Respondent could cite more than onereason, however, percentages reflect frequency each reason was cited by the total number of nonrefugees (n = 49).

12. Encouragement of Refugee Movement
(n = 1193)

Refugees Receiving Encouragement	382 (32%)
No Encouragement	811 (68%)

Encouraging Agent	Percentage of n (382)
Government military forces	57.7
Relatives, friends, neighbors	11.3
U. S.	7.6
Korean	7.3
Allied military forces (unspecified)	5.6
Village or hamlet officials	4.5
GVN civilian cadre	4.5
Religious leaders	1.0
Viet-Cong	.5

Nature of Encouragement	Percentage of n (382)
Warned of impending military operations	41.7
Promised assistance/better life if relocate	36.3
Threatened with reprisals if do not move	15.3
Other	6.7

13. Discouragement of Refugees
(n = 1193)

No discouragement	1012	(85%)
Discouraged	181	(15%)
Discouraging agent: Viet Cong	181	

Nature of Viet-Cong Discouragement	Percentage of n (181)
Threatened life if caught leaving	45.3
Told of GVN/Allied maltreatment of refugees	18.2
Threatened with imprisonment if caught leaving	9.4
Threatened to be given re-education course if caught	9.4
Forcibly detained	6.6
Threatened to confiscate property if left	3.9
Kept under surveillance to prevent leaving	3.3
Other	3.9

14. Rate of Refugee Generation at District Level



14 (Continued)



15. Extent of Inter-District Movement of Refugees
(n = 1193)

Districts of Origin	Districts of Resettlement					Totals
	Dong Xuan	Hieu-Xuong	Song-Cau	Son Hoa	Tuy-Hoa	
Dong Xuan	58 (63%)		4 (4%)		31 (33%)	93 (100%)
Hieu-Xuong	1 (.3%)	258 (77%)		2 (.6%)	75 (23%)	336 (100%)
Song-Cau			106 (96%)		4 (4%)	110 (100%)
Son Hoa	1 (.5%)	2 (1%)		183 (94%)	9 (5%)	195 (100%)
Tuy-Hoa		1 (1%)			294 (99%)	295 (100%)
Tuy-An	10 (7%)	2 (1%)			137 (92%)	149 (100%)
Phu Duc				12 (100%)		12 (100%)
Totals	70	263	110	197	550	1190*

*Three refugee families came from outside the province.

16. Percentage of Refugee Families in Resettlement Areas From the Same District



17. Changes in Village Populations Caused by Refugee Movement[a]

Column:	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Village Name	No. of Refugee Families From Village in Sample	Total No. of Refugee Families from Village (Projected)	No. of Refugees from Village (Projected)	Projected Pre-migration Population of Village (Estimated from 1964 Census)	Estimated No. of Persons Remaining in Village	Percent of Population Decrease in Village
Dong Xuan						
Xuan Lanh	32	264	1,320	3,204	1,884	41%
Xuan Long	6	50	248	5,289	5,041	5%
Xuan Phuoc	1	8	41	4,151	4,110	1%
Xuan Quang	15	124	619	5,314	4,695	12%
Xuan Son	41	338	1,692	7,603	5,911	22%
Hieu-Xuong						
Duc Thanh	7	58	289	2,239	1,950	13%
Hoa Binh	32	264	1,320	11,739	10,419	11%
Hoa Dong	65	536	2,681	5,903	3,221	45%
Hoa Hiep	9	74	371	10,259	9,887	4%
Hoa My	73	602	3,012	8,237	5,224	37%
Hoa Phong	56	462	2,310	8,949	6,638	26%
Hoa Tan	30	247	1,237	10,134	8,896	12%
Hoa Thanh	2	16	82	13,319	13,236	1%
Hoa Thinh	31	256	1,279	4,136	2,856	31%
Hoa Vinh	14	115	577	5,459	4,881	11%
Hoa Xuan	15	124	619	11,516	10,897	5%
Phu Duc[b]						
Song-Cau						
Xuan Canh	1	8	41	4,902	4,861	1%
Xuan Loc	27	223	1,114	13,816	12,702	8%
Xuan Phuong	37	305	1,526	12,788	11,261	12%
Xuan Thinh	8	66	330	5,104	5,434	6%
Xuan Tho	37	305	1,527	11,931	10,404	13%
Son Hoa						
Son Binh	10	83	413	2,901	3,314	13%
Son Dinh	1	8	41	5,402	5,360	1%
Son Ha[b]						
Son Hoi	2	17	83	568	486	15%
Son Long	7	58	289	1,757	1,468	16%
Son Phuoc	1	8	41	1,081	1,040	4%
Son Xuan	7	58	289	655	366	44%
Tuy-An						
An Cu	4[c]	55	275	5,083	4,808	5%
An Dan	20	273	1,365	6,254	4,889	22%
An Dinh	16	219	1,094	3,808	2,714	29%
An Hai	6	81	405	2,854	2,449	14%
An Hiep	25	341	1,705	3,308	1,603	52%
An Hoa	11	149	745	6,393	5,648	12%
An Linh	10	136	680	4,818	4,138	14%
An My	3	40	200	6,038	5,838	3%
An Ninh	9	123	615	16,162	15,547	4%
An Nghiep	13	177	885	4,032	3,147	22%
An Thanh	24	328	1,640	5,130	3,490	31%
An Xuan	7	95	475	1 395	1,870	25%
Tuy-Hoa						
An Chan	85	701	3,507	6,048	2,540	58%
An Tho	23	189	949	1,749	800	54%
Hoa Dinh	63	520	2,599	8,935	6,336	29%
Hoa Kien	32	264	1,320	9,062	7,741	15%
Hoa Quang	37	305	1,527	7,532	6,005	20%
Hoa Thang	39	322	1,609	16,249	14,639	10%
Hoa Tri	14	116	578	7,908	7,330	7%

[a]See Map 2, p. 57.

[b]Data unreliable.

[c]The 800 unidentified refugee families residing in Tuy-An were allocated to the villages of that district on a weighted basis according to the number of respondents from each village who had been interviewed in neighboring districts.

18. Duration of Movement Phase
(n = 1188)

Length of Time	Number	Percentage
3 hours or less	306	25.8
4 - 9 hours	365	30.7
1 day	381	32.1
1-1/2 days	16	1.3
2 days	60	5.1
3 to 6 days	22	1.9
Over 7 days	2	.1
Trip made in 2 stages (with long stopover)	36	3.0
	1,188	100.0%

19. Means of Transportation
(n = 1181)

	Number	Percentage of Refugees
On foot	746	63.0
Lambretta scooter, bus, car	126	10.9
Boat	91	7.7
Helicopter or airplane	48	4.1
Truck	43	3.6
Horse cart	16	1.4
Bicycle	3	0.2
Walked and used vehicle	99	8.4
Other	9	0.7
	1,181	100.0%

20. Cumulative Frequency Curve:

Distance Traveled from Home to Relocation Site*



Q1 = 25% of respondents

Q2 = 50% of respondents

Q3 = 75% of respondents

*Because plotting distance requires measurement between two map coordinates, hand tabulation was necessary to obtain this data. For this purpose a random stratified sample of 200 questionnaires was used.

21. Time of Movement by Landownership
(n = 1152)

District	No land		0.1-1.9 ha.		2.0-3.9 ha.		Over 3.9 ha.		All refugees	
	Pre '66	1966	Pre '66	1966	Pre '66	1966	Pre '66	1966	Pre '66	1966
Dong Xuan	42.3% (11)	57.7% (15)	40.4% (19)	59.6% (28)	50.0% (7)	50.0% (7)	50.0% (4)	50.0% (4)	43 2% (41)	56.8% (54)
Hieu-Xuong	46.2% (49)	53.8% (57)	28.0% (28)	72.0% (72)	44.8% (39)	55.2% (48)	45.0% (10)	55.0% (22)	40.2% (134)	59.8% (199)
Song-Cau	47.7% (21)	52.3% (23)	47.4% (18)	52.6% (20)	61.9% (13)	38.1% (8)	71.4% (5)	28.6% (2)	51.8% (57)	48.2% (53)
Son Hoa	23.3% (7)	76.7% (23)	22.8% (18)	77.2% (61)	12.2% (6)	87.8% (43)	50.0% (2)	50.0% (2)	20.4% (33)	79.6% (129)
Tuy An	50.9% (27)	49.1% (26)	64.9% (37)	35.1% (20)	66.7% (18)	33.3% (9)	62.5% (5)	37.5% (3)	60.0% (87)	40.0% (58)
Tuy-Hoa	80.1% (109)	19.9% (27)	64.0% (57)	36.0% (32)	68.0% (34)	32.0% (16)	80.0% (16)	20.0% (4)	73.2% (216)	26.8% (79)
Phu-Yen Province Total	56.8% (226)	43.2% (172)	42.9% (179)	57.1% (238)	47.0% (117)	53.0% (132)	58.0% (51)	42.0% (37)	49.7% (573)	50.3% (579)

22. Correlation of Premigration Income Level with Time of Movement

District	Under 50 piastres		50-99 piastres		100-199 piastres		Over 200 piastres		All Income Levels	
	Pre '66	1966	Pre '66	1966	Pre '66	1966	Pre '66	1966	Pre '66	1966
Dong Xuan	43.6% (17)	56.4% (22)	35.7% (10)	64.3% (18)	64.7% (11)	35.3% (6)	33.3% (2)	66.7% (4)	44.4% (40)	55.6% (50)
Hieu-Xuong	38.8% (47)	61.2% (74)	45.6% (52)	54.4% (62)	30.8% (16)	69.2% (36)	64.7% (11)	35.3% (6)	41.4% (126)	58.6% (178)
Song-Cau	52.0% (13)	48.0% (12)	39.5% (15)	60.5% (23)	57.6% (19)	42.4% (14)	83.3% (5)	16.7% (1)	51.0% (52)	49.0% (50)
Son Hoa	15.4% (10)	84.6% (55)	22.4% (13)	77.6% (45)	20.5% (9)	79.5% (35)	37.5% (3)	62.5% (5)	20.0% (35)	80.0% (140)
Tuy-An	68.0% (34)	32.0% (16)	55.3% (26)	44.7% (21)	56.7% (17)	43.3% (13)	63.6% (7)	36.4% (4)	60.9% (84)	39.1% (54)
Tuy-Hoa	79.2% (61)	20.8% (16)	66.7% (86)	33.3% (43)	85.1% (40)	14.9% (7)	84.6% (11)	15.4% (2)	74.4% (198)	25.6% (68)
Phu-Yen Province as Whole	48.2% (185)	51.8% (199)	48.6% (203)	51.4% (215)	50.0% (112)	50.0% (112)	63.9% (39)	36.1% (22)	49.6% (539)	50.4% (548)

23. Relationship of Insurgency to Refugee Movement



Economic Aspects			Houses destroyed by GVN bombardment. Forced labor demands. Heavy insurgent taxation. Land redistributed by Viet-Cong.		
Political Aspects			Insurgent infrastructure established. GVN hamlet council disbanded. GVN Cadre executed by VC.		
Military Aspects	Strategic hamlet organized.	VC began night time infiltration of village.	*Combat hamlet established* VC occupied village after defeating combat youth in battle ARVN operation in hamlet. Village subject to GVN bombing and shelling. Many villagers killed, houses destroyed. Combat youth disbanded.		
	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966

Pacification History of Ap Xuan Thanh, Xa Hoa Tan, Hieu-Xuong District.

Source: C-1 Questionnaire RAS-3.

23 (Continued)



	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Economic Aspects			Forced labor and taxation increasing burden. Land restributed. Houses destroyed by bombing and shelling.		
Political Aspects		GVN cadre assassinated by VC.	VC administrative infrastructure established. GVN hamlet council disbanded.		
Military Aspects	Strategic hamlet organized.		VC occupy hamlet. Establish combat hamlet. Viet-Cong inviltration Hamlet bombed and shelled by GVN.	U. S. operation in village. Self-defense force defeated and abandons hamlet.	

Pacification History of Ap Phu Can, Xa An Tho, Tuy-Hoa District

Source: C-1 Questionnaire RAS-1.

24. Reasons for Selection of Resettlement Site: Phu-Yen
(n = 1166)

Reasons Cited	Number of Citations*	% of Refugee Population*
Friends/relatives at site already	430	36.8
Site arranged by GVN authorities	220	18.8
Availability of land for home site	137	11.7
Hamlet/Village Chief advised or gave land	129	11.1
Employment opportunities available	124	10.6
Followed neighbors and/or other refugees	110	9.4
Security considerations	99	8.5
Religious factors	51	4.4
Proximity of site to native hamlet	39	3.3
Availability of government commodity support	38	3.3
Other	59	5.1

25. Reasons for Selection of Resettlement Site in Son Hoa and Song-Cau Districts

Reasons Cited	Son Hoa (n = 197)	Song-Cau (n = 110)
Friends/relatives at site already	10.1%	49.1%
Site arranged by GVN authorities	45.6%	6.3%
Availability of land for home site	5.5%	1.8%
Hamlet/Village Chief advised or gave land	19.2%	5.4%
Employment opportunities available	3.5%	7.7%
Followed neighbors and/or other refugees	9.6%	6.3%
Security considerations	6.5%	14.5%
Religious factors	0	.9%
Proximity of site to native hamlet	2.5%	5.4%
Availability of government commodity support	11.1%	0
Other	4.5%	5.4%

*Refugees could cite more than one reason; percentages are based on number of refugees responding (n = 1166).

26. Retention of Possessions
(n = 1193)

	Number of Citations	% of Refugee Population
Retained no possessions	412	34.5
Retained possessions	781	65.5
	1,193	100.0

Kind of Possession	Number of Citations*	Percentage*
Clothing	483	61.8
Food	418	53.5
Money	260	32.3
Livestock	161	20.6
Furniture	79	10.1
Major means of production	60	7.6
Kitchen utensils	50	6.4
Sampan	43	5.5
Home Construction materials	2	.2
Other	46	5.8
Total	1,602	

*Refugees could cite more than one item, hence percentages are only of those retaining possessions (n = 781).

27. Return Visits to Native Village
(n = 194)



Reasons:

- Harvest crops
- Collect possessions
- Visit friends

No. of refugees NOT Returning: 999 or 83.7%

28. Land Ownership as a Factor in Future Aspirations
(n = 713)

	Land Ownership in Mau*				Totals	
Aspirations	No Land	0.1 - 1.9	2.0 - 3.9	Over 3.9	No.	%
Want to stay at present location	20.8%	17.0%	12.2%	6.5%	115	16.1
Want to return to home village	55.3%	61.4%	73.8%	75.8%	459	64.4
Want to move	7.1%	8.3%	3.0%	8.1%	47	6.5
Uncertain	16.8%	13.3%	9.0%	9.7%	92	13.0
100% = n	n = 226	n = 253	n = 172	n = 62	713	100%

*Mau = one hectare or slightly less than 2 1/2 acres.

n = 713 df = 9

$X^2 = 27.02$ $.001 \leq p \leq .01$

29. Premigration Occupation as a Factor in Future Aspirations
(n = 730)

Aspirations	Premigration Occupations									Totals	
	Farmers, Ten. Farmers	Agricultural Laborers	Fisher-men	Small Merchant	General Laborers	Crafts-men	GVN Cadre		Unem-ployed	No.	%
							Army	Civil			
Want to stay at present location	14.6%	15.8%	22.8%	50.0%	14.3%	15.4%	20.0%	31.6%	16.7%	120	16.4
Want to return to home village	68.4%	59.2%	66.7%	30.0%	50.0%	61.5%	60.0%	47.4%	50.0%	469	64.2
Want to move	5.4%	6.6%	8.8%	10.0%	8.9%	3.8%	0	15.8%	0	45	6.2
Uncertain	11.6%	18.4%	1.7%	10.0%	26.8%	19.2%	20.0%	5.3%	33.3%	96	13.2
100% = n	n = 465	n = 76	n = 57	n = 10	n = 56	n = 26	n = 15	n = 19	n = 6	730	100%

n = 730 df = 27

X^2 = 48.38 $.001 \leq p \leq .01$

30. Refugee Expectations vs Future Aspirations
(n = 742)

	Aspirations				Totals	
Expectations	Want to Stay	Want to Return	Want to Move	Uncertain	No.	%
Expect to stay in present location	99.2%	94.1%	70.2%	91.7%	691	93.1
Expect to return to home village	0	3.6%	6.4%	2.1%	22	3.0
Expect to move	0	1.7%	17.0%	2.1%	18	2.4
Uncertain	.8%	.6%	6.4%	4.2%	11	1.5
100% = n	n = 124	n = 475	n = 47	n = 96	n=742	100%

No responses = 37.8% of sample

n = 742 df = 9

X^2 = 69.98 $p < .001$

31. Official Evaluations of the Implications of Refugee Movement for the Pacification Program in Phu-Yen Province

Respondent	Overall Evaluation of Impact of Refugee Movement on Pacification Effort	Summary of Specific Views on Actual and Potential Implications of Refugee Movement for Pacification Effort
Province Chief	Mixed impact	1. Depopulation of rural areas removes constraints on Allied military operations by depriving Viet-Cong of civilian "shield" 2. Refugees offer Viet-Cong a means of infiltrating agents into GVN controlled areas 3. Refugees are economic burden on GVN. They are consumers rather than producers.
Social Welfare Ministry Representative	Negative impact	Refugee movement eliminates need for pacification program--rural areas now uninhabited.
Refugee Commission Representative	No impact	No specific comments.
MACV Sector Advisor	Mixed impact	1. Refugee influx overburdens GVN government and police systems. 2. Viet-Cong are deprived of human resources 3. In theory, refugees could be recruited for self-defense forces, but population lacks men of military age.
USAID/ORC Representative	No impact	Refugees may offer pacification resource but more information needed on population
District Chief, Song-Cau	No impact (There is no formal pacification program for Song-Cau)	Refugee movement may deny resources to Viet-Cong
MACV Subsector advisor, Song-Cau	No impact	Refugee movement denies resources to Viet-Cong

31 (Continued)

Respondent	Overall Evaluation of Impact of Refugee Movement on Pacification Effort	Summary of Specific Views on Actual and Potential Implications of Refugee Movement for Pacification Effort
District Chief, Hieu-Xuong	Mixed impact	1. Depopulation of rural areas removes constraints (fear of causing civilian casualties) from Allied military operations 2. Refugees are consumers rather than producers 3. Agricultural production of district is lowered 4. Refugees could be organized into self-defense forces
MACV Sub-sector advisor, Hieu-Xuong	Positive impact	1. Viet-Cong guerrillas are deprived of intelligence network 2. Refugees provide labor pool for GVN economic development projects.
District Chief, Dong Xuan	Negative impact	1. Refugee movement reduces Viet-Cong logistic problems 2. Refugees are a drain on GVN resources. May divert these supplies to Viet-Cong 3. There is no potential utilization of refugees in the pacification effort
Special Forces CAPO Officer, Dong-Tre (Dong Xuan District)	Positive impact	1. Viet-Cong are deprived of human resources 2. Resettled refugees could provide intelligence shield against Viet-Cong sabotage of Route 1
District Chief, Tuy-Hoa	Mixed impact	1. Viet-Cong are deprived of civilian shield 2. Viet-Cong are denied human resources 3. Refugees provide recruits for ARVN 4. Refugees are burden on GVN administrative system 5. Economic productivity of district is reduced by refugee movement

APPENDIX B

DESCRIPTION OF PHU-YEN PROVINCE

APPENDIX B. DESCRIPTION OF PHU-YEN PROVINCE

The development of the refugee problem in Phu-Yen has been heavily influenced by the particular history and topography (both physical and social) of the province. This appendix presents brief background descriptions of the geographic, economic, ethnological, political and military aspects of Phu-Yen which are helpful to an understanding of the refugee situation.

Geography

Phu-Yen is located at near midpoint on the South Vietnamese coastline. Its capital city, Tuy-Hoa, lies 240 air miles northeast of Saigon. Phu-Yen is centered on the large alluvial flood plain of the Song Ba River commonly referred to as the Tuy-Hoa Valley and includes a series of smaller valleys which cut into the heavily forested mountain ridges that extend from the Truong Son or Annamite chain to the shore of the South China Sea (Map 1). These ridges, reaching an elevation of over 1,000 meters on the northern and southern borders of the province, serve both to isolate Phu-Yen from its neighboring provinces and to divide it internally into five clearly bounded geographical units: Tuy-Hoa Valley, Cung-Son Basin, Tuy-An Coastal Plain, Song-Cau Coastal Plain, and Dong Xuan Valley.

As can be seen from Map 1, the district subdivisions of Phu-Yen are generally coterminous with the major natural divisions, excepting Tuy-Hoa and Hieu-Xuong Districts, which together comprise the Tuy-Hoa Valley unit, and Son Hoa and Phu Duc Districts, which both lie in the Cung-Son Basin.

Transportation System

As a consequence of its geographic disunity, Phu-Yen has a poorly articulated and highly channelized system of transportation which has been badly dislocated both by insurgent sabotage and the demands of military usage.

Map 1. Physiography of Phu-Yen Province



Source: Joint Operations Graphic (Ground) Maps: 1501ND49-13, ND49-9.

Of the three major roads in Phu-Yen, only one is hard surfaced; National Route 1, a two-lane asphalt roadway which connects Tuy-Hoa with the neighboring provincial capitals of Nha Trang and Qui-Nhon. Outside of the Tuy-Hoa Valley it has been badly sabotaged and as of July 1966 was not open for traffic beyond the limits of government secured areas. Route 6a, a gravel surfaced road, parallels the railroad line from Route 1 inland to the town of La Hai (Dong Xuan District capitol) and on to Van Canh in Binh-Dinh Province. Occasional convoys run from Tuy-Hoa to La Hai, but must be preceded by major road-clearing operations. Route 9a, a single lane dirt road, runs from Tuy-Hoa to Hau Bon (Cheo Reo) in Phu-Bon Province by way of Cung-Son, the capital of Son Hoa District. Private tri-Lambrettas (3-wheel motor scooters) travel part of the route, but Cung-Son is dependent upon convoys for resupply, with a consequent high cost of living.

Viet-Nam's north-south railway runs through Phu-Yen along the coastal plain, but is currently inoperative as a result of guerrilla sabotage of bridges and right-of-way.

The Song Ba is the only navigable river, but only on its lower stretches; consequently, it is not an important artery of transportation. Coastal shipping, though now utilized to a considerable extent for civilian commerce, could potentially relieve much of the overburden on road and air transport resulting from military logistics demands. Port facilities are lacking, however, and only shallow-draft vessels can unload at Tuy-Hoa.

The recently expanded main airfield at Tuy-Hoa can handle heavy aircraft up to C130's, while the strips at Cung-Son, Dong Tre and Song-Cau are suitable only for Caribous and other STOL aircraft.

The present inadequacy of the Phu-Yen transportation system poses great difficulties for the government in its efforts to provide relief for the refugees outside the capital city of the province. Supplies must be moved either by air or by truck convoy, with consequent high cost and frequent difficulty in obtaining space for nonmilitary goods.

Economy

Agriculture dominates the Phu-Yen economy, with fishing and services forming relatively minor sectors. Industry, other than a very limited cottage craft production of bricks, charcoal, cloth, baskets and hats, etc., is nonexistent and there appears to be no local resource base suitable for other than a handicraft-level productive capacity.

Agricultural production is centered on rice. Except where irrigation is practiced, only a single monsoon crop, planted in August/September and harvested in January, is taken from the land. In the Tuy-Hoa Valley, however, there is an extensive irrigation system with water drawn from the Dong Cam Dam, and two crops per year are planted.

In the mountains slash-and-burn (swidden) agriculture is practiced. All rice production is by primitive, labor intensive methods, with no mechanization and little use of fertilizers or chemicals. In consequence, yields are low and Phu-Yen is at present a rice-deficit area.

Sugar had been a significant cash crop in many areas but recently the government has severely restricted planting of cane as it is viewed as providing ideal cover for the guerrillas. Coconuts were produced in large quantities in Song-Cau District but some of the palms were killed or injured by misdirected defoliation spraying in the spring of 1966.

In the inland districts of Son Hoa and Dong Xuan, tobacco and cattle are raised as major sources of cash income, but production has fallen drastically due to the difficulty of getting produce to the market in Tuy-Hoa.

Fishing is the major occupation of several coastal villages, but is predominantly subsistence oriented with only a crudely developed marketing system.

Services, principally government and military/paramilitary activity, provide considerable employment opportunities, while the Viet-Cong also absorb part of the able-bodied labor force. Recent military construction, especially the expansion of the airstrip at Dong Tac, has involved heavy labor demands but provided only short-term employment for unskilled laborers.

Basically, Phu-Yen has an oversupply of labor in an economy with only limited absorptive capacity. Partly this is a correlate of the rice-centered economy, which requires a large "reserve" labor supply for the seasonal peaks of transplanting and harvesting but at other times has only minimal labor requirements. Although in "normal" times the extended peasant family is a mechanism for ensuring the availability of labor when needed, while providing a secure existence for the oversupply in off-seasons, the mass population shifts resulting from the insurgency have disrupted the equilibrium between labor supply and demand. The normal underemployment of the rural population has been replaced by visible unemployment in those areas impacted by heavy population increases resulting from refugee immigration.

Population Distribution (Pre-refugee migration)

While there is an average population density of 62.6 persons per square kilometer, the 327,533 persons composing the population of Phu-Yen (1964 census) are distributed with considerable unevenness over the Province's 5,233 square kilometers. For example, Duc Dung Village in Phu-Duc District has a density of 4.1 persons per square kilometer, compared to 2,326.5 for Tuy-Hoa City. Variations in population density by village are indicated in Map 2, while Table 1 presents a district level breakout of demographic data.*

*Dan-So Viet-Nam: Theo Don-Vi Hanh-Chanh Trong Nam 1964, National Institute of Statistics, Saigon, June 1965.

Map 2. Population Density of Phu-Yen Province



Source: Population Density Map of South Viet-Nam, Army Map Service, Washington, D. C., 1964.

Table 1. Population Distribution in Phu-Yen Province

District	Area (km^2)	Population	Number of Persons per km^2
Dong Xuan	1,186	24,938	210.3
Hieu-Xuong	no data	89,649	--
Phu Duc	1,027	4,594	4.5
Song-Cau	434	47,679	109.9
Son Hoa	722	16,176	224.0
Tuy-An	409	64,145	156.8
Tuy-Hoa	no data	80,352	--
Province Total	5,233	327,533	62.6

Ethnic and Other Groupings

The population of Phu-Yen is predominantly ethnic Vietnamese, although several non-Vietnamese tribal groups are represented in the mountainous inland districts.

The ethnic Vietnamese are relatively homogeneous in culture, though distinguishing characteristics are noticeable along linguistic and religious lines. Most of the population speaks a variant of the Central Vietnamese dialect, but refugees from North Viet-Nam who resettled in Phu-Yen in 1954 use various Northern dialects. There is no real problem in the province in understanding all dialects, but older native residents on occasion have difficulty in communicating with speakers of the Northern dialect. Villagers also easily distinguish North Vietnamese soldiers from indigenous Viet-Cong guerrillas on the basis of linguistic characteristics.

A more significant sociological division stems from the differing religious affiliations of the Vietnamese in Phu-Yen. Accurate statistics are unavailable, but Buddhists represent the majority religion. This form of Buddhism is the traditional folk religion (with no leadership hierarchy, however) rather than the "reform" Buddhism which has become increasingly prominent in urban Viet-Nam since World War II. Ancestor worshippers or "Confucianists" form the second largest grouping, although the demarcation between this folk religion and traditional rural Buddhism is in no sense sharp, even to their adherents. In fact, many refugees, when asked their religion, had difficulty in formulating a specific answer except when they were members of one of the two hierarchically organized religions represented in Phu-Yen: Cao-Daism and Catholicism.

Although Catholics and Cao Daists make up distinct minority religious groups, probably together comprising less than one-tenth of the total population, their social cohesiveness and their hierarchical leadership structure give them political significance beyond their actual numbers. It is reported, for instance, that when rural self-defense groups were organized in Phu-Yen in 1963, in certain areas arms were distributed only to Catholics. Also Catholic and, to a lesser extent, Cao-Dai refugees today appear to maintain considerably greater group cohesion than refugees of other religions. For example, the leadership and organization of the Catholics in the province played a significant role in a Government project to resettle refugees from Phu-Yen to Cam Ranh Bay.

Four of the five non-Vietnamese ethnic groups represented in Phu-Yen are classed as Montagnard tribes--Hroi, Rhade, Bahnar and Jarai (see Map 3). Accurate data are unavailable, but the Montagnard population is estimated at about 16,000 or just under 5% of Phu-Yen's total population.* The fifth group are Chams, descended from the population of the Champa Kingdom which ruled the Central Coastal region until the Vietnamese conquest of the area in the 15th century. Unlike the Montagnard tribes, the Chams of Phu-Yen have become so acculturated

*Projected from data presented in Health Survey of Boun Khan: A Jarai Village. Vol. I: Phu-Bon Project II. (Saigon: United States Operations Mission, 1963), pp. 22-25.

Map 3. Minority Ethnic Group Areas in Phu-Yen



Note: 1) Shaded areas delimit overall territories of tribal groups: at any particular time much of the land included is uninhabited. 2) Ethnic Vietnamese are often resident within tribal areas. No attempt has been made to delineate these enclaves. 3) Sources: U. S. Army Special Ethnological Map for Vietnam, 1964. SORO Ethnographic Study Series: Selected Groups in the Republic of Vietnam, 1965-66.

by centuries of contact with the Vietnamese that they no longer form a distinct or readily identifiable group. Figures on the Cham population of Phu-Yen are not available.

The four Montagnard tribes are culturally distinct groups, but share many characteristics, such as the practice of swidden agriculture, animistic religions and the absence of political integration above the village level, that tend to distinguish them as a group from most of the ethnic Vietnamese. A common trait, however, is their sense of their cultural distinction from the ethnic Vietnamese. Mutual suspicion and hostility often characterize relations between Vietnamese (who dominate the government at all levels) and the tribal groups, witn this always-latent intergroup conflict becoming particularly manifest in issues of arming joint Vietnamese/Montagnard military forces and distributing relief commodities to the refugees.

Governmental Structure

Governmental structure in Phu-Yen is hierarchical, with four major administrative levels: the province (tinh), the district (quan), the village (xa), and finally the hamlet (ap) (Figure 1). The hamlet is the basic sociopolitical unit in Viet-Nam in contrast to the "village," which is purely an administrative unit combining a number of scattered hamlets.

Each of Phu-Yen's administrative units is headed by either an elected or appointed chief. The Province Chief is appointed (nominally by the Central Government, but more accurately by the Military Commander of the Corps Tactical Zone). For a number of years the position has been filled by field grade military officers and, although the Province Chief is the chief executive of the province, he tended to focus most attention on his responsibilities as chief military officer in the province (Sector Commander). The Province Chief is assisted, however, by a civilian deputy who more directly supervises the normal administrative services, and by a military assistant for internal security matters.

Figure 1. Government Structure in Phu-Yen



*Paralleling the political structure of province and district is the military command structure of Sector (Province-level) and Sub-Sector (District-level). The Province Chief also serves as Sector Commander, the District Chief as Sub-Sector Commander.

Since 1963 district chiefs have also usually been military officers of company grade, seconded by civilian administrative assistants. Implementation of population control measures is primarily a district level responsibility and each person residing in the district is issued an identification card. Possession of a card is essential for movement, employment, and all relations with the government. Refugees, for example, must produce identification cards before they can receive government aid. If they cannot, they are processed through the district police prior to being officially registered as refugees. One indication of the importance of these cards is that the Viet-Cong make a constant effort to destroy them: by destroying the identification cards of persons residing

in their zones of control, the insurgents both underline the extent to which the GVN lacks effective authority and, perhaps more importantly, greatly reduce the freedom of movement of the peasantry.

Below the district chief are the village chiefs who, in Phu-Yen, are generally appointed to office, and the hamlet chiefs who often are elected. Due to the precarious security situation, some hamlet and village chiefs now live in district towns, but many remain in their native settlements and are recognized leaders of their communities. For example, in some refugee resettlements where large numbers of persons from the same hamlet have settled together, their hamlet chief has moved with them and continues to serve as defacto chief even though removed from his legitimate base of authority.

APPENDIX C

SURVEY METHOD

APPENDIX C. SURVEY METHOD

In order that the reader may better evaluate the data presented in this report, a brief statement is necessary on the methods by which the information was collected.

Selection of Interviewers

The best designed questionnaires and the most representative sample will obviously produce undependable results without competent interviewers. However, recruitment of interviewers for the refugee study presented unusual problems due to both the nature and location of the work. Not many qualified Vietnamese are willing to leave the relative security of the cities for the dangers, real or fancied, or provincial areas, and not a great percentage of those who were willing to venture to Tuy-Hoa were qualified for the job.

There were two principal criteria used in selecting interviewers:

1. The applicant had to demonstrate an ability to relate well to the peasantry. This was tested by placing the prospective interviewers in a refugee hamlet in Gia-Dinh Province and observing trial interviews. In this field situation it quickly became apparent whether the applicant could engage in successful informal interaction with the peasants. Only those students who showed respect toward the refugees as persons and freely and sympathetically engaged in interchanges about the peasants' problems and prospects were selected as interviewers.

2. The applicant had to demonstrate sufficient command of English to be able to understand instructions from the American researchers and to be able to fill out the questionnaire in English.

Out of some 75 applicants for the position, thirteen interviewers were finally employed; ten from Saigon and three locally from Tuy-Hoa, Phu-Yen. Relatively few problems developed once the interviewers were deployed to Phu-Yen. However, their brief predeployment training on how to complete the questionnaires proved to have been inadequate and the first protocols collected in the

initial week of surveying had to be discarded because they were not completed correctly. At this point, the practice of having an American researcher check each interview as it was collected was introduced, thus ensuring that it was complete and that the interviewer was collecting the data in the desired form. Interviewer enthusiasm remained high throughout the study and there was little evidence of a "hired-hand mentality" as might be manifested in sloppiness in conducting interviews and filling out the protocols.

The continued cross-checking by the American researchers of protocols would have quickly revealed if a particular interviewer was "loading" his answers (e.g., following a particular "line" in reporting responses on such questions as those dealing with causes of movement or refugee aspirations). There was, however, no evidence of this occurring. Capt. Truong also made a practice of talking informally with many refugees in the interview sites and this provided an independent source of validation for the general trends reported by the interviewers. Finally, it is no overstatement to say that an extremely close rapport developed between American and Vietnamese personnel on the project and frequent informal discussions were held on the goals and methods of the research. As the interviewers' understanding of the project increased, so did their sense of responsibility for the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the data they collected.

Respondent Attitudes and Behavior

A more difficult problem than that of interviewer competence and reliability is the question of the extent to which the refugees themselves gave biased responses. To those accepting the stereotype of Vietnamese as deviously indirect or cautiously oblique, survey research may be viewed as producing data of dubious validity.

Paul Mus, for example, has written that Vietnamese peasants will only respond to an official inquiry, and in fact view doing so as one of their obligations to the government; however, "...part of those very obligations was to provide the authorities with answers that were satisfactory. The inquirer was supposed

to be experienced and clever enough to take due account of such a disposition in his informers, careful, above all, not to make him lose face."[1]

This view may have some validity when applied to the traditional Vietnamese elite, but it is questionable if it applies to the peasantry generally. There were simply too many cases during this study of persons answering questions with a frankness that could only injure their standing with the local authorities for the writers to accept a view of peasants as deceitful. For example, a surprising number of refugees reported family members as being with the insurgent forces, despite a known GVN bias against providing aid to Viet-Cong "dependents." Of course, in such instances, the interview situation may have led the people to be more open than usual. Although an effort was made to minimize the American presence it was probably clear to most of the refugees that this was a U. S. rather than a GVN enterprise which, while perhaps biasing some of their responses may also have led them to talk more freely about their relationship to the insurgents and about experiences of government failings.

The relative youth of the interviewers and the informal and friendly approach they adopted when they questioned the refugees tended to minimize any threat that the peasants may have perceived in the interview situation. The presence of two young female interviewers further contributed to formation of a relaxed atmosphere.

It has been occasionally suggested that the Viet-Cong may have "coached" the refugees to provide answers in order to deliberately distort the survey results. Given the size and geographical distribution of the refugee population in Phu-Yen and the interviewing pattern (interviewers were not informed beforehand of the particular hamlet they would be working in), it is highly improbable that the insurgents could have achieved such a feat even if they had thought it desirable. Certainly, there was never any indication that they made a systematic effort to bias the responses of the refugees.

---

[1] "Foreword," to Gerald C. Hickey, Village in Viet-Nam (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964).

Data Collection Instruments

Given the objectives of the study, a survey approach using written questionnaires appeared to be the most feasible method of data collection. Other approaches to data collection (observation, informal conversations with refugees and officials, etc.) were also utilized, but definitely represented a subsidiary aspect of the research effort.

The principal data collection instrument was the "Refugee Population Survey Questionnaire, Series B;" (samples of all questionnaires are reproduced below). The B Questionnaire was designed for relatively rapid but comprehensive interviewing of large numbers of refugees, covering four of the main study areas of interest: causes of movement, the nature of movement, demographic characteristics of the population, and problems of refugee relief and resettlement.

The B questionnaire was employed on a mass survey basis; over 12% of the heads of refugee families in Phu-Yen Province were interviewed in the course of seven weeks. The completed protocols were then returned to the HSR office in Washington where they were coded and the data transferred to punch cards. The bulk of the data presented in this report has been developed on the basis of computer analysis of the survey protocols.

Five other standardized data collection instruments were utilized on a more limited basis:

Questionnaire A: Interview for Officials: This questionnaire, completed by various administrators, is divided into two sections. The first focuses on refugee demography while the second examines government policy toward refugees and, specifically, what actions were being taken in such areas as aid, civic action, psychological operations, etc. This section includes open-ended questions covering matters such as the role of refugees in the pacification effort, and recommendations for future refugee programs. Analysis of 13 protocols collected in Phu-Yen provides much of the data base for Chapters V and VI.

Table 1. Phu-Yen Refugee Population and Survey Sample
(as of July 1966)

(I) Resettlement Area by Hamlets	(II) No. of Refugee Families	(III) Refugee Families as a % of Total No. in Province	(IV) No. of Question-naires in Sample	(V) Questionnaires as % of Total No. of Families
1. Tuy-Hoa District	1,707	17.3	209	12.24%
Lien Tri	60	.6	8	
Ninh Tinh	119	1.2	17	
Phuoc Hau (Thuong Phu)	355	3.6	42	
Phuoc Khanh	38	.4	5	
Dong Phuoc	235	2.4	29	
Ngoc Lang	300	3.1	36	
Dong Binh	35	.3	4	
Phong Nien	40	.4	5	
Hon Chua	525	5.3	63	
2. Tuy-Hoa City	2,642	26.8	312	11.81%
Binh Hoa	889	9.0	108	
Binh Loi	400	4.1	45	
Binh My	298	3.0	35	
Binh Tinh	1,055	10.7	124	
3. Hieu-Xuong District	1,701	17.2	206	12.11%
Dong Tac	34	.3	4	
Phu Lam	320	3.3	41	
Phuoc Loc	735	7.4	89	
Phuoc Binh	612	6.2	72	
4. Resettlement Camps	631	6.5	89	14.10%
Chop Chai Temporary	155	1.6	20	
Ninh Tinh Resettlement	86	.9	11	
Dong Tac Temporary	83	.9	8	
Dong Tac Resettlement	307	3.1	50	
5. Dong Xuan District Dong Tre and La Hai	589	6.0	70	11.88%
6. Song-Cau District Song-Cau	928	9.4	110	11.85%
7. Son-Hoa District	1,647	16.8	197	11.96%
Dong Hoa/Bac Ly			15	
Son Ha Resettlement			182	
Phu-Yen Province Total	9,845	100.0%	1,193	12.12%

This total does not include 600-1000 refugee families in Tuy-An District or 246 families in Dong My Village, where security considerations in July 1966 precluded conducting interviews.

Map 1. Resettlement Areas in Phu-Yen Province



Resettlement Area	No. of Refugee Families	Percent of All Refugee Families in Province
1. Tuy-Hoa District	1,707	17.3
2. Tuy-Hoa City	2,642	26.8
3. Hieu-Xuong District	1,701	17.2
4. Resettlement Camps	631	6.5
5. Dong Xuan District	589	6.0
6. Song-Cau District	928	9.4
7. Son Hoa District	1,647	16.8
	9,845	100.0

Questionnaire C: Refugee Attitudinal Survey: The C questionnaire was designed for collection of extensive information on changes in rural living conditions resulting from insurgent and counterinsurgent activity in the native hamlets of refugees. This was an experimental effort and due to the complexity of the questionnaire, required highly skilled interviewers. The interview required from 2-4 hours, and consequently only 23 protocols were completed in Phu-Yen. These have been useful, however, both for the understanding they provide of conditions in rural Phu-Yen and for the independent check they provide on data collected in the mass survey.

Questionnaire D: Nonrefugee Population Survey: Administered to 49 heads-of-family who had remained in their hamlets despite large scale emigration of their neighbors, this questionnaire was designed to determine if there were any measurable sociological differences between refugees and nonrefugees who had undergone similar experiences.

Questionnaire E: Economic Aspects of Refugee Resettlement: Specialized data on economic aspects of the refugee problem were collected using this schedule to interview 24 refugee heads-of-family. This questionnaire was designed to obtain information on refugee consumption patterns and economic attitudes and motivations. Lt. Robert Sansom, USAF (on TDY assignment to OSD/ARPA RDFU-V) designed the questionnaire and has prepared an analysis of the responses.

The Relocated Refugee Questionnaire: This schedule was employed to interview a number of refugees from Phu-Yen who had resettled at Cam Ranh Bay.

Samples of Questionnaires

These are reproduced on the following pages.

QUESTIONNAIRE A3 - INTERVIEW FOR OFFICIALS

1. Location
   a) Village
   b) District
   c) Province

2. Official's name:
   a) Present position:
   b) Length of service in present position:_____year(s)
   c) Ever held any other position in the area:
   d) For how long:_____year(s)

3. Total number of refugees currently in area of responsibility;

4. How do you define a refugee?

5. Demographic composition of refugee population:
   Number or % of refugees who are: ages 0 - 15_____
   15 - 40_____
   40 + _____
   Of the 15 - 40 group what % are : male_____
   female_____

6. Ethnic composition:
   Number or % of refugees who are Vietnamese_____
   Montagnard_____
   (specify)
   Other _____
   (specify)
   Are these figures_____estimates
   _____reliably compiled statistics

7. Religious compositions
   Number or % of refugees who are Buddhist _____
   Catholic _____
   Cao-Dai _____
   Hoa-Hoa_____
   Other _____
   Are these figures_____estimates
   _____reliably compiled statistics

8. Source of statistics (what agency):

9. Cut-off date for compilation of statistics:

10. Estimate of reliability of statistics (explain):

11. Character of refugee movement in area: (Note any differences in ethnic or religious groups)

_____ As separate families
_____ As group of families
_____ As hamlet or village
_____ Under the leadership of religious leader
_____ Other:

12. What are the causes of refugee movement:

_____ Because of VC taxes
_____ Because of VC terrorism
_____ Because of VC demand for labor
_____ Because of fear of air bombing
_____ Because of fear of artillery shelling
_____ Because of military operations in area
_____ Because of difficulty of earning a living
_____ Other (describe)

13. What is the effect of refugees on area pacification program:

_____ Favorable
_____ No effect
_____ Unfavorable
How and why:

14. How can refugees be utilized to make the maximum contribution to the pacification efforts:

15. Has the government either encouraged or discouraged people in Viet-Cong areas to move to secure areas? By what means?

16. What policy (regulations and programs) does the area government have fo:
a) Refugees in temporary camps

b) Refugees in resettlement camps

17. What is being done to aid refugees:
a) On the part of local Government:

b) On the part of the province:

c) On the part of Central Government:

d) On the part of USAID:

e) On the part of MACV:

f) On the part of religious or other relief organizations:

g) Other:

18. Is there differential treatment of various ethnic or religious groups? Describe:

19. Are you satisfied with the present program for handling refugees; if not, what change would you make:

20. What psy-war efforts have been directed at refugees?

21. Have the presence of refugees affected the Chieu-Hoi program?

22. What civic action programs have been conducted with refugees? (U.S. Forces, Korean, GVN)

23. What additional civic action and psy-war programs would be useful?

24. Are refugees being recruited for the Armed forces:

	Number each year	Source:
a) Regional force	_____	_____

	Number each year	Source:
b) Popular force	_____	_____
c) Village self-defense forces	_____	_____
d) ARVN	_____	_____

25. Have refugee cadres been trained to provide leadership in resettlements?
    a) Where:

    b) How many:

    c) How long:

26. What change in the refugee situtation do you anticipate in the next six months?

27. What planning or preparation has been done to handle the expected changes?

28. What are the locations of refugee concentration (include sketch map), and
    What locations have the refugees come from (when did they move):

QUESTIONNAIRE B3 - REFUGEE POPULATION SURVEY

Questionnaire No. _____

1. In what place did you have your home before coming here?
   Ap_____
   Xa_____
   Quan_____
   Tinh_____

2. What was the date that you left your village?
   day:_____month:_____year: 19____

3. What were your reasons for leaving your home?

4. Did anyone encourage you to leave your home? _____yes _____no

5. (If answer to above is "yes"): In what ways were you encouraged to move?

6. Did anyone try to discourage you from leaving your home? _____yes _____no

7. (If answer to above is "yes"): In what manner were you discouraged from moving?

8. By what means of transportation did you come here?

9. How many days did the trip take you? _____days

10. Did you travel mainly by day or at night? _____by day
    _____by night

11. What were your reasons for selecting this place to come to?

12. Did you have friends or relatives who lived here already: _____yes
    _____no

13. Had you ever visited here before: _____yes
    _____no

14. What people did you travel together with when you came here?

15. What possessions did you bring with you?

16. What members of your family are living in the same household with you here now? (Ascertain sex, age, marital status, relationship to interviewee, literacy, and physical condition of each member).

relationship to interviewee	sex	age	marital status	literate	occupation	physical condition
1. Interviewee*						
2.						
.						
.						
.						
15.						

17. Are there any members of your household who are not here with you?

relationship to interviewee	sex	age	marital status	occupation	location
1.					
2.					
.					
.					
.					
5.					

18. Have any members of your household been killed as a direct result of the war?

relationship to interviewee	sex	age	marital status	occupation	cause of death	year of death
1.						
2.						
.						
.						
.						
5.						

*CODE:
sex: M = male, F = female
marital status: S = single, M = married, W = widowed
literate: 1 = literate, 2 = illiterate
physical condition: 1 = able-bodied, 2 - major physical defects

19. What was your occupation before you moved here? (head of household's occupation)

20. What was the average daily income of your family before coming here?

21. Did you own farm land? _____yes _____piastres
_____no

22. If "yes", how many mau? _____mau

23. Did you rent farm land? _____yes
_____no

24. If "yes", how many mau? _____mau

25. (If refugee rented land), how much rent did you pay last year?

26. How many gia of paddy did you harvest last year? _____gia

27. How much tax did you pay last year? to the Government: _____
to the Viet Cong: _____

28. Did you own any major means of production before coming here? (buffalo, sampan, tools, etc.)

29. Since becoming a refugee have you received any help from the Government? (describe)

30. Have you received help from any non-governmental sources? (describe)

31. What are you doing now to earn your living?

32. What is the average daily income of your family now?

33. Have you made any trips back to your village to collect left-behind possessions or to harvest crops? (what reason and how many trips)

34. What do you think you will do in the future? (resettle here, return to your village, etc.)

35. If you had a choice, what would you like to do in the future?

36. What is your religion?_____

37. Ethnic group: If refugee is not a Vietnamese, inquire as to what tribe he belongs to:

38. What is your name?_____

_____

INFORMATION TO BE SUPPLIED BY INTERVIEWER:

a. Location of the interview: Ap_____

Xa_____

Quan_____

Tinh_____

b. Date: day_____month_____1966

c. Interviewer's comments on the refugee (estimate of intelligence, cooperativeness, honesty, etc.):

d. Interviewer's name:_____

QUESTIONNAIRE C1 - REFUGEE ATTITUDINAL SURVEY

We are interested in learning what life was like back in your old village before you left to become a refugee:

1. What was the name of your old hamlet? Ap_____
   Xa_____
   Quan_____

2. How many years had you lived there before becoming a refugee?_____years

3. What did most of the people do in your hamlet to earn a living?

4. Was your hamlet ever a "strategic hamlet"? When?

5. If "yes", was there a hamlet council (Ban Tri su ap) in your hamlet?
   _____yes
   _____no

   a. Did the villagers elect the hamlet council members, or were some or all appointed?

   b. What were the activities of the hamlet council? (describe)

   c. Did the members of the hamlet council stay in the village at night?

   d. When did the hamlet council become ineffective in fulfilling its function?

6. Was there a school in your village? _____yes
   _____no

   a. Did your children attend the school?

   b. Did you have to pay a tuition fee?

   c. Was there a teacher for the school? Was he assigned by the GVN?

7. Was there a medical aid clinic in your village? _____yes
   _____no

a. Was there a nurse?

b. Was the clinic open every day, and how many hours?

c. Were you charged for treatment?

8. Was there a combat youth group or PF organization in your hamlet? How many?

9. If "yes", when did the combat youth group or PF disband or become ineffective in providing security for your hamlet?

10. Was there a government military post in or near your hamlet?

11. Where did the GVN troops go at night? Did they go into the post or did they stay outside?

12. Did the government troops ever come to help villagers in farming, building community projects, to give medicine, repair roads, etc. ?

13. Did any government troops ever come to your hamlet and ask for food (chickens, pigs, etc.) and did they offer to pay for it?

14. Did the government post commander ask villagers to come to work as laborers on the post? Did they pay them if they worked?

15. If there was not a military post, did government troops ever come to give you protection? How long did the troops stay in your village?

16. What did the government troops do while staying in your village? (describe)

17. Did you pay any tax to the government? How much last year?

18. Were there any battles fought in your hamlet's area? When?

19. Were any villagers killed or wounded as a result of the fighting?

20. Where were you during the battle?

21. Do you know how the battle started? How long was the battle?

22. Were any houses destroyed in the battle?

23. Do you know who fought against the VC in the battle?

24. Who occupied the hamlet after the battle was finished?

25. Did the VC or the GVN officials ever come to help the villagers to rebuild their houses?

    a. How did they help?

    b. Did they provide any material?

26. Was your hamlet ever shelled by artillery? When?

27. Were any villagers killed or wounded by the shelling? Were any houses destroyed?

28. Was your hamlet ever bombed by aircraft? When?

29. Were any villagers killed or wounded by airplanes? Were any houses burned or destroyed?

30. Do you know why your hamlet was shelled or attacked by aircraft?

31. Did foreign troops ever come to your hamlet? _____yes
    _____no

    a. If "yes", which foreign troops?

    b. Did the foreign troops cause you any trouble, sufferings? (describe in detail)

c. Did they do anything to help you? (describe in detail)

d. Why do you think foreign troops are in Viet Nam?

e. What do you think of the foreign troops in Viet Nam?

32. When did the "quan cach mang giai phong" first come to your hamlet?
_____years
_____by day
_____by night

33. How long did they stay in your hamlet?

34. Where did they get their food during their stay? Where did they sleep?

35. Did they call your hamlet a "liberated area"?

36. Did they organize any armed groups in your hamlet? When?

37. What kind of forces were they? and how many?

	type	company	platoon	squad
a.	Dan quan tu ve (self-defense)	_____	_____	_____
b.	Du kich xa (local guerrilla)	_____	_____	_____

38. What did the Viet Cong forces do when they visited your hamlet? (did they hold meetings, entertainment, or propaganda sessions)

39. Did the Viet Cong forces (quan cach mang giai phong) who visited your hamle speak mostly northern or southern dialect?

40. Was there a "ban tu quan" (self-operating committee) established in your hamlet? _____yes
_____no

41. If "yes", when was the "ban tu quan" organized?

    a. Was the chairman a native of your hamlet?

    b. What were its activities in the hamlet?

    c. What did the people of your hamlet think of the "ban to quan"s work and policy?

42. Was your hamlet ever organized as a "combat hamlet" by the Viet Cong?

    a. When?

    b. How was your "combat hamlet" run? By whom?

43. Did the Viet Cong organize in your hamlet any: _____schools
    _____dispensaries
    _____cooperatives
    _____courts

    a. Who ran these organizations?

    b. Did these organizations help you _____yes
    _____no

    c. How did they help you?

44. Did the Viet Cong ever ask people of your hamlet to go to the city or town market to buy things for them?
    _____yes
    _____no

    a. If "yes", what kind of things did they ask you to buy?

    b. Did the Viet Cong give you money to buy these things?

45. Were you ever required by the Viet Cong to contribute labor? _____yes
    _____no

46. If "yes", describe the nature of the labor that the Viet Cong asked you to do:

    a. What kind of work did you do?

b. Did you go away from home to do this work?

c. Did you have to work at night or during the day?

d. How many hours a day did you work?

e. How often did you have to do this work? How long each time?

f. Did the Viet Cong give you food or did you have to take food with you?

g. What did you eat? If rice, what did you eat with rice?

h. Where did you sleep?

i. Did you ever hear any of the workers' opinion about this work? (describe)

47. Did you ever attend a Viet Cong "education or "propaganda" session"

_____yes
_____no

a. If "yes", where were these sessions held?

b. How often did you go to such sessions?

c. Did a Viet Cong agent come and ask you to go each time?

d. Who spoke at these sessions: village cadres or others?

e. What did the Viet Cong say at these sessions? Any instructions given to people of the hamlet to carry out later? (describe)

f. Did the Viet Cong ever investigate or check to see if you carried out their instructions? How?

g. Did the Viet Cong ever mention why foreign troops are in Viet Nam? What did they say?

h. Did many people from your hamlet attend these sessions? How many?

i. What did people of your hamlet think about these sessions?

48. Did the Viet Cong re-distribute land in your hamlet? _____yes
_____no

a. If "yes", when did the Viet Cong re-distribute land?

b. How did the land re-distribution effect you? _____I gained land
_____I lost land
_____It had no effect

49. What category did the Viet Cong assign you? _____co nong (landless laborer)
_____ban nong (share-cropper or poor peasant)
_____trung nong - kem hoac thuong (lower middle peasant)
_____trung nong - kha (upper middle peasant)
_____phu nong (rich peasant)
_____dia chu (landlord)

50. Did you ever pay any taxes to the Viet Cong? How much last year:_____
How much year before:_____

51. Did the Viet Cong ever ask you to contribute any money or other things?

52. What did they tell you of the purpose of this contribution?

53. Who collected these taxes, money or others? How often?

54. Do you know how the Viet Cong set the rate of tax you paid?

55. Were you ever promised that you would someday be re-paid the money taken? (Were you ever given the tin phieu bonds?)

56. Did any agent of the Viet Cong ever come to your hamlet to ask young men and women to join them?

a. How did they persuade or convince the young people to go? (describe)

b. How many joined last year?

57. Did the Viet Cong ever kill any people in your hamlet? _____yes
_____no

a. If "yes", when_____how many_____

b. Had these people been sentenced by a "people's court"? (toa an nhan dan)

c. What reasons did the Viet Cong give for killing them?

d. What did people in your village think about these killings?

58. Since becoming a refugee did anyone promise you aid? _____yes
_____no

a. Who promised you aid?

b. Have they fulfilled their promise?

59. Has the district chief ever visited you in this place? What did he do during his visit?

60. Has the Province Chief ever visited you in this place? What did he do during his visit?

INFORMATION TO BE SUPPLIED BY INTERVIEWER:

a. Place of interview: Ap_____Xa_____Quan_____

b. Date: day_____month_____1966

c. Situation of interview: _____done in private
_____done in public
_____in presence of interviewee's family only

d. Interviewer's evaluation:

e. Interviewer's name:_____

QUESTIONNAIRE D1 - NON-REFUGEE POPULATION SURVEY

1. Is this your native village? _____yes _____no

2. If this is not your native village, how many years have you lived here?
_____years

3. What was your native place?

   Ap _____

   Xa _____

   Quan_____

   Tinh_____

4. Around Tuy-Hoa there are mnay refugees who formally lived in this location. Why do you think that these refugees left this hamlet?

5. For what reasons did you stay here rather than becoming a refugee also?

6. Has your house ever been destroyed because of the war? _____yes
_____no

7. (If answer to above is yes): When? day_____month_____year_____
(check one): Lunar_____
Calendar_____

8. In what way was your house destroyed? (describe)

9. Did anyone encourage you to leave your home? (describe)

10. Did anyone discourage you from leaving your home? (describe)

11. What is the average daily income of your family?_____piastre

12. Do you own farm land? _____yes _____no

13. If "yes", how many mau? _____mau

14. Do you rent farm land? _____yes _____no

15. If "yes", how many mau? _____

16. (If person rents land), how much rent did you pay last year?

17. How many gia of paddy did you harvest 1st year? _____gia

18. How much tax did you pay last year? to the Government _____
to the Viet Cong _____

19. Do you own any major means of production? (buffalo, sampan, etc.)

20. What members of your family are living in the same household with you here now? (Ascertain sex, age, marital status, relationship to interviewee, literacy, and physical condition of each member)

relationship to interviewee	sex	age	marital status	literate	occupation	condition
1. Interviewee						
2.						
.						
.						
.						
15.						

*CODE: sex: M = male, F = Female
marital status: S = single, M = married, W = widowed
literate: 1 = literate, 2 = illiterate
physical condition: 1 = able-bodied, 2 = major physical defects

21. Are there any members of your household who are not here with you?

relationship to interviewee	sex	age	marital status	occupation	location
1.					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					

22. Have any members of your household been killed as a direct result of the war?

relationship to interviewee	sex	age	marital status	occupation	cause of death	year of death
1.						
2.						
3.						
4.						
5.						
6.						

INFORMATION TO BE SUPPLIED BY INTERVIEWER:

a. Location of the interview:
Ap _____
Xa _____
Quan _____
Tinh _____

b. Date: day_____month_____year_____

c. Interviewer's name:_____

QUESTIONNAIRE E1 - ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT

E-1. You have said your family now earns ____ piastres per day. On what items do you spend this income?

a. Food: (rice, fish, eggs, nuoc mam, beverages, etc.)

b. Housing: (rent, thatch, etc.)

c. Household goods: (fuel, clothing, etc.)

d. Other: (religious or ceremonial items, special equipment such as bicycles, farm equipment, radios, or raw materials for conical hats, etc.)

E-2. If you were to get a job which paid you 100 piastres per day more than your present daily income, how would you spend the extra money?

a. 100 piastres per day more:

b. Only 50 piastres per day more:

E-3. Have you noticed any changes in prices recently?

a. If "yes," have prices changed on any specific items (e.g., rice)?

b. What do you think is the cause of these changes in prices?

E-4. Would you and your family move to another province if you were offered a better job in that province?

Name of the interviewee: _____

APPENDIX D

Plan for "Return to Village Campaign"

This appendix presents a verbatim reproduction of the plan for the "Return to Village Campaign" distributed originially in mimeographed form by USAID, Tuy-Hoa. Special appendices on staffing of cadre teams, etc., have been deleted.

PROJECT STATEMENT

Subject: A Project Proposal, "Return to Village Campaign", Dealing With General Rehabilitation of Farmers and Refugees in the Rice-Producing Areas of Hieu-Xuong and Tuy-Hoa Districts.

I. RATIONALE

1. Background Information

Sometime during the middle part of January 1966 a Rice Harvest Protection Operation was jointly launched by ARVN and Allied Troops operating in Phu-Yen Province. The operation covered the rich rice delta areas under VC control within the districts of Tuy-Hoa and Hieu-Xuong and its main objective was to decrease VC capability to collect rice and, thereby, enable GVN to gather available harvestible rice to augment its own rice stock with which to support the pro-GVN civilian population of the province.

Just before the launching of this operation, reliable intelligence reports disclosed that the VC transported rice collected from Phu-Yen, through mountain trails, to other VC troops operating in the Western Central Highland provinces of Phu-Bon, Pleiku and Kontum. An earlier study on this matter revealed that the VC can easily gather 10,000 metric tons of milled rice, from the combined areas under their control, out of three cropping seasons in one year. Assuming that the average rice consumption of a full-grown person is 600 grams for one day, the 10,000 VC troops in Phu-Yen can only consume about 2,000 tons of rice in one year, thus, the VC in Phu-Yen can easily have 8,000 tons of rice in excess of their own needs. Incidentally, 8,000 tons of rice will be sufficient to feed 35,500 persons in one year.

The Rice Harvest Protection Operation covering the period from 24 January through 19 February realized some 30,200 metric tons of rice paddy gathered mostly in areas previously under VC control. It can be concluded, therefore, that the operation has had significant contribution to the improvement of the overall friendly position in this province.

2. The Problem

It was observed, however, that recent encounters between the VC and Allied Troops have incurred considerable losses and damages in properties. For instance, the District Chiefs of Tuy-Hoa and Hieu-Xuong advanced the information that a total of 7,807 families in 58 rice-producing hamlets have been rendered homeless. In addition, a substantial number of such public facilities as bridges, schools, dispensaries, markets, village halls, roads, etc., have been destroyed.

Moreover, it was also noted that a large number of farmers, who have lost their homes in the areas subjected to this operation, evacuated with their families to the secure areas within the vicinity of the district headquarters; and, unless something is done about motivating them to go back to their home villages, it is very likely that they will stay in as refugees for an indefinite period of time. Consequently, it is feared that a large tract of rice fields will be abandoned and the rice productive potential fo the province will be reduced considerably.

3. The Need

It seems rather obvious that the most logical course of action is to formulate and implement a plan which would motivate these farmers to return to their native villages and extend to them governmental support in the pursuance of their normal farming operations. The realization of one such plan will: (1) minimize problems arising from influx of refugees, (2) make significant contributions to the economic stability of the province, (3) pave the way to effective utilization of manpower resources, (4) stimulate coordination of activities among participating agencies in a combined operation, and, (5) develop favorable impression and desirable psychological impact upon the public at large.

II. PROCEDURE

1. Evolvement of the Plan

Key GVN officials and representatives from various U. S. agencies in the province were convened in a meeting at the Province Headquarters on the 18th of February 66. The deliberations revolved mainly on the farmer-refugees' current situation and the feasibility of resetting than back to their farms. After an exhaustive sharing of ideas on this subject, it was agreed that a combined operation, dubbed "Return to Village Campaign", will be launched immediately. Plans were simultaneously drawn to carry out the objectives of the campaign.

2. The Plan

The plan envisions to rehabilitate farmer-refugees by moving them from the areas where they have temporarily sought refuge back to their areas of origin. To undertake this activity, the Provincial Administration will utilize all its available personnel and material resources; and, in coordination with Allied Troops and U. S. agencies stationed in the province, a combined operation will be launched.

There will be three distinct phasing in the execution of programmed activities; each with specific target dates or schedules of completion.

The first phase will attempt to make an assessment of the depth and breadth of existing problems. Specifically, the following baseline information will be established: number of farmers who can be motivated to go back to their farms, number of houses and facilities which have been destroyed and the possible areas where this type of campaign might be feasibly undertaken; then, such requirements as funds, foodstuff, medicine, agricultural supplies and other commodities will also be determined. Under this phase, executive committees will be organized at province and district levels. These committees will be charged with the responsibility of setting up the necessary administrative machineries for purpose of carrying out the goals of the campaign.

The second phase includes preparatory activities before the farmer-refugees actually return to their home villages. Province and district officials will be engaged in an intensive propaganda campaign in order to motivate the farmers to return to their home. Additional cadres will be recruited and trained to support the operation. Security plans will also be drawn utilizing available ARVN and Allied Troops.

The third phase outlines the details of implementation. Farmer-refugees will be brought back to their villages under the guidance of GVN officials. Rural Construction Teams which include Armed Propaganda Cadres (PAT), census and Grievance Cadres, Civil Affairs Cadres and New Life Development Cadres will play a vital role in the rehabilitation of the farmer-refugees. Planned activities follows: (1) construction or repair of houses, (2) provide guidance in the establishment of defense systems, (3) identification and destruction of VC infra-structure, (4) repair or construction of public facilities, (5) establishment of local governments, (6) pursuance of self-help activities and (7) provide such assistance as food, medical supplies, construction materials, agricultural tools, agricultural loans and other commodities as they become available.

III. PRIORITIES

1. Proposed Operational Areas

Considering current resources on hand and the capabilities of the Provincial Administration, priorities have been set in the selection of operational areas. It was agreed that the areas nearer the district capitals of Tuy-Hoa and Hieu-Xuong will be assigned first priority and the areas situated farther will be assigned second priority. Thus, the villages of Hoa-Thank, Hoa-Tri and Hoa-Kien in Tuy-Hoa district and the villages of Hoa-Binh and Hoa-Tan in Hieu-Xuong district will be the first operational areas. After accomplishing the mission in these priority areas, the operation will move onward to cover the areas designated as second priority. These areas are the villages of Hoa-Dinh and Hoa-Quang in Tuy-Hoa district and the villages of Hoa-Phong and Hoa-Dong in Hieu-Xuong district.

IV. RESPONSIBILITIES

1. GVN

a. Sets up the administrative machinery to carry out objectives of the campaign.

b. Provides the necessary personnel

c. Provides funds or materials as made available through its own channel.

d. Evaluates status and progress of the campaign.

2. US AID

a. Provides construction materials as made available

b. Provides technical advice whenever available and as needs arise.

c. Assists in establishing priorities relative to distribution of US AID-supplied commodities.

d. Provides advisory guidance in the execution of programmed activities.

3. US EMBASSY

a. Assists in the recruitment and training of cadre

b. Provides cash and/or material assistance as made available.

c. Provides guidance in the establishment of defense system

d. Assists in civic action and psy-war activities.

4. MACV

a. Provides material and/or cash assistance as made available

b. Provides guidance on security affairs.

c. Provides technical advice whenever available and as needs arise.

RETURN TO VILLAGE CAMPAIGN

RECOGNITION OF THE SITUATION AND THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PLAN

Since the later part of 1964, there has been a substantial increase in the number of refugees who have moved in from the insecure areas to the district capital of Tuy-Hoa and Hieu-Xuong and immediate vicinities.

At present, there are 22,315 refugees in Tuy-Hoa District and 16,029 refugees in Hieu-Xuong District, thus making a total of 38,344 refugees in both districts.

Recently, the combined operation launched by ARVN and Allied troops has forced a large number of inhabitants to move into the secure areas of the two districts mentioned above. These people who were previously living in VC controls areas had to evacuate for security reasons. After harvest time, the quantity of rice brought in to our controlled areas up to 18-02-66 at Tuy-Hoa District was 1,524 tons and 996 Kgs and Hieu-Xuong District was 28,605 tons and 925 Kgs or a total of 30,130 tons and 921 Kgs. This is a big victory for us in winning the hearts of the people. It proves, once again, that the people disliked the VC. Furthermore, from the view point of finance and economics, we have executed effectively the food protection plan and thereby impaired the enemy's economic pursuit.

However, this has brought about the following problems:

1/ - Local authorities could not solve the over increasing refugee problems.

2/ - Decrease in the number of farmers who can cultivate the rice fields for the next planting season.

3/ - It would be difficult to implement the rural life programs.

To solve these difficult problems the Province has requested assistance from U. S. AID and the Allied Forces in organizing a campaign named "Return to Village Campaign".

This campaign aims to bring refugees back to their homes and former villages, provide them with adequate assistance so that they may be able to improve their standard of living.

CONTENT OF THE PLAN

The action plan for the "Return to Village Campaign" includes three phases:

- Assessment

- Preparation

- Execution

I. Assessment Phase

In this phase, the District administration of Tuy-Hoa and Hieu-Xuong assumes the responsiblity of conducting an estimate of essential data which would determine the plan necessary for the "Return to Village Campaign".

Result of estimation:

1/ - Tuy-Hoa District: See the appendices I, II, and III

2/ - Hieu-Xuong District: See appendices I, II and III.

It will be noted from the appendices herewith enclosed that after execution of the "Return to Village Campaign" at the 1st priority villages, the number of refugees remain as follows:

Tuy-Hoa District	:	9,845	(
			(20,590 people
Hieu-Xuong District	:	10,745	(

Upon completion of the 2nd priority villages the number of refugees follows:

Tuy-Hoa District	:	6,751	(
			(7,300 people
Hieu-Xuong District	:	549	(

On the other, after the "Return to Village Campaign" is carried out at the 1st priority areas, we will get 10,948 Tons of paddy in the next harvest. If carried out in both areas, we will get 14,852 Tons.

To support this Campaign, technical Officers in the Province have to estimate essential data pertaining to each field of responsibility. The essential requirements of support includes:

a/. Foodstuffs.

Based on family rationing system, we will provide 13 kgs of rice and 90 grams of salt for each family per month. The tabulated information hereunder will show an estimate of our rice and salt needs.

Priority	District	No of Evacuees		Rice		Salt	
		No of fam	No of pers	3 months	6 months	3 months	6 months
I	Tuy-Hoa	2,244	12,470	486T330	972T660	606kgs	1,212kgs
	Hieu-Xuong	823	5,284	206T076	212T152	223kgs	446kgs
	Total	3,067	17,754	692T406	1,184T812	829kgs	1,658kgs
	Tuy-Hoa	1,638	6,751	263T289	526T578	443kgs	886kgs
	Hieu-Xuong	2,606	10,196	397T644	795T288	704kgs	1,408kgs
	Total	4,245	16,947	660T933	1,321T866	1,147kgs	2,294kgs
GRAND TOTAL		7,312	34,701	1,353T339	2,506T678	1,975kgs	3,952kgs

b/. Health.

The Health Development Service will organize mobile medical teams equipped with first aid kits, to go along with combined cadre teams in bringing the people back to the vaillages. At least, one first aid kit should be provided to each hamlet to take care of the health needs of the population. U.S. AID, MED-CAP Team and Allied Troops will also provide assistance as the needs arise.

c/. Materials for Farmers.

* Tools: Provided by U.S. AID
* Animals: The Animal Husbandry Service will study and prepare an estimate of needed funds.
* Seeds, fertilizer, insecticide: The Agriculture Service will study and prepare an estimate of needed funds.
* Agricultural loans: The NACO will study and ask the Farmer Association's opinion on the feasibility of securing loans.
* Repair immediately the irrigation systems to insure adequate supply of water during the next rice planting season.

d/. Construction or repair of facilities in order to raise the standard of living of the populace.

* Roads and bridges: Public Works Service will prepare estimates of repair/construction requirements of needed facilities in pacified areas.

II. PREPARATION PHASE

This activity will commence on February 21st, 1966 and terminate on March 10th, 1966 or for a period of 18 days.

1/-ORGANIZATION OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES AT PROVINCE AND DISTRICT LEVELS.

a). Executive Committee at Province:

- Lt Col, Province Chief . . . . . Chairman
- Capt, Deputy Province Chief for Internal Security and Deputy Sector Commander . . . . . Vice Chairman
- Deputy Province Chief for Administration . . . . . Vice Chairman
- Chairman, Provincial Council Rep . . . . . Vice Chairman
- Section Chief of Routine Business of Rural Construction Council . . . . . Secretary
- Service Chiefs . . . . . Members

b). Executive Committee at District:

- District Chief . . . . . Chairman
- 2 Members of Provincial Committee Council . . . . . Vice Chairman
- District Administrative personnel . . . . . Secretary
- Officer who represent for Sub-Sector . . . . . Member
- Rolling village and hamlet Representative . . . . . Member
- Concerned Sub-Office Representative . . . . . Member

2/-RECRUIT AND TRAIN CADRES FOR A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME.

a). Recruit enough village and hamlet cadres for areas which lack cadres. Mobilize persons who have capability, moral integrity and good will to assume the responsibility. Train them in a short period of time about the political and administrative aspects of community life.

The District administration should consult the Provincial Council in charge of this activity.

b). Organization of cadre teams.

* Propaganda teams: Psy-War cadre at Province and District levels will play the major role in this activity. This team must be organized early enough to become functional during the launching of propaganda campaigns.

* Refugee Voluntary Workers Team: Selecting the young men and young ladies who have sufficient prestige and good will among the refugee. This team will assist the combined cadre team on matters pertaining to planting of cash crops for refugees. At least, two teams for each village are needed.

* Combined cadre team: This team includes the following divisions: Psy-War and Information Office, National Police, Rural Construction, Civil affairs and Technicians. Each team will have from 7 - 10 members cadres and one team for each pacified village at least.

3/-INITIATE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN.

This activity will be undertaken simultaneously with the recruitment and organization of cadre teams. The purpose of propaganda campaign is to explain to evacuees, in particular, and the population, in general that friendly troops will protect them upon returning to their former homes. Local authorities will help them re-establish a normal life and assist them in raising their living standard. Besides the assistance available from the Provincial Council, JUSPAO, Provincial Psy-War and Information Committee and the Psy-War and Information Office will play major roles in this activity. We can avail ourselves of such communication media as radio broadcasts, demonstrations, conversation, slogan and leaflets in the preparatory phase of the campaign.

4/-ACTION PLAN AND COMBINED OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES.

Administrative Committee at Province level will draw a general plan for each district compatible with the number of cadres and available resources. Administrative Committee at District level will provide details for the plan by setting up the scope of activity for each cadre team.

5/-SET TARGET DATES OF SCHEDULED ACTIVITY.

Administrative Committee at Province level will set target dates of completion for each phase of the operation.

Administrative Committee at District level will in turn set target dates of completion for their respective village and hamlet cadres.

6/-DIVISION OF JOB RESPONSIBILITIES AMONG SUPPORTING WORK GROUPS.

Set target areas and duration of operation for PF platoons and PATs. This will be the function of administrative Committees at District level.

7/-MAKE MATERIALS AND FUNDS AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THE CAMPAIGN.

Materials and funds will be provided by the Central Government Ministries, Technical Offices of Foreign agencies. Materials must be made available in order that we can use it as soon as the campaign starts.

The activities listed in the preparation phase must be completed before March 10th, 1966.

III. EXECUTION PHASE

- This phase will commence upon completion of the 2nd phase of the campaign.
- It includes three sub phases as follows:

A - 1st phase. Schedules for 45 days covering the period from March 11th, 1966 through April 25th, 1966.

- PLANNED ACTIVITIES.

* Guide the farmer-refugees back to their home villages.

* Repair or construct their dwellings.

* Screen the population for purposes of identifying and destroying the VC infra-structure.

* Prepare family booklets for effective population control measures.

* Construct or repair of such public facilities as roads, bridges, schools, markets, dispensaries and others.

* Repair of irrigation system to insure adequate supply of water for rice fields.

Services in charge: District Administrative * Cadre Teams * Health Service * Public Works * Irrigation * Rural Construction.

B - 2nd Phase. Commencing May 1st, 1966 (Farmers will prepare the land for rice planting on April 21st, 1966).

- PLANNED ACTIVITIES.

* Prepare lands for the next rice planting season. Provide seeds, fertilizer, tools and technical assistance to farmers.

* Provide agricultural loans to farmers.

* Keep on identifying and destroying the VC infra-structure.

* Organize hamlet defense system through the youth groups who will get the guidance from PF and PAT.

* Encourage qualified inhabitants to join PF and Combat Youth Forces.

* Construct roads, bridges and irrigation Projects.

Service in charge: Cadre Teams * Agriculture Service * Animal Husbandry Service * Public Works * Irrigation * NACO * Farmer Association * PF * PAT * National Police * Rural Construction.

Period of time:

C - 3rd Phase. Will commence immediately after completion of 2nd phase.

- PLANNED ACTIVITIES.

* Complete construction/repair of farmers' houses.

* Completion of Administrative structures.

* Implement GVN democratic policies.

* Continue implementation of program initiated by technical Services (Roads, bridges, irrigation and so on . . .)

* Continue the follow through on VC infra-structure to cause its total destruction.

* Training of local inhabitants to reinforce the defense system with a view to replace PAT and PF troops who will be assigned to other priority areas.

* Provisions for reinforcement of established defense system (activity started at the 2nd phase)

* Completion of other socio-economic development programs: Health, Education and Self-Help Projects.

* Follow through on the proper culture of agricultural crops.

The role of hamlet cadres in this phase is very significant after completion of 2nd phase, they will assigned to other priority areas. Operation in villages within the 2nd priority area may possibly commence simultaneously with operation in villages classified under 1st priority, if means of support were made available; Otherwise, activities will start upon completion of work in the first priority area.

* Dikes and drains: The Irrigation Office will request funds in the amount of 10, 800, 000 which they plan to request for the irrigation programs in 1966 in order to carry out this activities.

* Schools: The Education Service will use its funds for repair of the damaged schools (840, 000$00) and will also request additional support from the Central GVN Agency concerned.

* Such other facilities as dispensaries, markets, wells and Health stations... will be estimated by the Province and request funds under the item of Self-Help project. Number of Self-Help projects will be equivalent to the number of hamlets in the pacified areas which belong to the first priority area of the "Return to Village Campaign",

After completion of estimates by technical Service agencies concerned, the Province will summarize in a general plan all requests for funds and submit to CTZ and DTA and Central for approval, and meanwhile, to support agencies: U.S. AID and Allied Troops...

The estimation phase must be completed before 20/2/66

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Based on interview data collected in mid-1966 in Phu-Yen Province, Viet-Nam, this report describes who become refugees, why they want to relocate, and when and how they move; examines some of the problems involved in refugee relief and resettlement for the refugees, their host communities, and the Government of South Viet-Nam; and proposes and sets forth some implications of the refugee situation for the pacification effort.

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